767.68119/11–345: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 4—10:35 a.m.]
1412. I have given Soviet and British Ambassadors copy of our proposal from [for] modification of Montreux Convention.
Attitude Soviet Ambassador of interest as possibly foreshadowing position his Government. He immediately inquired with reference to principle (3) what would be situation in time war. He stated proposal [Page 1272] furnishes no guarantee that denial of passage through Straits to warships of non-Black Sea powers would be enforced in time of war. He stated that because of this our proposal fails to offer necessary security to USSR. I pointed out that on assumption Turkey accepts such proposal Turkey would incur obligation to deny passage through Straits to non-Black Sea warships. He objected that Turkey too weak to do this and also that USSR could not trust Turkey to fulfill such obligation. He made bitter criticism of Turkey’s record during war and took issue with President Inönü’s exposition of Turkey’s war position in address at opening of National Assembly November 1. He admitted that under instructions his Govt he had on January 19, 1942, expressed appreciation for Turkey’s attitude but insisted that Turkey, by failing to enter war after Cairo Conference,91 had forfeited any claim to good will of western Allies. I pointed out that neither his country nor mine had entered war until attacked and stated that looking at record objectively it seemed to me good case could be made that Turkey’s resistance to German demands at critical period of war had been helpful to Allies.
I inquired whether Soviet Govt intends to submit separate proposal to Turkish Govt. Vinogradov replied only that his Govt’s views had been stated by Stalin at Potsdam. I asked if this meant that USSR maintains demand for bases in Turkish territory. He said that in no other way could Russian security in time of war be safeguarded.
Vinogradov spoke with such bitterness and hostility concerning Turkey that assuming his attitude reflects views his Govt there would seem little likelihood reasonable settlement of Straits question on its merits with USSR. Rather his attitude tends to confirm view that Straits question as raised by USSR is façade behind which stands Soviet objective to control Turkey.
British Ambassador said he thought our proposal satisfactory with exception of provision obliging Britain to secure consent of Bulgaria and Rumania to send war vessels into Black Sea. He said Britain would not mind asking consent of Russia but he could see no reason why they should ask consent Bulgaria and Rumania. He admitted, however, that this was not essential point. He said he was glad to note that certain changes had been made in our proposal and that he interprets principle (3) as permitting entry non-Black Sea warships into Dardanelles and Marmara although passage through Bosphorus into Black Sea would require specific consent Black Sea powers. He thought it likely British Government would submit separate proposal [Page 1273] to Turks which would differ enough from our proposal “so as not to look the same”.
Repeated Moscow and London.
Sent Dept as 1412, to Moscow as 96 and London as 118.
- Meeting between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Turkish President Inönü at Cairo, December 4–6, 1943; see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 690 ff.↩