Office of the Historian

860F.01/9–445: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Praha, September 4, 1945—6 p.m.
[Received 9:20 p.m.]

306. To reconcile the War Dept’s desire to withdraw all of our forces from Czechoslovakia in the near future with the political advantages of retaining American forces in the part of Czechoslovakia now occupied by them, I suggest that the two divisions about to be withdrawn be not replaced but that the third division be not withdrawn or if withdrawn that it be replaced immediately.

My reasons for recommending the above course are as follows:

1.
The reduction of our present forces in Czechoslovakia, consisting of three divisions, to one division would have advantages and no foreseeable disadvantages in that the large number of American troops now occupying a relatively small area of Czechoslovakia are in excess of the numbers required and tend to emphasize the undeniable feeling on part of Czechoslovakians that Americans are too friendly with Sudeten Germans in occupied area.
2.
The withdrawal of two thirds of our forces at this time might induce the Russians to reduce their forces in Czechoslovakia and would in any event strengthen the Czechoslovakian Govt in its efforts to persuade the Russian Govt to carry out its promise to withdraw its forces to Czechoslovakian frontier.
3.
The present large American occupation forces by their mere presence tend to delay rehabilitation and recuperation in the small area occupied by them and to impede a return to normal life.
4.
Our large forces create a certain amount of jealousy among the Czechoslovak male population because of their high standard of living and all that goes with it.
5.
Our large forces have tended to make the Czechoslovakians reliant on American help and thus to stifle initiative in rehabilitation their own country.
6.
The present demarcation line between the American and Russian forces could be held by a considerably smaller contingent of American troops.
7.
The withdrawal of all American forces to the Bavarian-Czechoslovak border would probably result in an official or unofficial Russian infiltration into the evacuated American zone in Czechoslovakia with the resultant wholesale “requisitioning” by individual Russian troops of cattle and food, seizure of machinery, equipment, household and personal effects as “war booty” attacks on individuals and various other depredations such as are all too common in the present Russian occupied zone.
8.
The withdrawal of all American forces would cause the Chechoslovakians to feel that they had been morally as well as physically abandoned by the Americans at the very time they are beginning to show signs of courage in standing up to Russians. This might well prove to be a determining factor as between the moderates and the Communists in the forthcoming Czechoslovak parliamentary elections.
9.
The retention of one full strength American division or even less in Czechoslovakia along the present demarcation line would not necessitate any elaborate supply organization in their rear but would constitute merely a minor extension of our zone of occupation in Bavaria and would be cheap insurance against the unfortunate political reactions which might arise as the result of complete withdrawal (your 182, September 1 [August 31]).

Steinhardt