761.91/12–2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State

4311. For Ambassador46 from Jernegan.47 Following summary of Moscow conversation on Iran is being telegraphed in view of possibility bad weather may delay my return:

Begin summary. At first meeting December 16 FonMins agreed remove Iran from formal agenda but also agreed it could be discussed informally.48

[Page 518]

On December 18 Bevin spoke to Molotov re deep sympathy and interest felt by Brit public with respect to Iran. Asked for frank and friendly exchange of views on difficulties which has arisen that country. Molotov replied that Russians were not intervening in Azerbaijan affair which he termed National Democratic move directed neither against Iran Govt nor Sovt Union. Said it was purely internal matter. As to withdrawal of foreign troops, Molotov said that question had been discussed at Potsdam and London and agreement reached. He saw no reason to revive subject.

Both Byrnes and Bevin raised question with Stalin December 19 (see Embtel 187, December 13 [23]50)

On December 13 [23] Byrnes again spoke to Stalin saying he feared dispute would be raised at January meeting of UNO and hoped measures could be taken to avoid this. Secretary stressed that American concern arose out of Tehran Declaration of 1943 and said in view of appreciation expressed in that document for Iranian aid to war effort it would be hard to assert that Iran was hostile to Soviets. Remarked that American press had written much about presence foreign troops in Iran and American Govt had decided to eliminate any grounds for suspicion by removing last American troops. Stalin replied Sov Union was not afraid of having Iran question raised at UNO meeting and no one need blush if it should come up. Pledges given in Tehran Declaration still held good and would be observed by Sov Govt. However, expression of appreciation had been made to previous Iran Govt whereas present Govt had become hostile to Russia and was seeking people to act against USSR. What was needed was for Iran Govt to live up to obligations and reverse policy of hostility. Sovs had never asked US to remove troops from Iran and had no objection to their remaining or withdrawing, whichever we preferred.51

After consulting Byrnes and accepting his suggested changes, Bevin on December 24 submitted to informal meeting of three FonMins draft agreement for creation of Anglo-American-Soviet Commission52 to advise and assist Iran Govt in reestablishing satisfactory relations with provinces through establishment of provincial councils as provided in Iranian Constitution. Commission would also make recommendations to Iran Govt on use of minority languages such as Kurdish, Turki and Arabic and would supervise first provincial council elections. It would investigate question of troop withdrawal and make [Page 519] recommendations to three participating Govts for acceleration of withdrawal. (Purpose of Brit in presenting this was to enlist Sov cooperation in reducing scope of Azerbaijan autonomy and bringing province back under de facto authority of Iran Govt. Section on troop withdrawal was suggested by Byrnes to give recognition to Iranian complaints and avoid appearance of considering only matters of internal Iranian administration. Proposal was made as a last resort in face of unyielding attitude of Stalin and Molotov toward previous American and Brit representations.)

Evening of December 24 Stalin told Bevin he thought agreement might be reached on basis of his draft and following day Russians presented certain minor amendments which were discussed at length by three FonMins. On December 26 Bevin offered to accept all Sov amendments if this were necessary to reach agreement but Molotov displayed complete change attitude and refused continue discussion.53 Despite repeated attempts by Bevin to reopen question, Molotov persisted in negative position. His general line of argument was that there had been sufficient discussion of Iranian question, that Sov Govt had made its position clear and that there was no need to take any decision, especially since Iran was not on formal agenda. He also asserted to Bevin that commission could not be formed without Iranian consent (Brit had already proposed that Iranian approval be sought), but that Sov Govt could not consider dealing with present hostile Iran Govt on such a question. End summary.54

Bevin has instructed Amb Bullard to inform Iranian PriMin of general course of conversations especially Brit proposal to form commission and to urge Hakimi to express his willingness to accept such a scheme. If Iran Govt adopts suggestion, Bevin says he will lend support by press and other means. Byrnes agreed with Bevin he would instruct American representative Tehran also to inform Iran Govt in general way of conversations and proposal and you may expect appropriate instructions from Washington in next few days.55 [Jernegan.]

[
Harriman
]
  1. In Iran.
  2. John D. Jernegan, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul at Tehran, detailed to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.
  3. See the United States delegation minutes of the first formal session of the Conference, December 16, vol. ii, p. 610.
  4. Same as telegram 4262 from Moscow, p. 510.
  5. See the United States delegation memorandum for the record of the Byrnes–Stalin conversation, December 23, vol. ii, p. 750.
  6. In telegram 1071, December 5, 1945, the Ambassador in Iran quoted a British Embassy news bulletin that the highest Iranian authorities were considering a request that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union send a commission to investigate the situation in Azerbaijan (891.00/12–545). The Ambassador reported further in telegram 1110, December 11, 1945, 9 a.m., that the Iranian Cabinet had taken no action on the matter and that the Prime Minister was still hopeful of resolving the impasse with the Soviet Union by direct negotiation (891.00/12–1145). For the text of Mr. Bevin’s draft agreement, see enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, December 24, 1945, 3:15 p.m., vol. ii, p. 771.
  7. See the United Kingdom delegation record of the Stalin–Bevin meeting of December 24 and of the Bevin–Molotov meeting of December 26, vol. ii, pp. 774 and 811, respectively.
  8. In telegram 4306, December 28, 1945, 6 p.m., Moscow transmitted text of a letter dated the previous day sent to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bevin in which he expressed his great disappointment that the Moscow meeting had been unable to come to final agreement regarding Iran (891.00/12–2845).
  9. Accounts by the Secretary of State of conversations on Iranian matters at the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers are given in his Speaking Frankly (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 118–122; his All in One Lifetime (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 332–334, 337–338, 343; and in a radio report to the nation on December 30, Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, pp. 1033, 1047. For President Truman’s view of the discussion at Moscow of Iranian matters, see his Memoirs, vol. i (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 549–552.