767.68119/10–2045

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State

You handed me several days ago the telegram to Ankara regarding the Straits, with the instructions to hold it up for a day or two until the British had had an opportunity to comment upon it. The British now have made their comment. One comment is that they do not like the idea that Great Britain might be compelled in certain instances to ask such former enemy countries as Bulgaria and Rumania for consent in case Britain desired to send warships into the Black Sea. We have discussed this matter informally with the British Embassy and are inclined to believe that this British suggestion is of no importance at the present time. This is the type of thing which could be ironed out during the course of an international conference.

The other British suggestion was that the language in our third general principle, to be found near the bottom of page 2 of the telegram, should be changed so that instead of reading: “the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times,” it would read: “passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times”. We consider this British suggestion as a good one since, if adopted, it would permit warships of non-Black Sea Powers to visit Istanbul, which is in the Straits, without obtaining the permission of all of the Black Sea Powers. We have accordingly taken the liberty of making this small change in the telegram as drafted.

The British have also suggested that it might be advisable to postpone sending the telegram at present. They believe that our proposals will be unsatisfactory to the Russians, who will doubtless disapprove of any proposal which does not specifically give to the Soviet Union a military base in the Dardanelles. They point out that there are a number of points of disagreement between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other at the present time, and that it might aggravate the situation if just at this moment another clear-cut difference in views should arise.

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Although we recognize the force of this British suggestion we are inclined to believe, on balance, that it would be advisable to make the proposals to Turkey without further delay. The President stated at Potsdam, as long ago as July 16, that the United States would discuss this matter with Turkey. Since that time we have been pressed on several occasions by both the Turkish and British authorities to let them know what action we were taking in carrying out this commitment. Just two days ago the Turkish Ambassador again pressed us on this subject, stating that his Government found that the failure of the American Government to make its promised suggestions added to the uneasiness of the Turkish public. We believe that the forthright thing for us to do is to go ahead with our suggestions to Turkey on the revision of the Montreux Convention, fulfilling the assurances we gave to Britain and Russia at Potsdam.

Lot W. Henderson

Since there is a possibility that Mr. Wilson, our Ambassador at Ankara, may be in a position to make a helpful suggestion with regard to the content or timing of the proposals, we have prefixed to the telegram the words “Unless you perceive serious objection”.