Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890D.01/5–1645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] May 16, 1945.

The present crisis in the Levant arises from the disinclination of the French to forego in Syria and Lebanon a position of “preeminence and privilege” to which they feel entitled by virtue of their long historical association with the Levant States.

The United States recognized the complete independence of Syria and Lebanon in September, 1944; it is not prepared to admit a “preeminent and privileged” position for France or any other country in the Levant States. To do so would give France a legal position in these independent countries which it did not have even under the Mandate. On the other hand we have long made it clear that we would welcome free and voluntary negotiations between the French and the local Governments with a view to defining their relations.

The principal demands of the Levant Governments have been:

(1) that the French turn over control of the native troops (known as the Troupes Spéciales) to the local Governments,

(2) that the French permit the reasonable re-armament of the local gendarmeries, and

(3) that normal diplomatic relations be established between the French and themselves in place of the present “High Commissioner” set-up.

The principal demands of the French, on the other hand, are substantially as follows:

(1) airfields in Syria and Lebanon,

(2) a “recognized position” for its cultural and educational institutions there,

(3) a position of preeminence for its diplomatic representatives, roughly similar to the position the British held in Egypt,

(4) France must be consulted and have some hand in the organization and control of the gendarmerie.

(General de Gaulle has recently stated to the British that he desired to obtain a military base in the Levant.)

The situation has thus been deadlocked for some months: The French are determined to try to maintain a special position in the Levant and to keep effective control of the Troupes Spéciales, and the Levant States are equally determined that their independence shall in no way be compromised and that the Troupes Spéciales shall be turned over to their control.

Largely through American and British efforts a détente in Franco-Levant relations was recently achieved, and it was hoped that a general settlement of outstanding problems could be reached in the improved atmosphere.

A crisis has now arisen, however, in view of French action in sending further troops to the Levant. Approximately 800 Senegalese officers and men arrived at Beirut aboard a French warship on May 6, to serve as replacements for a similar number who were embarked on the same vessel. Reinforcements to the extent of two battalions are scheduled to reach Beirut on May 17 aboard another French warship.⁶ In the absence of any military justification, this action appears to bear the taint of duress in connection with the negotiations which are being resumed upon the return of the French Delegate General, Beynet, from Paris. There is even a suspicion that the French may attempt a coup d’état to reestablish their former position, if they cannot get what they want through negotiations. National feeling is running too high in Syria and Lebanon to be diverted, and the landing of more French troops may provoke popular uprisings that could have highly serious repercussions throughout the Near East.

We have, on the one hand, vigorously called to the attention of the French Government the serious concern with which we view its action, especially at a moment when an international organization is being built at San Francisco which requires the faith and confidence of the smaller Powers toward the major Powers. On the other hand, we have counseled both Syria and Lebanon to act with a sense of responsibility and restraint.

The occasion of the French Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington may well be seized to reiterate our attitude and to express our earnest hope that France will avoid precipitating a condition in the Levant States that may lead to disorders, causing a diversion of the war effort; adversely affect the standing of the Western countries throughout the Arab world; and prejudice the outcome at San Francisco.

In regard to French demands, it may be well to emphasize our opposition to the extension of the French military establishment in Syria and Lebanon, which countries we have recognized as completely independent, and to express the hope that France will agree to Churchill’s proposal for an early progressive and simultaneous withdrawal of French and British troops from Syria and Lebanon.

If a military establishment is required in the Levant States, it is suggested that the proposal be pursued in the framework of the international security system. We should also support the three principal demands of the Levant Governments (enumerated on page 1), and make clear our opposition to an educational or cultural convention which would give a preeminent position in the educational systems of Syria or Lebanon of any foreign language or culture.

We might also state that we are convinced that a generous attitude toward the Levant States now would create good will toward the French on the part of the Syrian and Lebanese people and thus protect and serve the long run interests of France much better than insistence on retaining or creating powers or privileges which would certainly create an explosive quantity of ill will and resentment. We do not have the slightest objection to French influence in the Levant States, so long as the French secure it on a non-discriminatory basis and by the free consent of those countries.

Loy W. Henderson

6. In telegram 135, May 17, 1945, 7 p.m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported the arrival at Beirut of the Jeanne d’Arc at noon of the same day, the disembarking of 600 officers and men, and the French intention to withdraw perhaps 100 men (890E.01/5–1745).