891.00/12–1145
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Iran—Suggested Approach During the Moscow Discussions
The United States is in a better position than either Great Britain or the Soviet Union to take the lead in the discussions concerning Iran because we are freer from suspicion of having selfish interests in that country than either of the other two Powers and because the American case is based on an important principle of international conduct.
You may wish to point out to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin that we view the present situation in Iran as of importance not merely as [Page 489] regards Iran, but more significantly as a test of the ability of the permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate with each other on a basis of respect for the sovereignty of smaller members of the United Nations.
We should emphasize, at the outset, that we are not concerned with the maintenance of any particular social or economic system in Iran. Our view that the Iranian Government should be permitted to move its troops freely throughout the country is based squarely on our understanding of the meaning of the word “sovereignty”. Those who respect the sovereignty of a nation must permit the armed forces of that nation to move freely throughout its own territory.
As regards foreign troops in Iran, the American Government sees no adequate justification for their continued presence there. We believe earnestly that it would be most helpful, in removing the suspicion of small countries everywhere regarding the motives of the Great Powers, for all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Iran promptly. Nothing would build up confidence in the Great Powers more quickly than such action, inconvenient though it may be to us.
It has been suggested that one of the motives for Soviet interests in northern Iran is to obtain oil concessions there. Whether this is true or not, we readily recognize the legitimate desire of Soviet Russia to obtain oil concessions outside its territory. Northern Iran is a logical area for the development of petroleum for exportation to the Soviet Union. Neither the American Government nor American commercial firms, as far as we are aware, have any interest in obtaining petroleum concessions in the northern part of Iran. If the Soviet authorities desire to enter into friendly negotiations with the Iranian Government for an oil concession, the American Government would view the discussions with all good will. However, an important attribute of sovereignty is the right of a government to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory, in terms which it finds satisfactory. Either direct or indirect pressure to obtain a concession is an infringement of sovereignty. A repetition of the events of last year, when a Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs demanded the ousting of an Iranian Prime Minister who refused such a concession to the U.S.S.R., would be most unfortunate.
It would be helpful if an agreed policy by the Three Powers toward Iran along the following lines might be reached at Moscow:
(1) The three Foreign Ministers are agreed that the presence of foreign troops in Iran is no longer required, and these troops will be withdrawn as rapidly as transportation conditions permit; (2) the Foreign Ministers concur that the Iranian Government is entitled, as a sovereign government, to move its armed forces throughout its territory without hindrance; and (3) they concur that the Government [Page 490] of Iran, as an attribute of its sovereignty, is entirely free to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory, on terms agreeable to that Government, and without external pressure.