761.67/10–2745: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 28—9:15 p.m.]
1371. Having heard yesterday that on previous day Turkish General Staff had summoned British Military, Naval and Air Attachés, 1 requested my Military Attaché78 to obtain information. He spoke with British Military Attaché who, beyond saying that Turks were nervous over Soviet concentration of troops in Balkans, was reticent. Harriman then inquired of Chief of Turkish Military Intelligence who spoke frankly as follows: Turkish Military Intelligence has confirmed that in last 3 days 7 to 8 Soviet divisions have moved into Rumania from Russia and are moving south. This movement began about 2 weeks ago. Recently 5 to 7 Russian divisions have arrived in Rumania from Czecho. This means possibility of up to 15 new Russian divisions in Rumania. Turkish Military Intelligence has confirmed that in Bulgaria there are 7 Russian infantry divisions, 1 armored corps and 1 motorized brigade. Also confirmed that during past 72 hours 3 additional Russian divisions have crossed Danube into Bulgaria. This adds up to about 40 infantry divisions and 8 armored brigades in Rumania and Bulgaria with unconfirmed report of 2 additional divisions recently arrived in Bulgaria. Also there are unconfirmed reports of additional Soviet forces in Caucasus and Iranian Azerbaijan. Chief Turkish Military Intelligence said this situation had been explained to British Service Attachés with statement that if Russian attack takes place Turkey will resist, and inquiry as to what assistance they can count on from British. Also suggested that if British intend to give assistance immediate discussions should [Page 1261] take place. He stated that British Attachés had replied that they considered this information too fragmentary to evaluate and in any case question of British support would have to be decided in London. Turkish Military Intelligence considered this reply unsatisfactory. It was added that Turkish Army because of economic pressure began demobilization of 1922 Class 5 days ago; this has been halted and General Staff is considering request to Government for general mobilization. When asked when he thought attack might take place he said about November 8 after expiration of 1925 Treaty which would give Russians 2 weeks to complete preparations.
Later yesterday I spoke with Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said Turkish Government was seriously concerned over Soviet troop concentrations in Bulgaria and Rumania. He added that Soviet aviation had been strengthened recently in Bulgaria. He said that he had consulted British Ambassador and that Turkish General Staff had consulted British Service Attachés regarding this situation and to obtain their advice and guidance. Minister said of course these troop movements might be simply stepping up of war of nerves against Turkey, or Soviets might be sending troops to Balkans to exert pressure during forthcoming elections. However, there was also real possibility of sudden military action against Turkey and Turkish Government could not be taken unprepared. He said they were taking such measures as they could in way of strengthening garrisons at certain points, and Government was considering calling up more troops and even ordering general mobilization, although they wish to avoid anything which might make situation worse or give any semblance of provocation at Soviets. He said “We should know the answer in 2 weeks after November 7”.
Last night I saw British Ambassador. He told me of talks with Foreign Minister and General Staff. He was inclined to feel that Turkish General Staff is unduly nervous particularly because of absence of Chief of Staff General Orbay who has been in Erzurum for 2 weeks and returns to Ankara tomorrow (my Military Attaché discounts this). Peterson thinks this situation may be another phase of war of nerves; also that Soviets may feel their troops are so unpopular in Balkans that they must be kept on move from one country to another. However, he said possibility of Soviet attack cannot be ruled out.
My comments are as follows: If Soviets are engaged in intensified war of nerves they would probably do exactly what they are now doing as regards troop concentrations, coinciding with expiration of 1925 Treaty. They have in fact succeeded to limited extent in creating atmosphere of concern here with widespread alarmist rumors.
There are, however, other elements in situations which can not be [Page 1262] ignored. For example see Embassy Moscow’s telegram to Department 3488, October 8. Also Soviets have been steadily building up through press and radio case for annexation of Turkish eastern vilayets to Soviet Armenian Republic. Furthermore, fact that USSR has recently deposited ratification of United Nations Organization is not likely to weigh too heavily in calculation of regime which in August 1939 after violent anti-Nazi and pro-collective security campaigns could without apparent difficulty as regards its public opinion switch completely over to Soviet-Nazi pact.79 There are possibly other factors to be taken into consideration, which I am unable to appraise, such as Stalin’s absence from Moscow on vacation and Marshal Zhukov’s last minute “illness”80 which prevented his trip to United States as well as reports here of recent ascendancy of Soviet military leaders who know nothing of outside world and seek military action now while Soviet power is at zenith.
There is further fact that Soviets have put themselves out on limb beginning with demands last June and now with concentration these military forces in Balkans. In view Turkish refusal to give way it may be difficult for them to retire gracefully and save political face.
To sum up: Logic would clearly argue against Soviet attempt at military action against Turkey; but there are illogical factors in situate on which cannot be ignored.
To Department as 1371 repeated to Moscow as 89 for the Ambassador.
- Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Harriman.↩
- Treaty of Non-Aggression, with Secret Protocol, signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; for text, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. vii, pp. 245–247; for documentation concerning the making of this pact, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 312 ff.↩
- See telegram 3451, October 4, 5 p.m., from Moscow, vol. v, p. 888.↩