Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

894.00/12–1345

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan⁶⁶

[Tokyo,] November 6, 1945.

Participants:	Prince Konoye;67
	Mr. Ushiba, (who acted as interpreter);
	Mr. Bishop.

Subject: Background of political developments in Japan before “Pearl Harbor”.

The following is a resume of remarks made by Prince Konoye to Mr. Bishop in a personal interview on the above date.

Prince Konoye said that he would be glad to discuss informally on a personal basis and to explain from his own private notes and papers such political developments in Japan as were known to him. He said that he had no intimate knowledge of the activities of the Japanese Government or Cabinet after his resignation as Prime Minister in middle October, 1941. Prince Konoye added that the broad scope of developments could hardly be covered in one interview but would require considerable time, but that he would be glad to devote as much time to it as was desirable. He said that many important developments and situations in Japan were well known to him and that he could give the full background.

With regard to the opening of the “China Incident” in 1937, Prince Konoye said that in reading excerpts from Mr. Grew’s book “Ten Years in Japan” he had learned for the first time of the American and British offers of mediation and that strange as it may seem, the Japanese Foreign Minister had neglected to report to the Prime Minister these offers of mediation. (The Foreign Minister at that time was Mr. Hirota Koki.)

Speaking generally of developments during 1941, Konoye said that it was practically a race between his government and the military; the one attempting to make progress in diplomatic conversations with the United States and to forestall the activities of the military and the other to dispose its forces and to achieve a position of preparedness. Konoye added that because of military activities, the Cabinet and the Japanese Government were given the impression in the eyes of the United States of being insincere, if not dishonest, in attempts to reach a peaceful settlement and that on the other hand, failure to make progress in the conversations was used by the military as a reason for the necessity for further military dispositions.

Prince Konoye said that he did not know the details of the discussion in the Japanese Cabinet of the “November 26 (1941) note”⁶⁸ which was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington; but that when the note had been presented to the Privy Council by the Cabinet it was described by Tojo as an ultimatum from the United States Government and as the final American word in the conversations. Prince Konoye went on to say that during the discussion, certain members of the Privy Council had pointed out that the document was marked “tentative” and that therefore it could not be considered as the “final word” or as an ultimatum; but the Japanese Cabinet strongly argued for its interpretation of the note as an American ultimatum. According to Prince Konoye, the decision finally reached by the Privy Council was that whether the note was an ultimatum was a matter for individual interpretation.

M[ax] W. B[ishop]

66. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan in despatch 98, December 13; received January 3, 1946.
67. Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Japanese Prime Minister, June 1937–January 1939, July 1940–October 16, 1941; Minister without Portfolio, August 17–Octob’er 9, 1945.
68. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 766.