840.50 UNRRA/11–545: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 7—12:57 a.m.]
1251. Three UNRRA messages mentioned your telegram 1136, November 2 drafted and sent by Jackson after only brief conversation with me and Rankin and slightly longer ones with my British colleague. None of us saw messages till after sent. Last named is entire agreement this Embassy’s point of view that conditions indicate desirability of greater UNRRA control of distribution. However, Rankin and I feel this should be possible without any such extensive involvement of UNRRA in local government as Jackson fears. Necessary would be only more effective integration UNRRA with Ministry of Supply and willingness ability exert guidance informally which not excluded present agreement. This combined with judicious [Page 258] US British support to local efforts stabilize political structure with “middle of the road government” (which we all feel of top importance at this time) should constitute all “drastic action” required.
Specifically as regards four possible ways approaching situation mentioned paragraph 1 Jackson’s second telegram:
(a) UNRRA has not pursued consistent hands-off policy but has made certain exceptions under conditions described with some exaggerations in paragraph 6 first telegram. Nor would extension of UNRRA functions (b) into actual supply distribution on basis proven needs make it appreciably more of controlling authority economic field than it already could be with its virtual monopoly imports. Constitution Allied Advisory Mission (c) would represent simply extension and confirmation policy pursued from first with British Government advisers physically located same building UNRRA headquarters as described my despatch 1192, June 18. On other hand, final course (d) appears most desirable whether pursued until establishment Advisory Mission or until creation stable Greek Government based on elections. However, would point out if announced Allied policy favoring early elections followed firmly, establishment Advisory Mission perhaps unnecessary and could hardly be accomplished before elections any event. Therefore since British already have staff advisers here Department might prefer consider announcement sending soonest small high level US Mission on behalf Eximbank to report on best method extending reasonable credits Greece (my telegram 1250, November 5). Believe such step more immediately effective present situation without involving us in semi-permanent scheme economic tutelage this country.
Have already taken opportunity numerous occasions advise principal Greek leaders of unfortunate impressions abroad (as described by Department) and of effect on possible future financial other assistance. Pending outcome present well-meant effort achieve viable government perhaps nothing more overt this connection desirable. Partisan strife has so far certainly impeded economic recovery by preventing consistent development necessary government machinery which not “breaking down” but itself still seeking reestablishment after enemy occupation. However, lack of UNRRA leadership also contributing factor this situation and considerable betterment psychological conditions necessary to Greek recovery obtainable if such supplied. Hence would again recommend appointment top flight man for top flight job with authority ability to press and guide Ministry of Supply to secure onward movement UNRRA goods from warehouses and quick local distribution.