868.51/4–345: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

932. I am attracted [by] the suggestion in your No. 7232 that a high-powered economic mission should visit Greece, but I am rather doubtful whether this is an appropriate moment to bring the Russians in. We cannot expect any help from the Russians in the economic sphere, and to include them in the mission would be a purely political gesture. As such, it might be valuable if we could be sure that the Russian representative would behave correctly and make a public demonstration of his solidarity with our policy, but this assumption seems very doubtful. There is the further disadvantage that at a time when the Russians are firmly excluding both you and us from any say in the affairs of Roumania,3 it would be rather odd to invite them unsolicited to assume some degree of responsibility in Greek affairs.

2.
We have ourselves been giving some thought to the future Allied organization in Greece. I am, of course, most anxious to reduce the number of British troops in the country at the earliest possible moment, but it is clear that this will not be the end of our responsibility there. In fact the Greek Government must for some time be given advice and guidance in many spheres of the administration if they are to govern the country effectively. Without this help, they will be unable to resume control throughout the country, and the withdrawal of our forces may be seriously delayed.
3.
Advice for the Greek Government has hitherto been provided mainly under the authority of General Scobie as General Officer Commanding British troops in Greece. We hope, however, that the [Page 206] “operational phase” is now over and it therefore seems appropriate that Scobie should be relieved of many of the responsibilities which he has so far borne, and that these should be transferred to our two Embassies where they more properly belong. As you will know, it is proposed that UNRRA should take over relief work from the military on April 1, and this seemed to be a convenient date on which the other changes could be made. The War Cabinet have therefore agreed that on the British side the Embassy will be responsible as from April 1 for tendering advice to the Greek Government. This advice will be particularly important on economic and financial questions, and I much hope that we can count on the continued collaboration of the United States Embassy in Athens. If you agree, I suggest that a joint Anglo-American committee should be established, comprising the appropriate British and American experts and responsible to our two Embassies. Although members of this committee have not been invited by the Greek Government to advise, I have no doubt that they will in fact exercise great influence over the economic and financial policies of the Greek Government.
4.
I feel that this committee should be set in motion before we consider sending a mission on the lines you suggest. A further reason for postponement would be in order to see how the transference of relief from the military authorities to UNRRA works out. Once all this new machinery has begun to work, a high-powered mission on the lines you suggest might do great good by smoothing out difficulties and getting things moving. By that time we might also have resolved the troubles in Roumania and be in a position to invite the Russians to join the mission.
5.
We should, of course, welcome the assistance of Donald Nelson at any time, and if it [is] convenient for him to visit Greece now, I would certainly not suggest that he should delay his journey until a full Allied mission can be sent. The problems to be overcome in Greece are so formidable and urgent that his presence there even for a short visit would be of the greatest value.
Prime
  1. Dated March 21, p. 203.
  2. For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.