767.68119/1–246
The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)
Dear Ed: I deeply regret that your letters of November 5 and 1010 regarding the Straits have gone so long unanswered. We have been endeavoring to have some research work done on certain of the penetrating questions you asked, but unfortunately we have not been able to obtain it. In order to avoid any further delay, we shall give you our own thoughts on the matter as best we can.
Considering first your letter of November 5, answers to your numbered questions are as follows:
(1) The Department at no time prepared a proposal on the basis of internationalization of the Straits. The impression that we were considering such a proposal arose from the fact that the President mentioned the Straits in connection with his proposal for the internationalization of certain rivers and waterways in Europe.11 It seems clear, however, that the President had in mind primarily waterways which actually traverse the borders of two or more States, and that he was thinking primarily of the transit of merchant vessels and commercial cargo. Following the Potsdam Conference, the Secretary pointed out to the President, in a memorandum, that if the United States proposed internationalization of the Straits, we would inevitably be called upon to assume rather definite commitments in their regard. In spite of the fact that the newspapers frequently referred to proposals for internationalization of the Straits, the Department has not at any time given serious consideration to any proposal which would supplant Turkish sovereignty in that area.
(2) It is true that a good deal of consideration was given to the question of demilitarization. For your own information, there was considerable support in the Department for demilitarization on the score that our proposals would have to go at least this far in order to interest the Soviet Union at all. Strong argument was made that demilitarization would be a much less evil for Turkey than Soviet [Page 1290] naval bases on the Straits, and that Turkish forts were of little value anyway, in the era of airplanes and atomic bombs. It was finally decided, however, that if the United States took the initiative in suggesting that Turkey dismantle her fortifications, we would ipso facto assume at least a moral obligation to come promptly to the assistance of Turkey if Turkey should subsequently be attacked and be unable to defend herself because she had accepted our own proposal to demilitarize. It was decided that if Turkey were to be asked to accept demilitarization, the initiative should come from someone else. We have no reason to object, as far as American national interests are concerned, to Turkish fortification, and if some other Power objects to them, it was decided to let that Power say so. We have not decided what position we shall take if such a demilitarization proposal is made. Our decision will naturally be based on the circumstances at the time and on other attendant proposals which may be made.
(3) Your question regarding the delay and confusion in making our proposals is entirely understandable, particularly in view of some conflicting statements which got out to the press here and in London. This is what actually happened. As you know, it was agreed at Potsdam that each of the three major Powers would discuss with Turkey the revision of the Montreux Convention. Following the Potsdam meeting, we in NEA waited for a few weeks to receive instruction from the Secretary regarding any action he wished us to take in the matter. Finally, George Allen mentioned the matter to Jimmy Dunn, who suggested that we go ahead and draft proposals. We did so, but we were without instructions as to the line our proposals should take. We were aware, of course, that the general purpose of the revision of the Convention was to change its provisions in Russia’s favor, and we went over it with that in mind. We boiled down our suggestions to four general principles (regarding merchant vessels, warships of Black Sea Powers, warships of non-Black Sea Powers, and general provisions). The only discussion which took place in the Department concerning our draft was on the question of demilitarization. Finally the Secretary, a few days before he left for London in September, approved our draft without change and sent it to the President with a memorandum of his own,12 pointing out that our draft did not provide for either internationalization or demilitarization, and suggesting that the President would probably not wish proposals of this kind to be included unless they were first discussed with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in view of the commitments the proposals would probably entail. The Secretary discussed the matter orally with the President just before taking the plane for London. The President expressed [Page 1291] concurrence in our views, and the Secretary thought the matter was settled. He instructed me, however, to obtain his approval in London of the exact text of the proposals before they were sent out, since one or two drafting questions were still open. We understood that the file would come back to us from the White House with the President’s O.K. After the Secretary’s departure, we waited three weeks or more for the file from the White House. The matter was mentioned to the White House Secretariat a time or two and assurance obtained that it would be handled promptly. Finally it developed (again this is for your own ear) that the file had been misplaced. We sent over a duplicate. Shortly thereafter the Secretary returned from London. Before we had had a chance to see him, he held a press conference and was asked about our Straits’ proposals. He was under the impression that the note had already been delivered to Turkey, and a certain amount of confusion resulted, but the record was immediately set straight. A few days later the Secretary again went over the matter carefully with the President and the decision to make our proposals along the lines we had drafted was confirmed. A certain amount of actual drafting still remained to be done, but the principles were definitely agreed upon.
At this point a most unfortunate further complication arose. The British Embassy had been asking us for several weeks about our proposals. The Secretary agreed to give them a copy on the morning of October 24, the day we expected the proposals to be sent to you. Our telegram to you was in the Secretary’s office awaiting his signature. Within six hours the Embassy had communicated with London and received a reply urgently requesting us to withhold our proposals until the British had had an opportunity to comment. The Secretary agreed to hold them up for a brief period. Without our knowledge the British had meanwhile telegraphed the proposals to Hugessen13 with a request for his comment, although no telegram had yet gone to you on the subject. I may add that your complaint of October 27 was entirely understandable and justified and served a most useful and considerably broader purpose than you may have intended. Both the Secretary and Dean Acheson have insisted that an incident of this kind must not happen again. I hope it will not.
My memorandum to the Secretary of October 29, a copy of which is attached,14 shows what happened next. We adopted one British suggestion and rejected the other.
In answer to your specific question, nothing happened at London which changed our proposals in any way. The experience may have [Page 1292] convinced the Secretary more firmly than ever that we should not suggest internationalization or demilitarization, but beyond this possibility I know of no effect which the London meeting had on our proposals.
(4) My memorandum of October 29 will answer your question about changes made after consultation with the British. The only change made in our original proposal as a result of the British suggestion was to change a phrase in our third proposal from “the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers …” to “passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers …” The British suggestion was a good one, and in fact stated more clearly what we had actually had in mind all along.
(5) I do not believe there is any “inwardness” or special significance in any of the clauses in the Department’s proposals. Under our third suggestion, the phrase “agreed limited tonnage” is vague, but we have in mind generally the amount of tonnage provided for in the present Convention, subject to possible negotiation either up or down. In our fourth suggestion, we referred to substituting UNO for the League of Nations, but we have in mind that UNO control might be somewhat greater than that conferred upon the League in the present connection.
As regards the point raised in your letter of November 10, I agree that the phrase “in time of peace” needs definition. We certainly did not intend that no non-Black Sea warships could pass through the Straits if there was a war between Ecuador and Peru. The proposal refers in general to a time of peace in the region of the Straits or the Black Sea, but the phrase will have to be defined much more carefully when actual negotiations begin. Unless there is good reason to the contrary, we would be inclined to stick generally to the provisions of the present Convention.
It is true that under the letter of our proposals, Turkey would be technically responsible for keeping the Straits open both to the merchant vessels of all powers (including even an enemy of Turkey) in war as in peace. Moreover, strictly speaking, Turkey would also be responsible for keeping the Straits open to the war vessels of her enemy in time of war. Such provisions actually apply on paper to the Suez Canal and as far as merchant vessels are concerned, some authorities believe they apply technically to the Panama Canal. In actual practice, we know that any nation will do what it can to defend itself and defeat its enemy in time of war. Neither the British or ourselves have suffered any embarrassment as regards Suez or Panama, although it is true that a small power might find corresponding obligations more onerous. The advantage of our Straits’ proposals, however, is that they enable us to point out that the Straits’ provisions would in this respect be similar to those governing the Suez Canal. [Page 1293] The Soviet authorities like to make invidious comparisons on this score whenever possible.
I hope these remarks will be found helpful. Please let me express again my deep regret at the embarrassment caused you by obtaining your first look at our proposals from your British colleague. We shall try to prevent anything like this happening again, and your telegram of October 27 has strengthened our hand greatly.
Very sincerely yours,