890E.01/5–2445: Telegram
The Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 24—5 p.m.]
152. 1. Syrian MinFonAff today informed Satterthwaite that Govt had received from Beynet acknowledgment of Syrian reply to his aide-mémoire saying in view of prevailing situation he had referred it to his Govt.
[Page 1099]2. Lebanese MinFonAff repeated to me substantially as outlined in my 145, May 21, his views on how escape from Franco-Levant impasse might be found. He felt situation was deteriorating in Syria and tho now well in hand in Lebanon, Lebanese would react sympathetically [if] serious Franco-Syrian clashes should occur. He then diagnosed resulting problem as requiring “combined palliative and direct treatment”.
The palliative he urged should be Allied statement that their troops would be progressively withdrawn and Troupes Spéciales simultaneously progressively transferred to the states implemented by exchanges of notes or modus vivendi defining status of Allied troops during such transitional period. As direct treatment he was now prepared to offer draft treaty proposals to three great powers and France; he had completed first drafts and would go over them this week-end with Syrian MinFonAff.
Pharaon then said he had already mentioned possibility of such direct démarche to Brit and Soviet Ministers; with me he wished to go further on strictly personal plane should I so prefer; as I had been helpful in obtaining text of our Norwegian treaty41 as suggestive model he would like me to read and if possible comment on his drafts; in their preparation he had consulted several other texts as well.
I agreed but can readily avoid offering any comment even of personal nature should you so prefer. It was clear too that he would particularly welcome some encouragement from you as to the wisdom and timeliness of his suggested démarche. He would of course find it very awkward to be rebuffed in all quarters.
3. I found of interest also in this general connection comment made to me 2 days earlier by Gen Paget substantially as follows: “International cooperation is needed to solve this problem; I can’t, even should I persuade Beynet to agree to necessity for completing arming of gendarmerie. World opinion as I see it can’t accept the terms Beynet has offered; we couldn’t for example force Egypt to give us bases; there they could be had only by mutual agreement based on mutual interest. Why should the French be permitted to force these countries to give them; besides this is no place strategically speaking from which to protect French lines of communication.”
Similarly Gen Pilleau42 commented to me yesterday evening that solution of this problem would seem to lie only on highest international plane, e.g. by Big Three or Anglo-American decision (preferably [Page 1100] with French participating and concurring) that all Allied troops will leave progressively.
Such a decision he suggested might probably best be implemented by General Alexander as Allied CinCMed43 responsible to Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Rptd Paris as 45, sent Dept as 152, paraphrases to Arab capitals.
- Treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights, and additional article, signed at Washington June 5, 1928, and February 25, 1929, respectively, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. iii, p. 646. Two copies of the treaty were transmitted to the Minister in Syria and Lebanon in instruction 306, February 2, 1945, not printed.↩
- Maj. Gen. Gerald A. Pilleau, Acting Commander of the British Ninth Army (Levant).↩
- Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.↩