891.00/7–1445
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)4
The contents of this telegram5 assists in making more clear present Soviet policies with regard to Iran and serves to emphasize the gravity of the problems which face Iran and which may eventually affect the relations of various great powers in the Middle East. The publication of the appeal of the Tabriz Azerbaidjani nationalists in the Moscow press is significant because it shows that Moscow is now beginning openly to show its sympathy for and support of the Azerbaidjani movement in Iran. The strengthening of Azerbaidjani nationalism in northern Iran would do much to weaken the effectiveness of the Iranian central government, and a nationalistic slogan would probably be more helpful in winning the support for Soviet policies of the northern population of Iran than Communist propaganda. It is our understanding that the Soviet propagandists are accompanying their attacks upon the Iranian treatment of the Azerbaidjanians by words [Page 411] of praise of Moscow’s treatment of the Azerbaijanians in the Caucasus, most of whom, as you know, live in the Azerbaidjani Socialist Soviet Republic, the capital of which is Baku.
It is not as yet entirely clear whether the Russians hope to use aroused Azerbaidjani nationalist feelings in northern Iran to strengthen a movement for the annexation of the Azerbaidjani portions of Iran into Soviet Azerbaidjan in the not distant future or whether they hope to make use of Azerbaidjani nationalists in strengthening Soviet influence over all Iran.
It is possible that if the Russians can gain control of the leadership of the Azerbaidjani nationalist movement, they may endeavor to ally that movement with other political or racial groups, including Armenians, Kurds and the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, in an effort to gain the ascendancy over the central Iranian government.
Analysis of this situation strengthens our belief that we should do everything possible, even though we may suffer certain inconveniences and may have to sell our equipment and installations in Iran6 at lower prices, to draw all of our military forces out of Iran as rapidly as possible and that we should earnestly endeavor to prevail upon the British and the Russians also to effect complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Iran.
- Addressed to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson), the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), and the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow). In marginal notes, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Durbrow indicated their agreement and Mr. Acheson stated: “I agree but don’t see where it gets us.”↩
- Reference is to No. 3269, September 14, from Moscow, p. 407.↩
- This refers to the question of the disposition of United States surplus property in Iran; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 566 ff.↩