891.00/9–2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

768. Despite final abolition foreign censorship and evacuation of Tehran by Soviet forces with British evacuation in progress this Embassy regards situation in Iran with grave concern.

[Page 418]

Internal political, economic and social conditions are deplorable and present ruling class shows little evidence of either will or ability to improve them. Danger however lies in temptation, opportunity and excuse this offers for intervention by British and Russians.

Both powers are undoubtedly guilty of such intervention at present but I believe British objectives are purely defensive to prevent further Soviet penetration to the south and that British sincerely desire independence and stability of Iran as being in their own interests. They show every evidence of wishing to expedite evacuation of country and of willingness to relinquish special rights acquired during war. Their activity in my opinion is not to be feared except as counter measure to Soviet moves.

Soviet attitude therefore is crux of matter. Based on accumulated external evidence I have come to following conclusions this regard:

1.
Ultimate Russian objectives may include access to Persian Gulf and penetration into other regions of Near East but present aims are probably limited to maintenance of buffer zone in Iran as protection against attack from south. To accomplish this they are determined to have predominant influence in northern provinces at least.
2.
Since Anglo-Russian entry into Iran 1941, presence their troops in northern Iran has assured Soviets of dominant position that area which they have utilized fully. They are probably now seeking means to perpetuate that state of affairs after final withdrawal of forces which should occur by March 1946.
3.
Various alternative means suggest themselves and I assume Soviet policy is sufficiently flexible and opportunistic to use whichever seems most promising at any given moment. Recent events in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces seem to indicate that promotion of regional consciousness and dissatisfaction with central Govt leading to separatism and eventual incorporation in ranks of Soviet Republics is one of tactics being employed. However, I suspect this is merely second string to bow and think it likely their principal aim at present is establishment in power in Tehran of so-called “popular” govt like Groza regime in Rumania which would be led by men under Soviet influence amenable to Russian demands and hostile to other foreign nations (general trend of Soviet propaganda endeavoring to discredit Iranian ruling class as “reactionary” and “fascist” and exaggerating strength and popular character of leftist elements indicates Soviets may be paving way for coup d’etat which they would support and defend against outside criticism on grounds it represented will of people. Known corruption and inefficiency of Iranian Cabinets and Majlis would make contention the more plausible.

In addition to being clear and unjustifiable interference in Iranian affairs, such development would be most serious in its effect on Anglo-Russian [Page 419] relations which are already badly strained in this country. British would undoubtedly react violently to threat it would constitute to vital oil fields and refinery, to India, and to Empire communications.

Moreover, Soviet dominance of Iran Govt would be definitely harmful to American interests for following reasons:

1.
It would mean exclusion of American airlines from Iran.
2.
It would orient Iranian trade toward Russian to detriment of our commercial interests.
3.
It would end all possibility of an American oil concession in Iran.
4.
Most important of all it would mean extension of Soviet influence to shores of Persian Gulf creating potential threat to our immensely rich oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and Kuwait.

However much we may deplore present conditions in Iran, a cure administered by a minority group under Russian direction would be worse than the disease for United States, for the Iranians and for world peace.

I am strongly of opinion time has come for us to take positive stand against continuance present Soviet activities. First and most important step should be immediate withdrawal British and Russian military forces and abrogation Tripartite Treaty of 1942. I can see no excuse for continued presence here of troops of either nation, save possibly for small units as caretakers for installations constructed by Allies. (Russians have built none.) Further interference by Soviet military with Iranian civil and military administrations and Soviet control of movements of Iranians and foreigners in northern zone based on asserted treaty rights is intolerable. Russians must not be allowed to rest on letter of treaty when reason for its existence has disappeared.

I assume Dept agrees with my belief that British support is assured for any stand we may take along this line.

Sent Dept as 768, repeated to Moscow as 244 and London for Secdel as 65.

Murray