740.00119 Council/12–2645
United States Delegation Minutes, Fifth Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 20, 1945, 3:00–4:35 p. m.
| Present:64 | Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs | |
| Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to London | |
| Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo | |
| Mr. Tsarapkin, Chief, American Section, NKVD [NKID] | |
| Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter | |
| Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Cohen, Counselor of Department of State | |
| Dr. Conant, President, Harvard University | |
| Mr. Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow | |
| Mr. Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs | |
| Mr. Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary | |
| Mr. Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs | |
| Sir A. Cadogan, Under Secretary of State | |
| Sir R. Campbell, Ambassador | |
| Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Counselor, Far Eastern Department | |
| Mr. McAfee, Interpreter |
| Subjects: | Allied Council for Japan |
| Far Eastern Commission | |
| Korea | |
| Atomic Energy | |
| Germany |
1. Allied Council for Japan
Mr. Bevin suggested that the discussions commence on the revised American draft on the Allied Council for Japan.65
Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to reserve the opinion of the Soviet Delegation with respect to the final wording of Article 1. He pointed out that the Soviet Government had suggested that the body be called an Allied Control Commission and not an Allied Council. Inasmuch as the American draft provided for the controlling of Japan [Page 693] it was not clear to him why the body should not be called a Control Commission. This would be more precise.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the original American proposal provided for an Allied Military Council. The Soviet Government had not agreed to that name and had suggested “Allied Control Commission”. The United States could not agree to this and in the hope of reaching agreement, it had suggested that it be called an Allied Council, leaving out the word “military”, since it had been opposed by Mr. Molotov and “council” [“control”?] since it had been opposed by the United States. He considered that the document spoke for itself, since it specified control over Japan. He continued that it had been necessary to consult various Departments of the United States Government in respect to the title of this body and that a compromise had been reached in calling it an Allied Council. He expressed the hope that Mr. Molotov would agree to this terminology. He said that he was not in a position to make any changes and added that since the American Delegation had agreed to two or three other suggestions made by Mr. Molotov, he hoped that Mr. Molotov would agree to the American position.
Mr. Molotov remarked that the American and Soviet positions were now considerably closer together with respect to the Control Council. He suggested that the question of the name of the body be deferred.
Mr. Byrnes agreed. However, he wished to point out that control over Japan was divided between the council and the commission. Therefore, there was less reason to put the word “control” in the title.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the Delegates turn to Article 2. He said that he had received instructions to press for United Kingdom and Australian representatives on the council. As Australia had played a very special part in the Pacific war, it felt that it was in a special position and had consequently asked for this representation. He, therefore, requested that his colleagues support this proposal.
Mr. Byrnes explained that Australia had been taken into the FEC and that he believed that it would be wiser to restrict the Council to the four governments which had extended the original invitations to join the Far Eastern Commission. He stated that he could not agree to Mr. Bevin’s proposal. He felt that if an invitation were extended to Australia, it would be difficult to explain to other governments why they could not be included.
Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to remind his colleagues that the question of control of Japan had been the subject of months of discussion in Moscow. The British had been informed of these discussions. Thus far no proposal had been made for the inclusion [Page 694] of Australia. The question had only now been raised. He must report to his government and obtain instructions.
Mr. Bevin pointed out that the original British proposal called for a five power Control Council, including Australia. This had been dropped in favor of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington. Now the British Government was renewing its proposal. It had awaited the present opportunity in order to renew it. Since the United States Delegation could not agree to this proposal and since the Soviet attitude was not known, Mr. Bevin proposed to reserve further discussion on this until the Soviet reaction was received. Perhaps he might have the Soviet views at the next session.
He then suggested that Article 3 be taken up. No comments were made and the discussion turned to Article 4.
Mr. Molotov stated with regard to Article 4 of the United States draft that the Soviet Delegation believed that the phrase “the exigencies of the situation permitting” should be eliminated.
Mr. Byrnes replied that it was impossible for him to agree to that and proposed to proceed to the consideration of the next paragraph.
Mr. Molotov stated that he presumed that a drafting committee would be established to draw up the final text. He requested that this committee devote special attention to Article 4. He suggested that it would contribute to clarification if the word “individual” were to be inserted before the words “cabinet members” toward the end of this paragraph. Just as it had been specified that the Commander-in-Chief was entitled to change individual ministers, so it should be stated that he was entitled to fill vacancies created by the resignations of individual members of the cabinet.
Mr. Byrnes suggested that Mr. Molotov’s proposal be transmitted to the drafting committee.
Mr. Bevin stated that paragraphs 3 and 4 could now be submitted to a drafting committee, but that final agreement had not been reached regarding paragraphs 1 and 2.
Mr. Byrnes remarked that the drafting committee would not be able to proceed very far until settlement had been reached on paragraphs 1 and 2.
A drafting committee composed of Messrs. Cohen, Bennett and Vyshinski was appointed.
2. Far Eastern Commission
Mr. Bevin suggested that the meeting discuss the FEC. He said that the only unsettled questions appeared to be that of India and voting procedure. He asked his colleagues to agree to the inclusion of India.
[Page 695]Mr. Byrnes stated that he had agreed to this on behalf of the United States Government. That had been two or three months ago, since which time India had been represented in the meetings of the Far Eastern Commission. Mr. Byrnes had no objections at this time to India’s serving on the commission.
Mr. Molotov said that he had already expressed the Soviet view on this proposal and asked that further discussion be deferred until tomorrow.
Mr. Bevin took up the question of voting procedure, under paragraph V 2. The original British proposal was that only two of the representatives of the four powers (United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China) should concur with the majority. The latest draft provided for concurrence of all four.
Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States had originally proposed the concurrence of three and that the Soviet Government had suggested four.
Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it only just and right, in order to insure the friendly collaboration of all four powers in Far Eastern issues, to provide for four power concurrence. This would be in the interest of world peace.
Mr. Bevin faced a difficulty in agreeing to this.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he would accept any one of the three arrangements: two power concurrence as Mr. Bevin had proposed, three power concurrence as he himself had proposed, or four power concurrence as Mr. Molotov had proposed.
Mr. Molotov at this point reiterated his preference for an arrangement which would facilitate the friendly cooperation of the four powers in the Far East.
Mr. Bevin stated that the Australians felt that the work of the Commission might be held up in the event that all four could not agree. Mr. Bevin would like to decide this question tomorrow at the same time Mr. Molotov gave his reply on India.
Mr. Molotov stated that this particular question did not involve India.
Mr. Bevin said that he would give his answer tomorrow on both points. Meanwhile, he suggested that the remainder of the text be transmitted to the drafting committee.
Mr. Molotov emphasized that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of four power concurrence.
Mr. Bevin admitted that this question was very important and stated that he would look into it tonight.
Mr. Byrnes suggested that the drafting committee proceed with its work on the last paragraphs of the council proposal.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether, in view of the fact that other governments [Page 696] were involved, the three powers meant to arrive at a decision or merely a recommendation.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the United States had presented its proposals to the three powers only. The other representatives on the commission had been advised of the Moscow discussions, although they had not been informed of the final changes in the terms of reference. The Chinese Government had been informed of these.
Mr. Bevin stated that he wished it to be clearly stated whether the result would be recorded as a decision or an understanding of which other governments would be advised officially.
Mr. Byrnes stated that if agreement were reached the three powers could advise the Chinese Government thereof and ask for its concurrence. The Chinese would also be asked to join the three powers in presenting the plan to the several governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission.
Mr. Bevin stated that he had to be quite clear with reference to Australia. If the recommendations were put in final form without consulting Australia, this might create a difficult situation for him.
Mr. Byrnes suggested that a difficulty might arise if consultation were undertaken. If a government on the Far Eastern Commission might object to the terms of reference and ask for further consideration by the three powers, this would not be feasible. Mr. Byrnes urged therefore that the three powers agree to invite the other governments to join and concur in their plan.
Mr. Molotov stated that in his view Mr. Byrnes was correct. However, he would have to report to his Government and he hoped to obtain its agreement to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal. He hoped that China would associate itself with the plan adopted and that no insurmountable difficulties would arise after the other governments were informed.
Mr. Bevin preferred to defer this question until tomorrow.
Mr. Byrnes hoped that this question would be disposed of tomorrow in one way or the other. He did not wish the conference to continue indefinitely and it would be necessary to communicate with the Chinese before the end of the Conference.
Mr. Molotov agreed with him.
Mr. Bevin stated that there were three points outstanding: India, voting procedure, and the question of whether the result would be presented as a decision or merely as a recommendation. He hoped that final decision would be reached tomorrow on these questions.
3. Korea
Mr. Bevin proceeded to the next item on the agenda, namely the establishment of a unified administration for Korea.
[Page 697]Mr. Molotov stated that there were several points in the American draft66 which he desired to elucidate. The Soviet Delegation would formulate its views on this question today. He pointed out that the original proposal of the United States Government had raised the question of an independent Korean Government. He wished to ask as to how this question stood at the present time.
Mr. Byrnes stated that this question was dealt with in the American paper which had been circulated, without regard to the wording as contained on the original agenda or to what was said in Mr. Harriman’s letter.67 The United States Government hoped to see an independent government in Korea ultimately and he hoped that this question could be considered as set forth in the American paper.
Mr. Molotov said that it was easy to understand that the United States Delegate distinguished between urgent questions and those of long term significance. This was quite correct. There were urgent questions calling for immediate decision. Others required preparatory work before settlement. This was how he understood the United States proposal. Since there were Soviet military forces in the north of Korea and United States military forces in the south, the settlement of the urgent questions should be assigned to them. With respect to the long term questions he could state that the Soviet Government agreed to the establishment of a trusteeship for Korea and that this trusteeship should be undertaken by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether he was correct in assuming that the Soviet Delegation’s proposal was based upon the United States proposal. He inquired whether a decision, therefore, should be adopted on the basis of the United States proposal.
Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that both the United States draft and the Soviet proposals would be given consideration. He hoped to submit the Soviet proposals tonight.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he was anxious to make headway with the effort to solve the immediate situation in Korea. He had been advised since his arrival that 1,060,000 Korean refugees had come into the American zone. These included a half million from the Russian zone of Korea and Manchuria. There were many more to come. The half million from the Russian zone and Manchuria claimed that they had originally been residents in the portion of Korea embraced in the United States zone. This was a very important question to solve. [Page 698] It was also necessary to provide for a free exchange of merchandise and people and to restore the Korean economy. He inquired whether Mr. Molotov was in accord with the United States proposal for a trusteeship, having in mind an independent government in five years, at which time the trusteeship might be extended for another five years by agreement. He believed that this was what Stalin had in mind four months ago in Berlin. He said he had not discussed this matter with Mr. Bevin.
Mr. Bevin supposed that the trusteeship council would have something to say on this score.
Mr. Byrnes agreed. His only hope was that the present proposals would be agreed to by the three powers.
Mr. Bevin stated that the Soviet paper would be awaited and that the question would be returned to upon the receipt of it.
Mr. Molotov circulated a paper on Korea later in the meeting (see enclosure no. 1).
Mr. Bevin proceeded to item 4 on the agenda. (Disarmament and evacuation of Japanese in Manchuria).
At Mr. Molotov’s suggestion, it was agreed to defer consideration of this question until tomorrow.
Mr. Bevin then proceeded to item 5—Bulgaria and Rumania.
Mr. Byrnes circulated two American papers (enclosures no. 2 and 3) and suggested that they be considered at the next meeting.
4. Atomic Energy
Mr. Bevin then turned to item no. 6 (control of atomic energy).
Mr. Byrnes stated that he was very anxious to bring up this question for discussion in order to obtain the views of his colleagues on the United States proposal to establish a United Nations Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. He hoped that the Soviet Delegation would join in sponsoring this proposal when the United Nations Organization meets. He asked that consideration be given to the United States proposal68 and explained that he wished to make an addition following the last paragraph on page three. This consisted of an extract from the Declaration of November 15 and should have originally been included but had been omitted by mistake, (enclosure no. 4).
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was now studying the American proposal and requested that the subject not be considered today.
Mr. Byrnes agreed.
[Page 699]5. Germany
Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to distribute a memorandum on Germany with a view to exchanging opinions on that question (enclosure no. 5).
Mr. Bevin stated that he did not wish to discuss Germany without the participation of France. He wished to be perfectly clear on this point. He would, however, listen to what his colleagues had to say. He would look at Mr. Molotov’s paper; however, he was in a difficult position with regard to considering any questions concerning Germany.
Mr. Molotov suggested that these questions could be discussed in an informal way, not necessarily at the regular meetings.
Mr. Bevin stated he would be very happy to hear Mr. Molotov’s views regarding Germany, but this would have to be on a preliminary basis.
Mr. Molotov asked that the Soviet paper be studied and that agreement then be reached regarding the procedure of considering this question.
Mr. Bevin reiterated that he was placed in a difficult position. If the Soviet Government wished to say something in an informal way he would study the document as a document between the two governments, but he did not wish to formalize the discussion at the present time.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he would be glad to read the document and join in informal conversations on it and he proposed that this be done tomorrow.
It was agreed to meet at 12:00 noon tomorrow for this purpose.
The meeting was adjourned by Mr. Bevin at 4:35 p.m.
- The British delegation minutes of this meeting also list Edward Page as present with the United States delegation and Pierson J. Dixon as present with the United Kingdom delegation.↩
- The American revised draft on the Allied Council for Japan is included as enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Fourth Session, December 19, p. 672.↩
- United States delegation memorandum on the subject of a unified administration for Korea, included as enclosure 2 to the United States delegation minutes of the Second Formal Session, December 17, p. 641.↩
- Text of Harriman’s letter of November 8 to Molotov, included as enclosure 4 to the United State’s delegation minutes of the First Formal Session, December 16, p. 627.↩
- United States Proposals on Atomic Energy, included as enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Third Formal Session, December 18, p. 663.↩
- The text of the letter from King Michael of Rumania to Brig. Gen. Cortland T. van R. Schuyler, is contained in telegram M–1454, August 21, from General Schuyler to the War Department, vol. v, p. 574.↩
- Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Government of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France, June 5, 1945; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1051.↩
- Item IV, 5 of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1506.↩
- Item V of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1507.↩