890D.01/5–2145
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) to Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
I am attaching hereto an aide-mémoire 21 which was handed to Mr. Merriam, Mr. Colquitt and myself early this afternoon by Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy. Mr. Balfour stated that this aide-mémoire was presented in accordance with instructions contained in a telegram from the British Foreign Office dated May 20.
After examining the aide-mémoire we asked Mr. Balfour if he was aware of the fact that on May 18 Beynet, the French Delegate General to the Levant, had presented a memorandum to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments setting forth the basis upon which the French would be willing to negotiate a settlement with Syria and Lebanon. He said that the Embassy had received no information regarding Beynet’s memorandum. We then showed him our translation of Beynet’s memorandum and pointed out that the French were demanding military bases in the Levant as one of their conditions for settlement. We said that we were afraid that if there should be a meeting in Damascus [Beirut], as the British aide-mémoire suggested, of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Syria and Lebanon, in order to discuss the whole question of United Nations forces in the Levant States, the French would interject into those discussions their demand for military bases.
Mr. Balfour agreed with us that there was a distinct possibility that the French would not be willing to give any undertaking regarding the disposal of French forces in that area unless they could receive an advance assurance that they would be given bases. Mr. Balfour said that it seemed to him possible that when the British aide-mémoire was drafted in London the Foreign Office had not been advised of Beynet’s demands.
[Page 1086]We also drew Mr. Balfour’s attention to the statement contained in Mr. Wadsworth’s telegram No. 143 of May 20, to the effect that Beynet had told Wadsworth on May 19 that the despatch of cruisers and troops to the Levant and the policy set forth in the aide-mémoire “constituted a carefully considered personal policy of de Gaulle”. We said that it seemed to us likely that we could accomplish nothing in any conference in the Levant so long as Beynet took the attitude that the Levant policy of the French was a personal policy of de Gaulle. In our opinion, progress could be made in relieving the situation in the Levant States only if de Gaulle personally could be included in conversations on that subject.
We told Mr. Balfour that we were expressing merely our own personal opinions and that we were not in a position to give a definite answer to the aide-mémoire without consulting other members of the Department. Mr. Balfour stressed the urgency of the matter and said that he would appreciate it if we could give the British Embassy, some time during the day, an idea of our attitude with regard to the suggestions contained in the aide-mémoire. He added that if we felt that a conference in the Levant along the lines suggested by him would serve no useful purpose, it would be helpful if we could give to the Embassy some kind of counter suggestion.
We fear that the situation in the Levant is extremely dangerous. There is the possibility that disturbances will become so widespread that the French will call in more troops, battleships, and perhaps even airplanes for the avowed purpose of maintaining the peace. If we adopt at this time a negative attitude towards the situation, and if we offer no counter-suggestion the British might be in a position to state that we, by our failure to take any practical steps, are responsible for what may take place. You will note from the attached paraphrase of a telegram, dated May 17, from the British Minister in Beirut to the Foreign Office,22 that the British Minister has already reminded the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as the President of Syria, of Churchill’s statement to the effect that it was not for Great Britain alone to defend by force either the independence of the Levant States or the French position.
We are wondering whether it would be advisable for us to inform the British Embassy that we do not believe that a conference in the Levant of the character suggested would be useful; that we feel that it would be preferable to have a conference in London provided de Gaulle could be persuaded to go to London in the immediate future; or, if de Gaulle would find it impossible to go to London at once, to have a conference in Paris. We might say that we on our part would be willing to ask Wadsworth to proceed to Paris to assist Caffery during the course of [Page 1087] this conference, and add that possibly the British might like to send Shone. In case the conference should be in London we would similarly be willing to have Wadsworth go to London.
There is a possibility that the British have already given certain commitments, unknown to us, to the French with regard to French demands upon the Levant States. It might be appropriate in making our reply to the British Embassy to state that we would appreciate it if the British could tell us whether they have reached any understandings with the French with regard to the Levant States which are not known to us. It is imperative, before we enter into conferences including the British and French, that we know what if any understandings exist between them. This is particularly true with regard to French bases in the Levant States. From certain remarks which have been made to us on various occasions by British representatives, we are inclined to believe that the British may have agreed not to oppose the establishment of such bases. Before conversations could be had it would also be important for us to know what our attitude should be with regard to the establishment by the French of bases in the Levant States, and with regard to the method by which such bases might properly be obtained.