891.00/12–645: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 9—9:33 a.m.]
1082. Following are my thoughts on Molotov note of November 29 in reply to American note of November 24:
- 1.
- To say that events Azerbaijan do not constitute armed uprising directed against Central Government is obviously false. Armed bands have disarmed police, gendarmes and soldiers of Central Government, taken over effective control of towns and means of communication, and refuse permit passage government officials on government business. Declaration issued November 23 by “National Congress, Azerbaijan”, itself states unless its demands are met it will oppose Central Government by force.
- 2.
- Soviet assumption that “Popular Assembly” is authorized to speak for population Azerbaijan is untenable. In its own declaration “National Congress” claims only 150,000 supporters. It is extremely improbable that it has one-tenth that many genuine adherents who are aware what they are doing but even if we accepted the claimed figure it would still be far from representative majority of a province which Democratic Party itself asserts to have population of 4 million. It is absurd to suppose that in country like Iran a party created only 3 months ago could already have become true designated organ of 4 million people.
- 3.
- A movement which openly defies constitutional Central Government of Iran can hardly base itself on constitution. Although it is true constitution provides for provincial councils, it also specifically [Page 481] provides that these are to be established in accordance with a special law of national Majlis and that they must act within limits of national legislation. Law governing election and operation of provincial councils was passed 1907–1908 session of Majlis and lays down detailed rules for elections of members, duties, etc. Clearly says councils to have no legislative authority and “have no right to to debate political questions” empowers Shah to dismiss councils with approval of Minister Interior. Apart from fact any elections to be legal must be ordered by Shah and conducted under direction Central Government, it is clear from foregoing that “National Congress” is by no means acting accordance constitution or Majlis law. Declaration of November 23 obviously envisages far wider sphere of local self government than was contemplated in constitution or supplementary legislation. Among other points attention is called to repeated use of word “nationalist” rather than “provincial” and assertion that Azerbaijan is a “nation”.
- 4.
- It may not be “unusual” for “Democratic states” to seek self government, but it is equally not unusual for a government to desire to prevent forcible removal of part of its territory from its jurisdiction. “Democratic states” such as US have had occasion to put down secession by force of arms.
- 5.
- Although it is possible some of disturbances may have been provoked by landlords or government officials, all reports reaching us indicate that in most cases “Democrats” have been aggressors. In any case it is not the armed conflicts (which have been relatively minor) that are important. Essential fact is that authority of central government has been and continues to be denied.
- 6.
- In one breath Soviet note asserts Iranian forces already in Azerbaijan could maintain order while in next breath it says introduction of additional forces would create trouble and endanger Soviet security. I fail to see how these two statements can be sustained except by assuming that additional forces would attempt to do their duty in reasserting authority of government and so come into conflict with rebels, whereas present units are unable venture forth from their stations. In any case, by Molotov’s own statement, Iranian troops in area plus column halted Qazvin cannot number more than 6,500 while Soviet forces Azerbaijan are vastly more numerous. (Our best estimate is one corps of 3 divisions about 30,000 men.) Iranian troops poorly armed and equipped by comparison with Russians and are scattered in detachments around province.
- It is inconceivable that handful of Iranian troops or few thousand undisciplined civilians could constitute any threat to such a Soviet force even if we assume rebels would oppose real resistance to government troops. (It is likewise inconceivable that Iran Government [Page 482] would expect Iranian force of the small size involved to put down uprising if it really represented popular mass movement.) Furthermore, it must be as obvious to Soviets as it is to us that neither Iranian troops nor “Democrats” would have slightest thought of attacking Soviet forces.
- 7.
- If Soviets sincerely wish to avoid sending more troops into Iran easiest solution would be to withdraw troops now here.
- 8.
- Soviet refusal to permit free movement Iranian forces is clear infringement on Iranian sovereignty and, therefore, does raise question of observance of principles of Tehran Declaration. While such infringements may have had some justification during war under terms Tripartite Treaty (although this is doubtful), they cannot be justified on moral or military grounds at present.
- 9.
- Tripartite Treaty permits but does not require that Allied troops remain in Iran until expiration of treaty. I am at loss to see what useful purpose Soviets could assert to be served by continuance their forces here.
- 10.
- Iran-Soviet treaty of 1921 permits entry Soviet troops only when there is armed intervention by third powers in Iran or when there is danger that Iran will be made base of operations against Russia. Does Soviet Government contend it is endangered by third powers operating in Iran?
I suggest Department consider releasing discreetly information paragraph 6 above regarding comparative size Soviet and Iran forces Azerbaijan in order avoid giving public impression there is any substance in Russian statement despatch of additional Iranian troops might endanger security Soviet forces. Department might also let it be known total Soviet combat forces in all Northern Iran estimated at 75,000 as compared with about 5,000 British and less than 6,000 noncombat Americans in southwestern Iran. Public attention should be directed to question of why such large Soviet force is still needed in Iran and in fact why any force is needed at all since Russians have no installations here to dispose of and are so close to their own country. This might be contrasted with fact few American troops still here are merely trying salvage something for American taxpayers out of huge sums spent on equipment and installations in Iran in connection aid to Russia.
Public might also be reminded that Iran’s [Trans-] Iranian Railroad was taken over by Allies during war solely for purpose of sending supplies to Russia but that whereas British and Americans turned back section south of Tehran to Iranians on July 1, Russians have insisted on continuing their military control and operation of northern section. Point to be emphasized is that neither British nor ourselves have considered it necessary to retain control of railroad even though our troops must still rely on it for supplies and for transportation [Page 483] in connection with withdrawal. Russians, therefore, cannot properly claim they must keep control in order to supply or evacuate their forces.
Sent Department as 1082; repeated Moscow 318.