891.00/6–2645: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 26—6:35 a.m.]
428. Dept’s instruction of Feb 28, 1945.58 In view of unavoidable delay in reporting sooner by written despatch on the delivery to the Shah on June 5 last of my letters of credence and the audience I had with him following the ceremonies of presentation, I believe the Dept may be interested in the following résumé of the more important observations the Shah had to make on that occasion.
The Shah spoke earnestly of the present relations between Iran and Great Britain and said he sensed a very distinct change of late in British policy toward his country. Whereas the British Minister had demanded of him at the time of the furtherest advance of the Germans into the Caucasus that he close the Majlis and retain in power the then reportedly pro-British Prime Minister Ghavam-Os Saltaneh59 and had declared he was speaking for the American as well as the British Govt, His Majesty was convinced from recent indications that the British now realized the vital importance to their empire and to their very existence of doing all in their power to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. Such being the case, His Majesty expressed the earnest hope that we would work in close collaboration with the British to that end.
In reply to the Shah’s appeal, I pointed out the part which the American Govt had played in bringing about the American-British-Soviet Declaration on Iran of Dec. 11 [1], 1943, and added that while I was, of course, grateful to him for his helpful suggestion and would naturally wish to work closely with the British for the purpose to which he had referred, I would be equally desirous of collaborating also with the Russians who are likewise parties to the Tehran Declaration.
I learned in later conversation with Hossein Ala, Minister of the Court, that he was at least partly instrumental in suggesting to the Shah the line he should take with regard to American-British collaboration. The suggestion is of considerable interest coming from Hossein Ala in view of his long-standing reputation of being anti-British. The suggestion is also of interest in the light of the past strong resentment of the Iranians at any indication of close Anglo-American collaboration in matters affecting Iran.
[Page 385]The only other observation of importance made by the Shah during the audience related to the problem of democratic govt in Iran. He said his experience in dealing with the problem led him to the discouraging view that it would take “40 years” for the people of his country to learn to govern themselves. He referred in this connection to the remark he understood Palmerston or Gladstone to have made the [that] “British democracy is not for export” and wondered whether the British parliamentary system could ever be made to work successfully here.
Sensing that the Shah might be endeavoring to elicit from me some words that might encourage him to resort to personal rule without benefit of parliamentary restraints in case the situation might, in his opinion, eventually warrant such action, I took the occasion to point out that in my considered opinion based on long years of dealing with Iranian affairs, the Iranian Majlis, whatever its defects—and what parliamentary body is without defects?—has more than once in recent times served to protect the vital interests of the country against unwarranted foreign demands when the Govt itself or the Crown had proved unequal to the task. The Shah declared himself in agreement with this view and referred again to his refusal to accede to the earlier British demand referred to above that he close the Majlis; he added, however, a remark which he said he had made to the British Minister at the time, namely, that if the Majlis were ever closed it would be because the Iranians desired it and never on foreign demand.
A word in conclusion about the personality of the young Shah: I had been accustomed during my previous tour of duty here to dealing with his father, old Reza Khan, who was then the man of destiny in Iran but had not yet seized supreme power. He brought great reforms in Iran including the unveiling of women which is remarkable considering the fact that he was almost illiterate. However, although of humble origin himself, he had little if any interest in bettering living and health conditions among his unhappy people. A brutal, avaricious, and inscrutable despot in his later years, his fall from power when the country was occupied in 1941 by British and Russian forces and his death later in exile60 were regretted by no one.
With such a heritage on his paternal side one cannot but be surprised at the type and character of the son who succeed[ed] him in difficult days of foreign occupation. While he has had some schooling in Switzerland it was cut short in 1935 when his father ordered him to return to Iran. Nevertheless, and whatever the reason, he is today of a mental maturity that belies his 25 years. He is deeply distressed over the poverty and disease among his people, their low standard of living and bad working conditions and appreciative of the fact that if Iranian [Page 386] patriotism is to be revitalized in order to stem the tide and appeal of communism, drastic and urgent steps must be taken to relieve the misery in his country. It is not true, he says, that Islam can be counted on to be immune to communism when hunger, disease and misery are left unchecked. He added that he earnestly hopes the United States will lend him every possible assistance toward solving the grave problems with which he is faced.
- Not printed.↩
- See especially telegrams 362, November 7, 1942, 1 a.m., and 428, December 9, 1942, 11 p.m., from Tehran, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 180 and 211, respectively.↩
- The deposed Shah died in South Africa in 1944.↩