740.00119 Council/12–2645
Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers57
| Present: | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| The Secretary | |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
| Subject: | Preparation of Peace Treaties |
| Withdrawal of Troops from Iran |
After an exchange of amenities principally concerning Stalin’s health, The Secretary handed him a letter from the President.58
Mr. Pavlov began to translate the letter, but Stalin interrupted to ask the Secretary whether it was necessary to read the letter now while Mr. Byrnes was here.
The Secretary replied that it was not necessary since he was aware of the contents of the letter and could say that the President had expressed his desire that the Generalissimo see the Secretary and talk over with him the various outstanding questions between the two countries. He added that he did not wish to go into the details now of these problems but merely to say that it was the earnest hope of the President which he shared that some method could be found to settle these questions. He said that most of our difficulties related to procedure and not to substance but that a failure to agree on procedure gave an opportunity to certain people to say that it was more difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in peace than it had been in war. He was expressing President Truman’s views when he said that there was no conflict between our two countries and that our only desire was to live in peace and increase the comfort of the American people and help through economic means our friends abroad to restore the damages of war.
Stalin replied that he fully shared that desire.
[Page 681]The Secretary recalled that the first time he had met the Generalissimo at Yalta the latter had said that he spoke not as a diplomat but from the heart and he wished to assure him that he too was prepared to speak frankly on any subject that the Generalissimo had in mind and to tell him anything he wished to know concerning the United States’ attitude.
Stalin replied that he had no doubts as to the sincerity on both sides, but that he felt sometimes we had different understandings of the same questions.
The Secretary agreed and said that this was due to different positions, customs, and points of view. He was confident that all these matters could be ironed out.
Stalin replied he shared this conviction and that up to now our two countries had succeeded quite well.
The Secretary said one of the difficulties of the United States was that our press was completely uncontrolled and often printed stories which were reprinted in the Soviet press and thus led to mutual suspicion. He said he felt it was our duty to defend the actions of our ally, the Soviet Union, against any misrepresentation or untruth, and he felt that the Soviet Government would do the same.
Stalin agreed.
1. Preparation of Peace Treaties
The Secretary then said he noticed that the Generalissimo had before him a list of countries to be invited to the peace conference which they had been discussing at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. He said that morning Mr. Molotov had agreed to accept the list if India was omitted, but when Mr. Bevin had objected to this Mr. Molotov then proposed the addition of the three Baltic Republics.
Mr. Molotov said that he and Mr. Bevin had agreed to the inclusion of the three Baltic Republics but Mr. Byrnes had objected.
The Secretary said that regardless of who was right or wrong at the London Conference the fact was that there had been an honest misunderstanding between the three heads of Government as to the interpretation of the Berlin agreement. The President and he understood Prime Minister Attlee felt that under this agreement France and China would be permitted to sit with the Council to discuss but not vote on the peace treaties in question, whereas the Generalissimo insisted that only those countries signatory to the armistice should do so. He said, however, in their desire to reach an agreement the United States and Great Britain had agreed to accept the Generalissimo’s interpretation.
Stalin replied he felt that that was the decision reached at Berlin.
[Page 682]The Secretary repeated that he felt it had nevertheless been an honest misunderstanding but that we had accepted the Soviet interpretation. Not only that, but for the sake of agreement we had also accepted the Soviet position regarding final approval of these peace treaties. He said we had not liked it since we felt that all countries who had participated in the war should have a voice in the making of the treaties, but nevertheless we had accepted the Soviet proposal for final consideration. What we were asking, however, was that at the conference as wide a list of states as possible who had actively participated in the war should be given an opportunity to express their views. They would not have a vote or any final say in the treaties but merely be present and make their views known. He pointed out that as the matter now stood, if the proposal to include India and add the three Baltic Republics were accepted at the conference, there would be Great Britain with five Dominions including India and the Soviet Union with five of its republics whereas the United States would be alone. He said it would be difficult to explain this decision in the United States. He said he thought that one way out would be to omit India and White Russia and the Ukraine. Thus only states enjoying full sovereignty would be invited. He understood that on that basis Mr. Bevin would suggest to his Government the omission of India.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that that would still leave England with four Dominions.
The Secretary replied that he felt that both the United States and the Soviet Union were strong enough to stand alone and that Mr. Molotov could adequately protect the interests of these Soviet Republics at the conference. He said he felt we had made concessions in this matter of the peace treaties and that it was not very much to ask that our list for the conference be approved.
Stalin replied that the list was identical with the one which Ambassador Harriman had shown him at Sochi and that he saw no concessions on the part of the United States.59
Ambassador Harriman said that Luxembourg had been dropped.
The Secretary said that our concessions related to the preparation and final approval of the peace treaties.
Stalin remarked that the armistice in each case had been signed by those who had shed the blood in this war against the country in question and that they should be the one to sign the peace. He went on to say that Belgium and Holland, for example, have not fought against Italy and Rumania; but if it were the question of peace treaties against Germany and Japan it would of course be different. He said [Page 683] he felt that the United States should make a concession in regard to this list. Who in fact had waged war against Italy? In the first stages it had been the United States, England, and Russia, the latter having destroyed 16 Italian divisions on the Eastern front. France had come in with one or two divisions when Fascist Italy lay prostrate. He said that after the landing in Italy there was no question but that the United States and England had done most of the fighting and, therefore, had a greater right than Russia in regard to the Italian peace treaty. In the case of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, although the latter had not actively waged war, United States and British participation had been confined to air action which had been highly appreciated. The ground forces against these countries had been only Russian. Russia had fought and destroyed 24 Rumanian divisions, 26 Hungarian, 22 Finnish, and had forced Bulgaria out of the war. The Baltic States had contributed forces in these operations. Since 1942 there had been an Esthonian corps of two divisions, a Latvian corps of two divisions, and from the very beginning an important Lithuanian contingent. If the part played by these Baltic Republics is compared with the role say of Norway, it will be seen that there would be no grounds for inviting Norway, Holland, and Belgium. Nevertheless, as a concession the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to invitations to these three countries if Mr. Byrnes would agree to the three Baltic Republics which were sovereign and had their own Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In order not to offend England it would be well to accept India as well as Belgium, Holland, and Norway.
Stalin, therefore, proposed that the original American list be accepted plus the three Baltic Republics. He stated that soon the United States would have to recognize these countries and they might find it convenient to have consulates in Tallin, Riga, and Kaunas. He said he recognized that it was embarrassing for England to have six votes and the USSR to have six votes while the United States had only one and that this situation must be met. One way would be to give the United States six votes. He recalled that he had agreed with President Roosevelt to the United States having two additional votes in the United Nations Organization if it was so decided.
The Secretary replied that when Mr. Molotov had first agreed there had been no question of the three Baltic Republics but only to the exclusion of India. Mr. Bevin, however, had objected to that.
Mr. Molotov said he had first proposed to shorten the list and take off certain countries especially India.
The Secretary replied that when we spoke of votes it was somewhat misleading since at this conference no one would vote but merely express their views. He said he hoped the Generalissimo understood [Page 684] our opposition and our difficulties. The people of the United States regarded the war as one war and felt that where an army fought and against what country of the Axis was due to a decision of the military leaders. For example, had we not decided to invade Europe through Normandy, American troops might have been fighting on these other theaters against the satellites.
Stalin said that is true but a distinction must be made between the Pacific and European wars.
The Secretary agreed and said that even on this point that China by agreeing to accept a limited amount of help in the Far East had made it possible for the United States to throw its full weight into the European war first.
Stalin agreed that China had played an important role in the whole war although she had in fact fought badly.
The Secretary said he wanted to make it clear that the United States had no special interest in regard to Belgium, Norway, or any of these countries. It merely felt that since it had been one war the small countries who really participated could be given an opportunity to express their views on these peace treaties. He said, for example, that Norwegian ships had carried the gasoline which made possible our bombing of Rumania and had done their share in bringing supplies to the Soviet Union. He said in the last analysis we would be the judges and that it was possible, therefore, without any harm to our interests to let the little nations speak.
Stalin said that he saw two alternatives, one, to exclude India and leave the list as written which would include White Russia and the Ukraine; and the other, if England objects, to include India and the three Baltic Republics. He said the Soviet Government would withdraw its objection in either case to the inclusion of Belgium, Holland, and Norway, and also China.
The Secretary said that that would present certain difficulties. When he agreed to omit India Mr. Bevin objected. He said he hoped that the Generalissimo would think the matter over and see if some other way could not be found out of the difficulty.
Stalin agreed to think the whole question over.
2. Withdrawal of Troops From Iran60
The Secretary said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss the question of Iran with Mr. Molotov and was, therefore, bringing it up for the first time. He said that the United States was involved in the difficulties in Iran only because of President Roosevelt’s signature on the Declaration of Iran, and that because of this the Government [Page 685] of Iran had communicated to the United States certain complaints which we had felt bound to forward to the Soviet Government. He said criticism of Soviet acts had been caused in the United States by the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit 1,500 Iranian troops to go to Northern Iran to deal with the insurgents there. He said he wished to speak frankly which was the best way to discuss these matters and that we feared that at the forthcoming United Nations meeting the Iranian Government would raise this question and charge that the three Governments signatory to the Declaration signed at Tehran were not living up to their obligations to protect the integrity and sovereignty of Iran. The forces of our three countries were in Iran not as occupation forces but were there by agreement with a small friendly country. If the question were raised it would be difficult to explain why 30,000 Soviet troops in Iran would be endangered by 1,500 additional fully armed Iranian troops which he understood was the reason for the Soviet objection. He said he felt that the three great countries should always avoid any grounds for charges that they had failed to live up fully to an obligation to protect a small power.
Stalin said that the following were the pertinent facts in this matter: Baku oil fields in the south of Russia lay close to the border and this location created a special problem. These oil fields had to be safeguarded against any possible hostile action on the part of Iran against the Soviet Union. He was sure that if England or America owned these oil fields they would take every precaution to protect them against any possible action on the part of a hostile Iranian Government. He said the Iranian Government was hostile to the USSR and there was nothing friendly about it. He said he did not know what their attitude towards England and America was. That, those two countries knew, but he knew it was hostile to the Soviet Union. No confidence, therefore, could be reposed in this Government and anything might be done by it. Saboteurs might be sent into the Baku fields to set them on fire which is not difficult to do. It was for this reason that the Soviet Government was unable and did not wish to withdraw their troops until the date set in the treaty. There was another point now, that the Soviet Union had another bilateral treaty with Iran which gives the former the right if conditions are disturbed or there is the possibility of danger to put troops in Northern Iran.61 This treaty had been signed in 1921 and had grown out of a previous arrangement whereby Iran was divided into spheres of influence, the northern sphere to Russia and the southern sphere to England. The Soviet Union had subsequently renounced its claims to the northern sphere and had withdrawn its troops turning over without pay to [Page 686] Iran the Tabriz railroad which the Russians had built and a bank. In exchange Russia received the right to send troops into Northern Iran if a dangerous situation existed. It was, therefore, necessary for the Soviet Union to keep its troops in Northern Iran because of the hostility of the Iranian Government. It might be difficult for others to understand this but if they thought it over they would understand.
In regard to the internal difficulties, Soviet troops were not interfering in these local disturbances. The reason they would not allow the Iranian troops to come into the area was that they feared clashes between the Azerbaijan population and the Iranian troops and also incidents against Soviet troops. Even now Soviet troops were suffering and several had been killed by Iranian detachments. Even small numbers of troops were capable of provoking incidents and attacking the Soviet forces. The Iranian troops in Northern Iran are not attempting to put down the disturbances and do not wish to fight against the local population.
It is right to respect small nations and to safeguard their independence but the small nations are not always averse to attempting to promote friction between large powers. Some small nations come to the Soviet Government and charge that England and America are strangling and oppressing them. Others go to England and America with similar charges against the Soviet Union. It is necessary to take a skeptical view of such complaints from small nations who are very apt to stir up trouble. It was, therefore, impossible for the Soviet Union to withdraw those troops before the expiration date of the 1942 treaty and at that time it will be necessary to examine the situation and to see whether or not it is possible to withdraw the troops then. The decision will depend in large part on the conduct of the Iranian Government. The Soviet Union must safeguard the Baku oil fields. It was difficult to understand why all these complaints were made against Russia when England has troops in many places and even in Tehran as has the United States. It was not clear how these troops got there or what they were doing but the Soviet Government makes no complaint.
The Secretary replied that the one wish of every American soldier and the one wish of the American population was to see every soldier abroad get home. He said he was surprised to hear that the Iranian Government was regarded as hostile by the Soviet Government since he recalled that General Connolly62 who had been in command of our forces there had told him that the Iranian Government had been cooperative with both Russia and the United States in moving supplies through Iran to Russia. He repeated that he felt it was important [Page 687] that the great powers should always be in a position to show that they were behaving correctly and in accordance with agreement in regard to small nations.
In saying goodbye, Stalin said that the Secretary could rest assured that the Soviet Union had no designs territorial or otherwise against Iran and that once they felt secure about the Baku oil fields they would withdraw their forces and would have no interest whatsoever in any internal problems in Iran, but they felt it necessary to take adequate precautions against hostile action.
The Secretary replied that he had publicly stated that the United States was not interested in the formation of any bloc or group of states which might be directed against the Soviet Union and that no government which had hostile intent against the Soviet Union could come to the United States for any kind of support. He said he had stated this publicly in order that there should be no misunderstanding.
It was agreed that the Generalissimo would receive the Secretary again before the latter’s departure.
- Meeting held at the Kremlin, December 19, 1945, 8:30 p.m.↩
- For text of the President’s letter, see enclosure to this memorandum, p. 687.↩
- See the memoranda of conversations by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 24 and October 25, pp. 567 and 575, respectively.↩
- For the Secretary of State’s report to the Acting Secretary of State regarding the discussion at this meeting on the subject of Iran, see telegram 4262, Delsec 23, December 23, from Moscow, printed in vol. viii .↩
- Reference is to the treaty of friendship between Persia and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 383.↩
- Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General, Persian Gulf Supply Command, October 1942 until December 1943.↩