891.00/12–545: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:29 p.m.]
12741. In discussing Iranian situation with us today Baxter, head of Eastern Dept of Foreign Office, said British Govt regretted that Russians had not taken advantage of opening afforded by British note to take position that local Soviet authorities in northern Iran had gone beyond instructions and that there would be no further intervention. However, British note, together with that sent by American Govt, should serve at least to put Russians on notice that their actions are being followed with real concern and it is possible that they may be more cautious in future.
Question now arises regarding what next step should be and British haven’t yet made up minds, except to extent of deciding to keep light of publicity focused on matter and in this latter connection Baxter again suggested that sending a first rate American correspondent to report facts of case on spot might be useful.
Regarding current thinking in Foreign Office, Baxter said attitude might be taken that any further “returning to the charge” would be unavailing and that only thing to do is to accept prospect of continued Russian occupation until March in hope that Iranians will then be able to settle matter by direct negotiation with dissident elements in Azerbaijan. Foreign Office has been casting about however for some means of maintaining diplomatic pressure on Russians and a plan was only yesterday submitted to the Foreign Secretary suggesting a renewed approach to the Russians on the basis of the passage in Molotov’s letter to Bevin of September 20, 1945, in which observation had been made that if necessary plans for final withdrawal might be discussed between British and Russians toward end of occupation period. Baxter observed that actually less than 3 months remain before agreed evacuation date (as British at least understand it and as they assume the Russians agree, although latter still “skate around” specific commitment on exact date) and that in view of complexities involved in making necessary departure arrangements it could hardly be claimed that the British were forcing pace unduly by suggesting early discussions.
Baxter said that another thought in this regard had been to refer matter to UNO94 or in advance of its being set up to the Big Five in accordance with Article 106 of UNO Charter95 but after consideration [Page 479] it had been decided that action under this provision would hardly seem to be appropriate at the present stage.
Regarding our proposal for withdrawal by January 1, Baxter said it was hardly surprising that the Russians had failed to agree in view of fact that a similar British offer for withdrawal by mid-December had been made in September and turned down by Russians. As far as British are concerned, Foreign Office had favored accepting our proposal in event Russians agreed, but had also found it necessary to consult British military who had observed that, aside from inconvenience, proposal would involve abandoning material with consequent financial loss and this in turn necessitated Treasury approval. While these factors were under consideration British had learned of Russian reply and told British military unnecessary to proceed further. As matter now stands British reply to our proposal has been drafted and awaits imminent signature.
Sent Dept as 12741; repeated Tehran as 37.