Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890D.01/6–2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[ Washington ,] June 20, 1945.

Participants:	Mr. Lacoste, Counselor, French Embassy
	Mr. Henderson, NEA
	Mr. Merriam, NE
	Mr. Colquitt, NE

Mr. Lacoste opened his remarks by referring to newspaper reports regarding the debate in the Consultative Assembly regarding the Franco-Levant situation. He remarked that the “olive branch” had been extended to Great Britain, but that this involved certain considerations which were of primary importance in the opinion of the French. He referred to the statements made by Churchill in the House of Commons explaining British intervention in the Levant. Despite these explanations, Mr. Lacoste said, the British seem to have a very different object in mind which could not be reconciled with their public pronouncements. Mr. Lacoste then proceeded to make a free translation of instructions which he said had been sent by the French Foreign Office to the French Ambassador in Great Britain. The following is the gist of these instructions:

The Levant is a region where military responsibility was assumed by the French and the British under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941. The French expected that the participation of the British military in the Levant would be in the nature of Franco-British cooperation, but, in fact, the message read in the House of Commons by Churchill made it clear that by the recent British action the French were being dispossessed (désaisie)—that French authority was being discarded and French jurisdiction ignored. General Paget’s note to General Beynet was inacceptable; it contained a threat to French troops who were told not to use their arms even if attacked. The note was not justified, and it was calculated to make France appear not as an associate, but as a troublemonger. It was clear, therefore, that from the British point of view the threat to security came from the French and not from the Syrians. Furthermore, military and civilian personnel were being ordered out of Syria by the British, the British had taken over the O.C.P., and the British had deprived the French of their telephone network (Mr. Lacoste referred to the latter as outright confiscation). British agents were being substituted for French. Military and civilian personnel in Syria were unsafe—they were being attacked and they had no protection. In Lebanon where the situation was normal, the British had imposed censorship unfair to the French. The French Government, therefore, must ask the British to explain the discrepancy between their announced policy and the way in which they had acted—the way their agents were taking action on the spot. How does the British Government expect a return to normal circumstances? The French Government desires a reply at the earliest date. Liquidation of French interests is continuing and, as pointed out by General Beynet, there would soon be nothing left to lose. No country will permit itself to be treated as a culprit by its ally. With respect to establishing responsibility for recent incidents, the French Government reserves the right of appeal to any international organization or procedure it deems appropriate. To render possible a settlement of recent incidents, the French Government asks the British Government to make known the program for their agents in the Levant, and demands the British to take no general measures affecting French interests without the concurrence of French officials. So far as the settlement of the problem of what the French position in the Levant is to be, this is a matter of concern only to France on the one hand and to Syria and Lebanon on the other. Great Britain is charged with the military command in the Middle East, and has been given responsibilities pertaining to security in Syria and Lebanon for the duration of hostilities. The French Government is prepared to discuss directly with the British Government through diplomatic channels the problem of how the present situation may be liquidated in a manner which will guarantee the security of the Levant during the period of the war. The French Government insists on the urgent need of a reply. In spite of its resentment at the treatment inflicted by the British Government, the French Government is fully conscious of its obligations in the war and is fully conscious of its solidarity with Great Britain. It would dislike to be compelled to resort to ways of action making it too apparent that the situation in Syria and Lebanon is a conflict between France and Great Britain. The French Government desired that a settlement of recent incidents in the Levant should be handled directly between London and Paris. Once settled, it would be possible to broach more general aspects of the problem on a wider international basis. These suggestions would, however, be applicable only if applied at the earliest possible date: if the present danger of losing everything in the Levant continues, the French Government would be compelled to try other solutions …

In reply to Mr. Henderson’s query, Mr. Lacoste said that the three steps proposed by the French Government toward the settlement of the problem were:

1. Negotiations between France and Great Britain for a settlement of the immediate difficulties. Syria and Lebanon would be admitted only to the latter stages of these negotiations. (Mr. Lacoste commented that “it would not be proper for Syria and Lebanon to be present at a settlement of difficulties between France and Great Britain”.)

2. Negotiations between France on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other to define the basis for relations between them.

3. A conference on Near Eastern problems as a whole in which at least the five major powers would participate.

Mr. Henderson said that the American position should be borne in mind during various negotiations which might take place: we cannot look with favor on any agreement that would discriminate against the United States, and we would regard it as unfortunate if any agreement contrary to this principle should be entered into. Mr. Merriam read to Mr. Lacoste a portion of an exchange of correspondence with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in September, 1944 regarding the recognition and protection of American rights. Mr. Henderson pointed out that we simply wanted ordinary normal intercourse with that part of the world, free of artificial restraint. To Mr. Lacoste’s reference to British restrictive treaties with countries of the Middle East, Mr. Henderson pointed out that we did not condone those treaties, but that there was an obvious difference between a treaty made in 1930³⁸ and expiring five years hence, and a new treaty that might now be made.

Mr. Lacoste asked whether we had offered the British our good offices. Mr. Henderson said we had gone no further than to inform the British that we would be willing to attend a three-power conference, but that we would not initiate a proposal to the French to hold such a conference in London.

Mr. Lacoste concluded by saying that the French Government would, as indicated by the instructions he had read to us, demand a showdown of British intentions in the Levant States. The situation was disintegrating and there was general agreement among the French, even among opponents of de Gaulle, that the British were trying to oust the French from the Levant.³⁹

Mr. Henderson in conclusion emphasized the necessity of an early amicable settlement of the dispute for the sake of preserving Western prestige in the Near East. As the British Ambassador in Iraq, Cornwallis, once remarked to him, “Whenever agitation in the Near East rises against one power, it ends by being agitation against all of us”.

38. The reference is presumably to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.
39. In a memorandum of June 25, 1945, of a conversation with the French Ambassador the same morning, the Acting Secretary of State wrote: “The Ambassador said, first, that there was the unfortunate situation in the Levant in which we are supporting the British position. I interrupted to say that our attitude was based in no respect on the British position but that we were following our own view of the matter and that the Ambassador knows very well what that view is, namely, our desire to see an end to the disturbances in Syria and Lebanon. The Ambassador assented to this observation.” (740.00119 E.W./6–2545)