740.00119 Council/12–2645
Record by the United Kingdom Delegation of a Meeting at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers63
Present
| U.K. | U.S.S.R. |
| Mr. Bevin | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Sir A. Clark Kerr | M. Molotov |
| Sir A. Cadogan | M. Pavlov |
| Mr. McAfee |
Generalissimo Stalin said that he had just been seeing Mr. Byrnes who, on the subject of the peace treaty conference had suggested that [Page 689] if India were to be excluded the Ukraine and Belorussia ought also to be excluded, but that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should not be included. Generalissimo Stalin said that he could not settle the matter on those terms.
Generalissimo Stalin said that Mr. Byrnes had then put to him questions about Iran. He had spoken about the withdrawal of troops and had asked for the views of the Soviet Government. Generalissimo Stalin had told him that the Soviet Government did not propose an early withdrawal: they desired to safeguard Baku and the oil wells there. There was no guarantee of security in that region on account of the hostile attitude of the Iranian Government.
Mr. Bevin asked whether the Soviet Government were afraid of an attack from Iran.
Generalissimo Stalin replied that he was afraid of acts of sabotage.
Mr. Bevin said that it was important to bring out into the light of day the misgivings which either side might have. He himself was quite ready to tell the Generalissimo what was feared in England. It was thought there that the Soviet Government were following a policy aiming at the incorporation of Azerbaijan, or making it into a satellite state. He did not say that the Government were taking that view, but it was held in the House of Commons and in the country at large. Generalissimo Stalin must realise what a sensitive point Iran was to both Governments. He had observed to M. Molotov the day before that if there was any point of friction between their Governments, it was important at once to try to remove it at an early stage. His Majesty’s Government had interests in Iraq and in Mosul and the oil of those regions. If only His Majesty’s Government could know what it was exactly that the Soviet Government wanted it might be possible to cooperate.
Generalissimo Stalin said that, frankly and honestly, he had no claims against Iran, that was to say, he had no idea of incorporating any part of Iran into the Soviet Union and no intention of impairing the sovereignty of Iran. But he wished to safeguard the oil of Baku against diversionary activities. There were many extreme nationalists in the Iranian Government who wished to damage the Baku oil industry and who had plans of long standing for the incorporation of Baku in Iran. As to this, he had little fear but there was a real danger of diversionary activities. He had no territorial claim against Iran or any intention of infringing Iranian sovereignty.
Mr. Bevin said that we could assume then that Azerbaijan would remain in Iran, to which Generalissimo Stalin replied that Azerbaijan in fact consisted of two different regions, only one of which was genuinely Persian.
Mr. Bevin said that, at any rate, the Persian part would remain in Iran and Generalissimo Stalin indicated his assent.
[Page 690]Mr. Bevin said that he had taken an interest in the proposal for the establishment of provincial councils throughout Iran. His Majesty’s Government had suggested to the Iranian Government that that ought to be done. Could we not set up a tripartite commission to advise and assist them? The Iranians did not seem capable of carrying out reform by themselves. This reform seemed to be necessary and might effect a settlement of Persia. If this suggestion appealed to the Generalissimo, his personal opinion was that, if the latter favoured it, he (Mr. Bevin) might advocate it with the United States Government.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he might support this idea but he must know exactly what was intended.
Mr. Bevin explained that the measure had been provided for in the Iranian constitution but had never been carried out. He thought it was essential to carry it out but he feared that the Iranian Government would be unable to do it without assistance.
Generalissimo Stalin thought that that was probably the case and said that he would study the matter and then discuss it further. He thought it possible that agreement might be reached on this point.
Mr. Bevin said that he wished to put a further question. What was the difficulty in regard to Turkey? He did not want the term to be misunderstood but it seemed that a war of nerves was being conducted. He had the impression that there was a difficulty about the Soviet-Turkish frontier and as His Majesty’s Government were allied with Turkey, he was very anxious to understand this question.
Generalissimo Stalin replied that there were two questions.
- First, the Straits. Under the Montreux Convention it was left to Turkey to decide whether there was a threat of war and whether to close the Straits and to control them. That was a difficult situation for Russia because Turkey thus had a right to hem her in and the Soviet Government wished to safeguard their liberty.
- Secondly, there were certain provinces in Turkey inhabited by Georgians and Armenians which had been seized by Turkey and it was necessary to restore, at least to some extent, the old frontier which existed in the time of the Czars because the Georgians and Armenians were putting forward claims against the Turkish Government. All talk of war against Turkey was rubbish.
In reply to Mr. Bevin’s question as to how the matter could be settled, Generalissimo Stalin said it should be settled by negotiation either with Turkey or with the Allies.
In reply to Mr. Bevin’s question as to what exactly the Soviet Government wanted, Generalissimo Stalin said that the Soviet Government wished to regain the Georgian and Armenian portions of the [Page 691] provinces in question: they claimed, in fact, the old frontier which existed before the Treaty of 1921.
Mr. Bevin said that he understood that Russia had not then been in possession of these provinces for a very long period.
Generalissimo Stalin said that it was true that this position dated only from 1870 but the population was Georgian and Armenian and had always been so.
Mr. Bevin then asked the Generalissimo to state what exactly he wanted in the Straits. There had originally been talk of a Soviet base there.
Generalissimo Stalin said that this claim still stood.
Mr. Bevin asked whether that did not put Turkey in a difficulty as the Soviet Government would be able to close the Straits.
Generalissimo Stalin said that the Soviet Government would not have that right. Turkey was unable to defend herself and had shown during the war that she was afraid of everyone.
Mr. Bevin asked whether the Soviet intention was that all ships might pass through the Straits both in peace and in war.
Generalissimo Stalin replied that that was so as regards merchant ships. The important thing today was to limit Turkey’s right to close the Straits on her own authority.
Mr. Bevin asked what would be the situation if Turkey were at war, to which Generalissimo Stalin replied that Turkey’s interest should be placed first.
Mr. Bevin asked whether she could close the Straits and Generalissimo Stalin replied that she could and that those interested in the defence of the Straits should come to her aid.
Mr. Bevin said that he would be very interested to see definite proposals formulated by the Soviet Government so that he could consider whether there would be an advantage in calling a conference. He was anxious not to destroy Turkey’s free and independent position.
M. Molotov raised the point whether the question could be settled at the present Conference and after some discussion it was agreed that that would probably not be possible but Mr. Bevin expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would not necessitate the continuance of Turkish mobilisation.
Generalissimo Stalin said that this mobilisation had been undertaken by Turkey on her own initiative and when Mr. Bevin said that that was because Turkey was frightened of the Soviet Union, Generalissimo Stalin said that she need not be frightened.
[Here follows a discussion regarding the British position in the Dodecanese, the participation by India in the preparation of the peace treaties, and Anglo-Soviet relations in general.]
- Meeting held at the Kremlin, December 19, 10 p.m. Another copy of this record, included in the files of the Moscow Embassy, is accompanied by the following note from Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom delegation to Charles E. Bohlen: “Mr. Bevin thinks that Mr. Byrnes might like to see the record of his conversation with Generalissimo Stalin last night and asks me to send the attached copy.” (Moscow Embassy Files: 500 Foreign Ministers Conference—Moscow)↩