[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Acting Political Adviser
in Japan (Atcheson)
Memorandum for: The Supreme
Commander.
Subject: Arrest of War Criminals.
In connection with our recent discussion with Mr. McCloy65 of certain
questions relating to Japanese war criminals, you may be
interested in some of the political aspects which have
occurred to me in regard to the problem in general.
While the question of the setting of trials of some of the
major war criminals depends in part on the time of the
establishment of the projected International Tribunal, the
question of the timing of the arrests of the major suspects
already listed seems to lie within your discretion as
Supreme Commander.
The Japanese people at present show evidence of being in a
mood for reform and change. They are now thoroughly
disillusioned and there is wide and outspoken criticism of
the men who misled them and brought disaster upon the
country. I believe it is correct to say that the Japanese
people today expect the American
authorities to make more arrests and that, on the part of
the great majority, they will not resent those arrests.
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But this attitude may not last indefinitely. As the economic
suffering of the people deepens, particularly during this
coming winter and spring, some of their resentment will
inevitably turn against us. With that turn may come, at the
very least, a diminishing of their present repudiation of
their old leaders. Accordingly, from the point of view of
the attitude of the Japanese people, it would seem that the
sooner the arrests of most of the major suspects are
accomplished the better.
What may be another reason for early action is that, we are
told by Japanese, a number of moderate political leaders
both in and out of the Government are hesitant to come
forward because of uncertainty whether they may be listed as
suspected war criminals.
At the same time, there is a possibility—if arrests are too
long delayed—that some men listed will decide to enter the
political arena. If we wait until they are running for
office or have built up a political following, we will be
certain to meet some criticism. It would seem important on
both these counts to have the arrests generally completed
and the political atmosphere clarified before the coming
elections.
As regards the question of reaction on the present
Government, while there may be some adverse effect, it is
also possible that the resultant release of tension and
uncertainty may have a salutary effect by giving the Cabinet
greater confidence—unless, of course, Cabinet members are
arrested.
There is also, of course, the question of the interest of the
American public in the matter. While that should not be a
determining factor, it is believed that American public
opinion would be generally allied with Japanese public
opinion in supporting action at this time or in the near
future.
