891.51A/2–345: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)
65. Dept agrees that it is advisable to make clear its attitude with regard to the position of our civilian advisers in Iran in the light of recent developments and to seek clarification of Iranian Government’s intentions. First alternative given in urtel 70, February 3 is [Page 549] inconsistent with our policy of providing assistance only upon request and would be interpreted as an attempt to force a program upon Iran. Your second alternative is contrary to the controlling reasons for American participation in the advisory program. We should neither attempt to force a course of action upon the Iranian Government nor precipitate the withdrawal of Iran’s request for advisory assistance. Our objective should be twofold: (1) to demonstrate to the Iranian Government the economic and political desirability of a continuance of an advisory program; and (2) to obtain a clarification of Iranian purposes and specific guarantees of their fulfillment.
In view of your impression that Millspaugh is awaiting statement of Department’s attitude (urtel 73, February 6), and in reply to Millspaugh’s message contained in urtel 79, February 8, you are instructed to inform him substantially as follows:
Begin message to Millspaugh. Dept recognizes the magnitude of the task which he undertook as Administrator-General of the Finances of Iran and appreciates his considerable efforts in this connection. We regret the recurring difficulties which have arisen between him and his staff on the one hand and between him and the Iranian Government on the other. His demonstrated inability to concert his efforts with those of his associates and to maintain good relations with the Iranian Government makes it impracticable for Dept to support him in his current controversy, particularly in view of our belief that the instant difficulty is an internal matter which is within the exclusive competence of the Iranian Government to resolve. Since the Prime Minister has refused to accept the conditions under which Millspaugh would agree to retain his position, as stated to the Council of Ministers on January 27, it is assumed that Millspaugh is prepared to resign. End of message to Millspaugh.
In pursuance of the objectives indicated above, you are instructed to inform the Foreign Minister substantially as follows: Dept views with concern the recent deterioration of conditions under which the work of the American financial advisers to the Iranian Government is carried on and the consequent anomalous situation. Dept does not question the considerations which led the Prime Minister to refuse the conditions proposed by Dr. Millspaugh to the Council of Ministers on January 27, and believes that the points in dispute are internal matters within the competence of the Iranian Government to resolve. At the same time, Dept observes a regrettable lack of clarity in the policy presently being pursued by the Iranian Government with regard to the financial and economic advisory program as a whole. It is especially unfortunate that certain general assurances given Ambassador Morris with regard to the continuance of the adviser program and certain specific assurances given Dr. Black [Page 550] and other advisers have not been implemented with specific action by the Iranian Government. Conditions have become so confused and program so uncertain as to have caused the resignation of a number of the advisers and the threat of resignation by others. It is hoped that the Iranian Government will take immediate action, in case it sincerely desires to retain an American advisory program, to clarify the status of the various advisers and to give them and this Government assurances that conditions will be created which will permit their continuance on a basis which will give hope of success.
In formulating its policy with regard to the advisers, the Iranian Government will be aware that this Government is actuated solely by desire to be of assistance to Iran in fulfillment of the pledges given at the time of the Tehran Conference23 and in keeping with the unbroken traditional friendship existing between our two countries.24
- For text of Declaration Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413; for documentation regarding efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see ibid., 1944, vol. v, pp. 306 ff.↩
- In telegram 101, February 15, 1945, 2 p.m., the Ambassador in Iran stated: “In accordance with the Department’s wishes I delivered to Dr. Millspaugh a letter containing the Department’s comments to him as contained in its No. 65 of February 10. I have received no acknowledgment and no reaction from Millspaugh to this letter.” The Ambassador also reported that the Iranian Government had offered a settlement to Dr. Millspaugh which “is reasonable and in substantial accord with the settlement requested by Dr. Millspaugh. In fact, it is somewhat more generous than that. I am also satisfied that this settlement is in keeping with my frequently reiterated request that if the government decided to dispense with Millspaugh’s services that he be treated personally on an equitable basis.” (891.51 A/2–1545) There is no indication in the Department files of the exact date of Dr. Millspaugh’s resignation. In his Americans in Persia, Dr. Millspaugh states his resignation took effect on February 15, 1945 (pp. 151–152). In telegram 132, February 28, 1945, 4 p.m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that Dr. Millspaugh left Tehran “this morning”. (891.51A/2–2845)↩