740.00119 Council/12–2645
Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers25
| Present: | The Secretary |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Vishinsky | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
| Subject: | Ethridge Report on Rumania and Bulgaria |
| Finnish Peace Treaty | |
| Peace Treaties |
The Secretary said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov in order to give him a copy of the report which Mr. Mark Ethridge had made to him concerning Rumania and Bulgaria.26 He said Mr. Molotov would remember from our discussions in London that he had felt that one of the difficulties in the question of these two countries was that [Page 644] the divergent views of their Governments resulted from different information. He had always been aware that human beings being the way they were it was possible that the representatives on the spot had been affected by personalities or personal feelings. For this reason when he returned home from London he had sought to find an individual who would be absolutely independent and new to the whole situation and one who had had no connection with either of these countries or the State Department. He had finally selected Mr. Ethridge, a well-known American editor of liberal political views and sympathetic attitude towards the Soviet Union. He had told him before he left that he should obtain information from the officials of the Department of State but not any expressions of opinion and that he should also wipe from his mind completely the fact that the United States had not found it possible to recognize these Governments. In other words he should go to these countries with a completely open and independent mind.
Mr. Ethridge had made his report on December 8 and although he had told the President that his findings would be published he had withheld publication because of the present meeting which would give him an opportunity to show it to Mr. Molotov rather than make it public then. The Secretary added that he had had an unofficial translation prepared for Mr. Molotov’s convenience. He said Mr. Ethridge had not found it possible to recommend that recognition be extended to these Governments but had certain suggestions to make to bring about a situation which would permit recognition. He said he hoped that Mr. Molotov would read this report and have some suggestions of his own made bearing in mind responsibilities of the United States Government under the Yalta Declaration concerning interim governments.27 He said he hoped very much some solution could be found which would permit us to recognize these Governments and then to give the peoples of these countries some economic help which they sorely needed.
Mr. Molotov thanked the Secretary but remarked that obviously Mr. Ethridge when he left the United States was aware that the Secretary of State was against the recognition of these countries and that this would have a certain influence on his opinion.
The Secretary said that he had expressly asked Mr. Ethridge to wipe that from his mind and that the whole purpose of sending him there was to get an impartial and fair investigation of the facts. He had told Mr. Ethridge that the President at Potsdam although unable to agree to recognition then had agreed with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee that each country would examine separately the situation. [Page 645] He added that he felt that he had done everything he could in the search of a solution including sending Mr. Ethridge and he hoped Mr. Molotov would have some suggestion for his part.
Mr. Molotov thanked the Secretary and said he was grateful for his efforts and those of Mr. Ethridge and that he would study the report.
The Secretary said he thought that when Mr. Molotov had studied the report it would be better for the three Ministers alone with perhaps one adviser each to discuss this question.
Mr. Molotov agreed and said he would take advantage of the Secretary’s presence to answer an observation he had made yesterday concerning the peace treaties. He did not want to discuss the whole question of peace treaties but only the Secretary’s remark concerning the exclusion of the United States from the Finnish treaty. He said that the Secretary of course knew the opinion of the Soviet Government that an exception to the proposed procedure would be made in the case of the United States and that this was entirely natural in view of the relationship of the United States to the war. He said he had had this exception in mind which he regarded as only natural when he had made the proposal yesterday.
The Secretary replied that he had merely asked in order to find out how as written the proposal would operate.
Mr. Molotov repeated that they had always intended that an exception should be made of the United States. The same, however, could not be said of France who had no right to claim participation in the Finnish treaty. In regard to Germany and Italy the case was different.
The Secretary said that he had not expected to discuss the peace treaties at this visit but since the matter had been raised he must state that he was disappointed to find that our positions were still so far apart.
Mr. Molotov said that he felt that they had moved in the American direction but that the United States had not taken any steps from their London position.
The Secretary replied that he had gathered from Ambassador Harriman’s conversation with Marshal Stalin28 that the Soviet position was nearer the American one on the subject of the peace conference than appeared from Mr. Molotov’s proposal of yesterday.
Mr. Molotov stated that his proposal corresponded exactly and in detail with Stalin’s statement to Mr. Harriman.
Ambassador Harriman then outlined his understanding of Marshal Stalin’s position, namely, that on the first day he had been in favor [Page 646] of separate conferences but the second day he had agreed to have one conference at which all the states on the list he had presented would be present and express their views.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky said that yesterday’s proposal provided for one conference but for different composition depending upon the particular treaty to be discussed and that this was an accurate expression of Marshal Stalin’s words.
The Secretary said that he wished to recall the fact that we had abandoned our first position that all five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers should participate in the preparation of the treaties in deference to the Soviet view and that he now felt that the most important question was what states would have the final approval of the treaty and that the conference was less important except that it would give an opportunity to other states to be heard.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether the Secretary meant that all 51 of the United Nations should have a right to be heard. He said that it was the view of the Soviet Government that only states which had actively participated in the war against the enemy country in question should be heard. It was necessary to establish some principle in regard to participation in the conference and that the United States in asking only for Brazil had apparently been following that same principle.
The Secretary replied that we had never envisaged invitations to all 51 but merely those falling into the categories mentioned in the American proposal. He said that in our view the war had been one war and that the accidental participation of the forces of some of the United Nations in one theater as against another was not the proper basis to determine their right to participate. He said that all the countries that would be included on our list had actively participated in the war against Germany and had suffered greatly as a result of the war. In the American view Germany and her satellites were all one for this purpose.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that for example Norway had not declared war on Finland nor had Poland declared war on Rumania.
Mr. Byrnes emphasized that the purpose of the conference was not to afford these other states the right of decision but merely to give them an opportunity to express their views on the draft treaties which had been prepared in accordance with the Soviet formula.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether Turkey would be invited since she was a member of the United Nations although in fact she had helped Germany more than the Allies.
The Secretary repeated that the important question was who would decide the final terms and that he felt that as liberal an attitude towards the conference as possible would be most desirable. He said, [Page 647] however, that Turkey had not been envisaged as a country eligible to be invited.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that after the first world war different countries had participated in the peace treaties with the various enemy countries and that the list had not been identical for the various countries.
The Secretary said that as a lawyer he felt that the judge was more important than witnesses and that the main question was to decide who would have the final approval on the peace treaties and thus act as judges, whereas the countries invited to the conference would merely be in the capacity of witnesses. He said the judges can either accept or reject what the witnesses say. He added that Mr. Vishinsky as a lawyer would appreciate this point.
Mr. Vishinsky said he did and that it reminded him of a lawyers proverb that Turkish judges listened to what witnesses had to say and then always did the exact opposite.
- Meeting held at the Kremlin, December 18, 1945, 12:15 p.m.↩
- See letter of December 8, from Mr. Ethridge to the Secretary of State, vol. v. p. 638.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as section V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 971.↩
- Reference here is to conversations of October 24 and 25 at Gagri, between Ambassador Harriman and Generalissimo Stalin; for memoranda of these conversations, see pp. 567 and 575, respectively.↩