890D.01/5–2345
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State 36
It seems to us that the present situation in Syria and Lebanon may have extremely far-reaching consequences, and we therefore feel that we should express to you some of our thoughts on the subject.
In spite of the friendly suggestions which the British and ourselves have been making to the French, they have persisted in pursuing a policy in the Levant States which certainly does not seem to be consistent with the principles which the United Nations have stated they are upholding, and which apparently ignores the purposes and aims of the International Security Organization which we are trying to form in San Francisco. On the same day that the French diplomatic representative in the Levant States presented to Syria and Lebanon demands which would give France a special position, including “strategic bases”, and which would infringe upon the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon, the French landed additional armed forces from a French warship. It is clear that France is at present using force, or the threat of force, in order to extract from two members of the United Nations, which both France and we recognize as independent countries, concessions of a political, cultural and military nature. While we in San Francisco are talking about world security and are devising methods for combating aggression, France is openly pursuing tactics which are similar to those used by the Japanese in Manchukuo and by the Italians in Ethiopia. It will be difficult for any small nation or any great powder to have any confidence in the effectiveness of the International Security Organization if, at the very time that it is being built, we close our eyes to what is taking place in Syria and Lebanon, [Page 1094] merely because at this particular moment it would be politically inopportune, from an international point of view, for us to take a firm attitude towards France.
We realize that just now it is extremely important that the three great Western powers, Great Britain, the United States and France, cooperate closely together to strengthen such ties as already exist between them. On the other hand it is more important that these ties be strengthened on a basis which will strengthen the confidence of the rest of the world in us.
So far as we are aware, French action with regard to Syria and Lebanon is the first instance since the formation of the United Nations in which a great Western power has deliberately set about by force and threats of force to work its will upon smaller powers, without provocation and in its own selfish interest. It is possibly true that Russia has pursued similar tactics with regard to various smaller countries in Eastern Europe. Our inability to take effective measures to prevent Russia from infringing upon the sovereignty of its neighbors has resulted in the loss of prestige to the United Nations. That is serious. But it is much more serious for a great Western power, possessing democratic traditions, to follow a course similar to that pursued by Russia in Eastern Europe. It is possible for the small countries of the world to differentiate between the great democratic powers of the West and the Soviet Union. They are almost certain, however, to judge all the Western powers in the light of policies pursued by any one of them. Western prestige in the Near and Middle East rises or falls to the extent to which the great Western powers live up to the principles which they themselves maintain they are defending.
At the present time, while France is pursuing a policy which is alarming the whole Near East, the American press is carrying numerous articles to the effect that there is an improvement in the relations between the United States and France, and that we are planning for still closer cooperation with France. Thus far there has been no indication from any official source that the Government of the United States does not approve of the tactics which the French are pursuing. It is understandable, therefore, that the countries and peoples of the Near East are rapidly losing confidence in us and are beginning to question our good faith. In this, the first great test of the sincerity of our statements that we are determined to bring about a world system in which all small nations may have a sense of security, we are remaining silent and are allowing the exigencies of the moment to prevent us from taking action which might help to prevent the world from going back to the practices which, from 1931 to 1939, resulted in the present war.
[Page 1095]In this memorandum we are not attempting to give suggestions as to precisely what action we should take with regard to the tactics adopted by France in the Levant States. Our purpose here is merely to emphasize the importance of the decisions which we must make in the immediate future. Are we, at the moment that the International Security Organization is being launched, to tolerate one of our Allies engaging in a policy which partakes of aggression because we do not wish to give offense to that Ally? Or are we to make it clear to that Ally and to the rest of the world that we intend to follow a policy of combating aggression, even though such aggression should be committed by our closest friends and even though the combating of it might be extremely inconvenient to us?
- In a memorandum of May 23, 1945, to Mr. Grew, Mr. Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, stated: “Mr. Henderson’s memorandum is worth careful study. After talking to him about the situation, I feel strongly of his opinion as it is expressed in the final paragraph on page 2 and the following paragraph on page 3 [the last two paragraphs of the memorandum]. He presents an alarming picture which we must have clearly in mind while we are pursuing our policy of closer association with Britain and France.” (890D.01/5–2345)↩