767.68119/10–1545
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)
On September 10, 1945, I had luncheon with the Turkish Ambassador at the Embassy. After luncheon we had an informal talk in which we went over various aspects of the Straits question. I did not make a record of the conversation at the time as the conversation was on a personal basis and, for my part, I made no remarks which could in any way be considered as an official expression of views, other than to repeat what had already been transmitted to the Turkish Government.
The Ambassador was somewhat puzzled as to why the President had apparently considered the Straits question to be similar to the question of the inland European waterways.65 I said to the Ambassador that [Page 1254] according to my personal understanding the President wanted the greatest possible freedom in the use of all of these waterways. I added that I realized, of course, that free passage of merchant shipping in both peace and war through the Straits was provided for under the Montreux Convention.
The Ambassador then explained at some length that the reason why the Straits were not used for Allied merchant shipping during the greater part of the war was because the Germans commanded the Aegean and the Black Sea approaches, not because the Turks had prevented Allied shipping from going through.
I replied that I fully realized that was the case, and that, once German command of approaches to the Straits had ceased, the Turks had given a favorable interpretation of the Convention by allowing American merchant vessels to pass through to Russia despite the fact that they were armed. I said that we had, of course, fully briefed the President on these and other aspects of the rather complicated Straits question.
The Ambassador seemed to have got hold of the idea that it was contemplated that the Montreux Convention would be modified in a way to permit Soviet Russia to send warships through the Straits. When I made no comment, he went on to indicate that if such an arrangement were made, the Turks might desire a guarantee of their territorial integrity, otherwise they would be in a helpless situation. I replied along the lines of our previous telegram to Ankara, that we intended to work with and through the International Security Organization, the principles of which we fully supported.
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President Truman had written in part in a memorandum to the Secretary of State on October 13: “My position on Dardanelles has never changed. I think it is a waterways link with the Black Sea, the Rhine and the Danube as the Kiel Canal is an outlet to the Baltic Sea, which must eventually be internationalized. I am of the opinion if some means isn’t found to prevent it, Russia will undoubtedly take Steps by direct action to obtain control of the Black Sea straits.
“It seems to me that an international control would be much more satisfactory to Turkey than to lose Provinces over in the northwestern [northeastern?] corner of the country and lose the straits too, which undoubtedly would be the final result.” (767.68119/12–1345)
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