Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890D.20 Mission/8–1745

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[Washington,] August 17, 1945.

The Syrian Government has made a formal request (copy attached²⁰) that an American military mission be sent to Syria to assist the Syrian Government with the organization and training of its national defense and security forces, now that the Syrians have assumed direct control from the French not only of the gendarmerie but also of the Troupes Spéciales (native levies heretofore under French command). In submitting the request the following considerations were advanced by the Syrian Government:

(1) The Syrian troops transferred from the Troupes Spéciales are in a disorganized condition, and need organization, technical training and modern equipment.

(2) The training of these troops by an American mission would ensure their not being used for aggressive purposes, but only to ensure the internal security of Syrian territory.

(3) The training of these troops by American officers will furnish an important form of education to a section of the Syrian population and will inculcate in them the spirit and traditions of democracy.

(4) This is the first time that an Arab country has made this kind of request and a favorable decision by the United States would have a profoundly beneficial effect in the entire Arab world.

The organizational problem involves the creation of a Syrian defense and security force of approximately 20,000 strength, from the following material:

7,000	Troupes Spéciales who deserted to the Syrian Government during the recent crisis
1,500	Troupes Spéciales transferred by the French to the Syrian Government on and since August 1
1,500	Troupes Spéciales of Syrian nationality to be transferred from the Lebanese contingents
2,000	Troupes Spéciales “Avenantaires”* to be transferred in the near future from the French
7,500	Gendarmerie and Meharistes (Desert Patrol)

NEA²¹ suggests that the matter be submitted to the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for early consideration and strongly recommends, for political reasons, that the request be met and that steps be taken as early as possible towards its implementation.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the war has emphasized the strategic importance of the Near East, a region whose component countries are in a state of intense political, social and economic readjustment. There is vital need for a stronger role for the United States in the economic and political affairs of the Near and Middle East, especially in view of the strategic importance of oil reserves and the emergent role of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the present request from the Syrian Government constitutes an excellent opportunity which we should seize at once. The effect of our entering upon this comparatively small task will undoubtedly extend through the whole region and will serve to strengthen greatly our influence and prestige well beyond the borders of Syria.

An American officer recently returned from the Levant has aptly stated, on the other hand, that our refusal to meet the present Syrian request would be comparable, in its disillusioning and unsettling effect throughout the Near East, only to the retirement of the United States into isolationism after the first World War.

An American military mission of the kind desired would make an important contribution to the implementation of Syrian independence by paving the way for complete withdrawal of British and French forces, and would be consistent with our political policy towards the Levant States. It would in fact constitute material assistance to a formerly subject people now struggling to further their independence—a concept which this Government has consistently put forward as a basic principle of its foreign policy.

The British Government would welcome our acceptance of this undertaking among the new responsibilities that have arisen as a result of British intervention in the Levant following French attempts to subjugate the native population by force of arms. We have, in fact, as yet done little or nothing to assist the British in carrying the burden which they assumed in Syria only after they consulted with us and received our full concurrence and political support.²² We feel that the American Government should take a part more active than it has, and more consonant with its increasingly important responsibilities in this critical area.

The French Government would doubtless be displeased by our action in sending a military mission to Syria. The French might presume to assert their technical responsibility for territorial security under the wartime Lyttelton–de Gaulle Agreement of 1941,²³ despite the fact that the only serious disorders in Syria during the war have been due directly to French actions and policy. In any case, whatever validity this claim may have had has now been removed by the complete collapse of French security control in Syria and by the termination of hostilities. The French might also claim an option on supplying any advisers to the Levant States Governments. This is a claim which the United States could not in any circumstances admit and which could not be seriously put forward under present conditions. Even French civilians have been obliged to quit Syria and so great is the local antagonism that the Syrians would undoubtedly allow complete chaos to develop rather than call upon the French for help.…

20. Copy not found attached to file copy.
21. Troops originally intended for permanent service with the French Army. [Footnote in the original.]
21. Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
22. See telegram 59, May 30, from British Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, p. 1116.
23. For exchange of letters of August 7, 1941, at Beirut, by Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East, and Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Commander of the Free French, see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): Statements of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and The Lebanon, 8th June–9th September, 1941, p. 3. For documentation on the interest of the United States in this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 725 ff.