875.01/12–1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Baxter (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called this afternoon, at his request and under urgent instructions from the Greek Government, to discuss [Page 357] with Mr. Dunn Greek views on the serious consequences to Greece of the contemplated recognition of the Hoxha regime in Albania.

The Ambassador referred to previous memoranda on this subject, protesting against the contemplated recognition of a regime which the Greek Government considers unrepresentative and responsible for repressive measures against the Greek minority in Albania. Spontaneous public reaction in Greece has been most unfortunate and is causing the Greek Government a great deal of anxiety, particularly because it makes the Greek people feel that they are not being given proper consideration by the Great Powers.

According to information considered reliable by the Greek Government, the recent elections in Albania took place under conditions of violence and intimidation and for this reason the Greek Government feels compelled to declare once again that it is unable to recognize the results of Albanian elections, at least in so far as the district of Northern Epirus is concerned.

Mr. Dunn pointed out to the Ambassador that we had had a Mission in Albania for some months observing conditions and that according to their reports the recent elections were carried out in a manner satisfactory to us.

The Ambassador continued discussion of the Albanian question by stating that confidential information made it appear likely that the Albanian National Assembly soon after convening will pass a resolution which will in effect make Albania a part of the Federated Yugoslav Republic. If this should take place, the Greek Government will no longer feel constrained to follow the policy of the Great Powers, which aims at the restoration of Albanian independence. In 1944 Greece refused to discuss with Albanian leaders a proposal for union between Greece and Albania, considering that such action would be inimical to Allied policy. The Ambassador implied, however, that any formal confederation between Yugoslavia and Albania would result in a Greek demand for the partition of Albania and a union of Southern Albania with Greece.

In this connection the Ambassador further stated his personal feeling that Greece was being badly treated of late, mentioning the refusal of the Department to make available to the Greek Government its proposals for a peace settlement with Bulgaria, which, as reported in the press, contained decisions disposing of Greek territory. Mr. Dunn said he could understand the Greek feeling on this point but that on the other hand he was sure that Greek fears were unfounded. It has always been and still is the view of this Government that peace treaties should not be drawn up by the Great Powers and imposed upon the other Allied nations vitally concerned. It was on the question of procedure in drawing up peace treaties that the London Conference of Foreign Ministers broke down. The Secretary is now in [Page 358] Moscow with the hope of working out, among other things, the procedural arrangements for European peace settlements. It has always been our idea that the drafting of peace settlements as envisaged in the Potsdam decisions was for the purpose of reaching an area of agreement between the Great Powers and of presenting a working draft to the other nations concerned for modification and revision. If this cannot be done there would seem to be little hope for an eventual United Nations Organization. Mr. Dunn assured the Ambassador of his confidence in the eventual plans of a procedure that would satisfy all parties concerned.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this reassuring explanation and stated that he would inform his Government immediately of our views.

[Upon the instruction of the Greek Government its Embassy in Washington presented a memorandum dated December 19, 1945, to the Department of State in order to bring to the Department’s notice that the Greek Government had knowledge, which it considered to be trustworthy, that the recently elected National Assembly of Albania was soon expected to pass a resolution which would have the effect of establishing a virtual union with Yugoslavia. Any such happening would compel the Greek Government to reconsider its policy toward the entire Albanian problem. Hitherto Greece had followed the policy of the Great powers which had been in favor of the reestablishment of the independence of Albania, despite doubts that this would work successfully. The Greek Government explained that in 1944 it had even declined to discuss proposals advanced by some Albanian political leaders which had contemplated a personal union with Greece, because this might be looked upon as upsetting the status quo in which Yugoslavia was seriously concerned.

At present, however, if the proposal for a union between Albania and Yugoslavia were to gain momentum, the Greek Government could not continue its support of the Albanian policy of the United States and the United Kingdom. Instead the Greek Government would have to make most explicit reservations, and to look for a new solution of the Albanian problem along the lines of a partition in harmony with the national security of Greece. It could never agree to any territorial arrangement which could put the Corfu Straits even indirectly in the control of Yugoslavia.]