891.51A/7–945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Murray )

379. Urtel 473 July 9.27 We have given careful consideration to your suggestion of bringing in from abroad some disinterested and [Page 554] highly qualified man such as Landis29 to survey the Mission and to make suggestions for its reorganization. We are inclined to believe however that in view of what has occurred during the last 2 years it would be impossible to erect an effective advisory structure on what remains of this Mission.

It seems to us that for the last year at least the Mission has drifted aimlessly and futilely. The basic factor which has militated against its success has been the failure of the Iranian Government to implement its repeated assurances (Deptel 65, February 10, 1945 and urtels 37, Jan. 19; 50, Jan. 24; 102, Feb. 16 [15]) that the Mission would be accorded full cooperation and support. We are inclined to agree with the statements made by prominent Iranians that so long as Iran is occupied by foreign troops and so long as the representatives of great powers interfere in Iranian internal affairs, it will not be possible for a strong central government to exist in Iran. No weak government would have the character or the courage in the face of certain opposition to give unqualified support to the Mission. However, we feel that even with the full support and cooperation of the Iranian Government the Mission would not be able in the future to function effectively in view of the irreparable damage which has already been done to its prestige. The fact should also not be overlooked that certain members of the Mission, by their pettiness, incapacity, and sometimes even by their misbehavior, have contributed to the discrediting of the Mission.

We feel that the time has come to inform the Iranian Government that in our opinion the Mission will not be able in the future to be of effective assistance to Iran and to suggest that the Iranian Government take steps at once to bring about its complete withdrawal. In making such an approach it may be pointed out it is our belief that the presence of the Mission in Iran under prevailing circumstances would be prejudicial rather than beneficial to American-Iranian relations, and should be made clear that the dissolution of the Mission would in no way diminish this Government’s interest in Iran’s welfare or its desire to contribute thereto within the means at its disposal, nor would it affect Dept’s attitude towards any future requests by Iranian Government for American aid or advice. It might be added that we hope that the Iranian Government will accord all possible support to the Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions30 since the American Government would deeply regret the necessity of suggesting that they also be withdrawn.

We would appreciate a frank statement of your views. We do not contemplate taking action in this regard until after the return of [Page 555] American Delegation to Potsdam31 since developments may have taken place there which would influence our final decision.

Grew
  1. Not printed.
  2. James M. Landis, Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East until his resignation, effective January 23, 1945.
  3. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the continuation of these missions, see pp. 526 ff.
  4. The reference is to the Tripartite Conference of Berlin which was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945.