Office of the Historian

860F.01/9–445: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Berlin, September 4, 1945—5 p.m.
[Received 12:16 p.m.]

441. Your 386, August 31, 8 p.m.69 crossed our 418, August 31, 6 p.m.70 A telegram to USFET (United States Forces European Theater) from War COS (Chief of Staff71) states that the Dept believes that a token United States force should remain in Czechoslovakia as long as the Russians are there. War COS inquired whether in USFET’s opinion, the retention of a token United States force in Czechoslovakia is feasible. USFET has consulted General Harmon who has stated that if we keep troops there, the force should not be reduced beyond two divisions. He added that at present we are handling both the Czechs and Russians on the occupation border with friendliness but firmness. He believes that were the force reduced, we would be subject to frequent incursions by Russians across the border into our area, thereby possibly losing prestige and effectiveness. USFET will probably advise the War Dept that any token force should not be less than two divisions, thus putting the decision up to the War Department.

It seems to me that the idea of ATC (Air Transport Command) force is not sound and that we should either maintain a substantial force, effective to cope with the situation, or withdraw entirely.

War COS also has telegraphed USFET stating that consideration has been given to whether United States-Czech civil affairs agreement is needed, suggesting that should we execute agreement now, Soviets would be justified in assuming our intention to stay a protracted period. War COS added that interested Depts in Washington believed civil affairs agreement unnecessary. This view is concurred in here, USFET believing that whether we stay or pull out of Czechoslovakia, such an agreement would be unnecessary since matters are proceeding well enough now. This view is taken on basis that even [Page 488] if it were decided to keep our troops in Czechoslovakia, they would not remain any length of time.

Murphy
  1. Same as telegram 182, August 31, 8 p.m. to Prague, p. 485.↩
  2. Not printed; in this telegram, Mr. Murphy, on the basis of his knowledge of the situation in Germany, expressed the view that there was no overriding political necessity for the continued maintenance of American troops in Czechoslovakia 860F.01/8–3145).↩
  3. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.↩