Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

875.01/11–145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[Washington,] November 1, 1945.

The Greek Ambassador left me the attached memorandum⁹⁶ this afternoon expressing the astonishment and concern of the Greek Government at information received by it to the effect that the American Government is planning to recognize the Albanian Government of Enver Hoxza. The Ambassador stated orally that Greece has never been in so much danger as a nation as it is at the present time. The present Albanian Government, he says, is merely a tool of Tito and the recognition of that Government would serve to strengthen the framework built around Greece by Tito which is threatening the life of that country.

He asked me if I could tell him whether the United States is actually planning to recognize the Hoxza Government and if so what, if any, are the conditions being imposed for the granting of recognition. Is the Hoxza Government, for instance, permitted to hold free elections.

I told the Ambassador that I was not in a position to answer his questions; it was my understanding that the question of the recognition of the Hoxza regime was being given consideration; that I would inquire whether there was more information with regard to this matter which I might let him have and would give him the result of my inquiries in the immediate future.

The Ambassador said that any information which I could give him would be deeply appreciated since the Greek Government is anxiously awaiting news regarding the American attitude.

[The memorandum of November 1, 1945, from the Greek Embassy made it plain that the Greek Government failed to understand why the Allies showed sympathy for Albania to the point of considering recognition of the Hoxha regime. It was severely critical of the violence and terrorism of Hoxha’s rule, and asserted that he was a prisoner and blind instrument of Tito. The encouragement that recognition would give Hoxha would only make him more arrogant, and would cause him to continue his policy so harmful to Greece. Such indication of favoritism to a belligerent would increase public indignation in Greece, and the Greek Government called the attention of the United States and the United Kingdom to the many unfortunate consequences that could result. The Greek people, who had given so much to the Allied cause, ought not to be made to feel that their enemies were faring better than themselves, and the Greek Government urged that the possibility of the recognition of Hoxha would be reconsidered in the light of these views.]

96. Not printed. See bracketed note printed infra.