Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

894.00/12–1345

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan⁶⁹

[Tokyo,] November 7, 1945.

Participants:	Prince Konoye;
	Mr. Ushiba, who acted as interpreter;
	Mr. Bishop.

Subject: Some political developments in Japan in 1941.

The following is a résumé of remarks made by Prince Konoye to Mr. Bishop in a personal interview on the above date.

Prince Konoye discussed the events preceding his resignation as Prime Minister in the Fall of 1941, especially the proceedings of the Imperial Conference on September 6, and subsequent developments in Japanese High Policy. He explained that at the conference the decision was reached that the conversations with the United States should be continued, but that if by the first part of October, 1941, progress had not been made in the American-Japanese conversations, and if it appeared impossible for the Japanese to reach an agreement with the United States on minimum Japanese demands, Japan should immediately reach the decision to undertake preparations for war against the United States and the implementation of war plans.

Prince Konoye continued that on October 12 the Japanese Government held a conference to discuss whether in accordance with the above decision taken at the Imperial Conference on September 6, the Japanese Government should then decide that it was no longer reasonable to expect that agreement with the American Government could be reached on minimum Japanese demands and whether, if that decision were affirmative, the Japanese should not take the decision to prepare for war with the United States and discontinue the conversations which had been in progress until that moment. As Prime Minister, Konoye said that he firmly believed that an agreement with the United States was still possible and that the conversations should be continued in order to achieve that agreement. It was also his belief that if an agreement for the withdrawal of Japanese troops in China could be made, the whole problem of American-Japanese relations could be amicably settled. Prince Konoye added that the War Minister, General Tojo, was diametrically opposed and argued that there was no longer any possibility of arriving at an agreement with the United States and that Japan should at once take the decision to prepare to go to war with the United States.

Prince Konoye said that the fundamental disagreement between himself and the War Minister hinged on the problem of withdrawal of troops from China. According to Konoye, General Tojo contended that although he appreciated the Prime Minister’s difficult task and his unquestionable sincerity, it was not possible for Japan to agree to the withdrawal of troops from China for the reasons that it would utterly destroy the morale of the Japanese Army and people, that once Japan had yielded to American pressure, the United States would resort to more and more stringent and arrogant measures against Japan and in the end nothing would be left for Japan to do except to defend itself by arms which would be difficult with morale destroyed, that even though a temporary settlement of the “China Incident” were worked out, relations between Japan and China would again break down within two or three years, and that there were internal weaknesses in both the United States and Japan and accordingly, it was the best time for Japan to make up its mind to prepare for war against the United States. Prince Konoye added that there were four subsequent conversations between the Prime Minister and the War Minister, and that failure to reach an agreement with the War Minister during these talks forced Prime Minister Konoye to resign.

In explaining that General Tojo when he became Prime Minister, in spite of the views which had just been revealed continued the conversations with the United States and gave the appearance of seeking a peaceful settlement of pending problems, Konoye stated that in this connection the position of the Navy was highly important. He said that prior to his resignation as Prime Minister, the Japanese Navy had taken the stand that it would agree to whatever course Prime Minister Konoye decided upon: If the decision were to continue the conversations with the United States, the Navy would give wholehearted support; but if the Prime Minister were to decide to undertake preparations for war, the Navy would not oppose that course.

Prince Konoye then gave the following description of developments:

Through informal but entirely reliable information, the Prime Minister learned that the Japanese Navy was far from confident of Japanese ability to wage a successful war against the United States and that the real desire of the most important leaders in the Japanese Navy was to avoid war. The Army and General Tojo were also informed of this basic attitude on the part of the Navy. On October 13 or 14, 1941, the Gummu Kyohu Cho (Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau) of the Army went to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and told the latter that the Army would not give up its idea of preparing for war immediately against the United States if such were merely the wish of the Prime Minister. However, the Army would consent to give up this program if the Navy were formally to express its opinion that the Japanese Navy was not prepared for war against the United States. The Army therefore asked the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to obtain formally the official views of the Navy Ministry. Consequently, the Chief Secretary called upon the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy and asked him to present formally the official views of the Navy. The Naval Chief of Military Affairs refused to consent to this proposal and stated that the Navy, officially and formally, would go no further than to agree to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Prime Minister and to support whatever decision the Prime Minister should reach. The Army continued to oppose the views of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet was forced to resign.

With regard to the question of a successor, it was proposed at one time that Prince Higashi-Kuni should form a Cabinet in which the Army and the Navy would be able to discuss the whole matter with complete frankness and come to an agreement. The Emperor was reluctant to accept this proposal and thereupon Marquis Kido⁷⁰ recommended General Tojo as Prime Minister. It was Marquis Kido’s confident belief that Tojo having been informed of the real views of the Navy and thoroughly realizing that Japan could not reasonably undertake a Pacific war with the Navy fundamentally opposed, would be forced to reconsider his view of a possible war with the United States and exert every effort to continue the conversations with the United States to a successful conclusion. The Emperor himself, when he commanded Tojo to form a Cabinet, expressed his serious desire that General Tojo should make a “clean slate of the whole matter”, reconsider the questions from a new angle, and continue the conversations at all costs. In the light of these circumstances, Prince Konoye was also confident, at that time, that Tojo was sincere in continuing the conversations with the purpose of avoiding war. In view of Tojo’s interpretation which he expressed before the Privy Council of the November 26 (1941) note as an American ultimatum it then became apparent that the Tojo cabinet had given up further hope of successfully continuing the conversations.

Prince Konoye said that he could not offhand think of specific or direct occasions in the gradual widening divergence between the United States and Japan; but it seemed to him to be the result of an accumulation of bad feelings and misunderstandings ever since the Manchurian Incident of 1931. He did feel, however, that on several occasions both governments could have exerted more effective efforts to come to an understanding.

Prince Konoye said that, for example, he believed that his proposal for a meeting with the President of the United States in 1941,⁷¹ was one occasion when an understanding might have been reached and the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops from China could have been satisfactorily solved. He explained that it was his intention to meet the President in person and then by telegraph to ask the Emperor to take a decisive step and to order the withdrawal of troops from China. Prince Konoye went on to say that this was the type of decision which the Emperor had made when Japan decided to surrender. Prince Konoye concluded that he believed confidently that through the direct intervention of the Emperor the problem could have been solved at that time although he fully anticipated that he would have been assassinated upon his return to Yokohama.

M[ax] W. B[ishop]

69. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan in despatch 98, December 13; received January 3, 1946.
70. Marquis Koichi Kido, Japanese Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
71. See memorandum of August 8, 1941, of a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 550.