Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes, Third Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 18, 1945, 4:00–7:15 p. m.²⁹

Moscow, December 18, 1945, 4:00–7:15 p.m.

Present:30	Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to London
	Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo
	Mr. Tsarapkin, Chief, American Section, NKID
	Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter
	Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State
	Mr. Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow
	Mr. Cohen, Counselor of Department of State
	Dr. Conant, President of Harvard University
	Mr. Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs
	Mr. Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs
	Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary
	Mr. Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Sir A. Cadogan, Under Secretary of State
	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow
	Sir R. Campbell, Ambassador
	Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Counselor, Far Eastern Department
	Mr. McAfee, Interpreter

Subjects:	Council of Foreign Ministers
	Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission

1. Council of Foreign Ministers

Mr. Byrnes opened the session and presented for discussion Item 1 on the agenda.

Mr. Bevin stated that he found it very difficult to accept the Soviet proposal³¹ on preparation of peace treaties although he was very anxious to see the question settled. There was a wall separating the Delegations with regard to the peace treaties. The war, after all, had been one war.

Mr. Molotov admitted that the war had been one war but he could not ignore the fact that some countries had fought in it and others not, that some countries had fought on one side and some on the other. Not all the 51 United Nations were in an equal position in this respect. The United States draft³² drew a distinction between European and non-European nations, which would not be intelligible merely on the principle that the war had been indivisible. Why had only Brazil been singled out among the non-European nations for participation? Turkey was one of the European United Nations but it had not been proposed that Turkey participate in the peace treaties. Thus it was not possible to apply the principle proposed by the United States Delegation that all European members of the United Nations should participate.

Among the five permanent members of the Security Council, China had not claimed to participate. Should China be compelled to do so? Thus the formula of the indivisibility of the war did not dispose of the question at hand.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the American formula covered the States which should have the privilege of expressing their views. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China would wish to participate in order to discharge the duties of the Security Council, which were to preserve the peace. The United States Government had urged at first that China and France should participate in the drafting of the peace treaties. The Soviet Government had disagreed and it had been impossible to reach agreement. The United States Delegation had surrendered its position and agreed that China should be excluded from the drafting of the peace treaties. But it insisted that China and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, should have the privilege at least of being present and expressing their views concerning the peace treaties.

With regard to the categories “European members of the United Nations”, as referred to in the United States draft, Mr. Byrnes wished to state that the United States had not classified Turkey as a European state. There was also another reason why the United States did not insist upon this; namely, that Turkey had not declared war until after the Yalta Conference.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to bring about an agreement in this matter and that in the hope of so doing he was willing to amend the United States proposal by striking out the word “European” in the sentence “together with all the European members of the United Nations” and by striking out the next following line, so that the text would read: “together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military forces against the European members of the Axis”.

Mr. Byrnes submitted a list enumerating the nations which would be included in this category (enclosure No. 1³³). This list did not refer to the nations which would finally approve the peace treaties but rather to those which would be privileged to attend the Conference and to present their views. Each one had actively waged war against European members of the Axis. It seemed to him that those countries which had been actively at war should have the privilege of expressing their views regardless of whether those views were accepted.

Mr. Molotov stated that the drafting of peace treaties had no relation to the work of the Security Council. He had read statements to this effect by Mr. Byrnes. The drafting of peace treaties had no relation to any United Nations body. In drafting the peace treaties it was necessary to decide upon a principle for determining which countries were eligible to participate in this work irrespective of their status in the Security Council or United Nations Organization.

The Soviet Delegation proposed the principle that those countries were eligible which had actually waged war and furnished substantial military contingents in the war against one or another of the Axis powers. Accordingly, Mr. Byrnes’ formula was correct in principle in that it recognized as the criterion active warfare against an Axis power.

Mr. Byrnes repeated aloud the words in the United States draft “together with all members of the United Nations which actually waged war with substantial military forces against European members of the Axis.”

Mr. Molotov stated that it would be more exact if the formula read “with one or another of the European members of the Axis.”

Mr. Byrnes replied that his idea was that states which had been at war with any one of the European members of the Axis would have the right to express their views. Thus, the United States would have the privilege of expressing its opinion regarding the peace treaty with Finland although the United States would not sign the treaty. He emphasized the one-war theory. For example, the cooperation of China in fighting the Japanese had made it possible for the United States to contribute all its power to bring about victory in Europe. Thus in inviting China as a permanent member of the Security Council we would be inviting her as a partner who made it possible for the United States to bring all its power to bear in Europe. Mr. Byrnes repeated that China would not be among the states giving final approval to the peace treaties but merely would have the privilege of being present and expressing its views. The only possible objection would be that this would require too much time. However, that could be governed. In this fashion those who desired to express their views would be heard, which was the important thing.

Mr. Bevin declared that the war was an Allied war waged in accordance with strategical and geographical considerations. It was an accident whether a given country had fought in one theater or another. Germany had employed her forces and those of her satellites in accordance with military considerations. Mr. Bevin was concerned not so much with the drafting of the treaties as with what would happen afterward, especially in so far as UNO was concerned. The United Nations Organization was responsible for the observance of the peace treaties. Looking to the future, would it be wise to adopt an exclusive policy according to which certain countries would merely be told that they were expected in the United Nations Organization to see to it that the peace treaties are observed? If there should be consultation in as wide an area as possible, following the more liberal lines of discrimination of the United States proposal, would that not imply acquiescence and agreement to enforce the peace treaties? This course, which was not too rigid but on the other hand recognized differences among the United Nations, would be a reasonable compromise and would do injustice to no country. If Mr. Bevin correctly understood the United States proposal, this proposal was in accordance with the conclusion drawn from previous discussions that the preparation of the peace treaties would be in the hands of those countries named in the Soviet proposal. The next thing would be to provide for wide consultation. The final stage would re-create the original arrangement as formulated in the Soviet proposal. Mr. Bevin then inquired whether he had correctly understood the United States proposal.

Mr. Byrnes replied that Mr. Bevin had correctly understood the first and second stages. He pointed out, however, that there was a difference between the United States and Soviet proposals as regards the final stage of peace treaty procedure. According to the United States proposal the treaty terms would be given final approval by the states which had been at war with the countries in question. However, according to the Soviet proposal those giving final approval would be limited to states which had signed the armistice terms. Mr. Byrnes submitted that this was an important question, which he was willing to discuss in an effort to reach agreement. He had never taken an inflexible position in the matter. He was willing to discuss the question of the final approval of the peace treaties and wished to hear the views of his colleagues upon it. Mr. Byrnes called attention to the fact that at the Berlin Conference the heads of government, when drafting the provision for the Council of Foreign Ministers, had said that the immediate task of the Council was to draft peace treaties with a view toward their submission to the United Nations. It would be possible to justify failure to submit the treaties to all the United Nations in so far as their drafting was concerned in view of other decisions of the Berlin Conference. But the smaller nations of the United Nations had ground for arguing that the peace treaties should be submitted to them. Mr. Byrnes was satisfied that it would be in the interest of the Big Three to give no ground for the opinion that they were denying to the members of the United Nations the power or opportunity to express their opinions. He could not believe that Generalissimo Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee had intended that the peace treaties should be submitted to the members of the United Nations without giving them a hearing. This would be merely saying: “Sign on the dotted line.” If the treaties were to be submitted to them, then there should be no question of not abiding by this decision, regardless of how the matter was interpreted. The justification for not inviting all the states was that it would be more practical to limit the number to those states which had actively waged war, as in the United States proposal.

Mr. Molotov stated that with regard to the participation of the United States in the peace treaty with Finland, there was no doubt but that the United States would have an opportunity to participate. The Soviet Delegation had always recognized the right of the United States to do so and every one would appreciate that fact. But there were exceptions to the rule. China had not participated in the European war. Mr. Byrnes had referred to China as a member of the Security Council. However, it was not the task of the Security Council to draft the peace treaties. Applying Mr. Byrnes’ criterion of active participation in the war against European members of the Axis, it was clear that China was not covered in this formula.

With further regard to the remark of Mr. Byrnes, the Soviet proposal referred to the necessity of convoking a conference but at the same time gave consideration to the principle upon which this conference would be convoked. This principle was that all the United Nations which had actively engaged one or another of the European members of the Axis would participate in discussions of a given peace treaty. Comparing the final paragraphs of the United States and Soviet proposals, paragraph 4 of the Soviet proposal provided that the final text of the treaties would be signed not only by the signatories to the armistice agreements but also by those United Nations which under paragraph 2 had been supplying substantial military contingents. On the other hand, paragraph 3 of the United States proposal provided that the terms of the peace treaties would be finally approved by those among the states invited which had waged war against the enemy states in question. Both proposals referred to states which had actually waged war. Therefore, the distinction was not clear between paragraph 3 of the United States proposal and paragraph 4 of the Soviet proposal. It appeared that Mr. Bevin saw no difference between these two paragraphs.

Mr. Bevin [said he?] did not understand either paragraph. Did paragraph 4 of the Soviet proposal mean that all the states mentioned in paragraph 2 would sign all the treaties, or that only the countries which drafted a treaty would sign it? For example, would the Italian peace treaty be signed by just the four countries drafting it?

Mr. Molotov said that paragraph 2 of the Soviet proposal stated explicitly which countries would participate in the discussions on each peace treaty. Those countries would be the ones to sign them. Thus Yugoslavia would sign the treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. Greece would participate in discussing the peace treaties with Italy and Bulgaria and would sign these treaties. The Hungarian treaty would be signed not only by the Big Three but by Czechoslovakia. The Finnish treaty would be discussed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States but signed by the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was in a difficulty. He took it for granted that the treaties would be signed by the countries which drafted them.

However, other nations which had declared war against an enemy state would, according to international law, remain at war with that state unless they too signed the peace treaty.

Mr. Molotov replied that Czechoslovakia had declared war on Finland but inquired why Czechoslovakia should sign a peace treaty with Finland. Czechoslovakia’s signature would not be needed. Neither Great Britain nor the Soviet Union was in need of Czechoslovakia’s signature.

Mr. Bevin said that in the case of any country which had declared war some action would have to be taken to set matters right.

Mr. Molotov replied that this was a technicality which could easily be taken care of. Costa Rica had declared war on Rumania but would determine its relations with Rumania after the peace treaty had been signed.

Mr. Byrnes stated that when the heads of government had agreed at Berlin that the peace treaties should be submitted to the United Nations, they meant that the treaties, when finally drafted, would be submitted to the countries which had been at war. It had always been the United States view that any given treaty would be submitted to any country which had declared war. The countries would in this fashion have been given an opportunity to agree or not to agree to the peace treaty which had been arrived at.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether Costa Rica would be expected to sign the peace treaty with Rumania.

Mr. Byrnes replied that Costa Rica might be given an opportunity to sign the peace treaty. However, Costa Rica would not be invited to participate in drafting the treaty since it had not actually waged war against Rumania.

Mr. Byrnes explained to Mr. Bevin that paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal corresponded with paragraph 3 of the United States proposal. The United States proposal contains no paragraph relative to the formal signing of the treaties since the United States Government had regarded this as a matter of course. The difference between the two proposals was that paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal provided that the texts would be finally approved by the signatories of the armistice agreements, whereas paragraph 3 of the United States proposal provided for final approval by those of the states invited which had been at war with the given enemy state. By final approval the United States proposal meant the drafting of the final text.

Mr. Molotov stated that he now understood the distinction.

Mr. Bevin declared that this was not exactly a technicality. He pointed out that the Dominions had been at war with Finland, Rumania and Hungary. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had been at war with Bulgaria although Canada had not. Therefore this was not merely a technicality. It was necessary for the treaties to be signed since the establishment of various commercial and other peacetime relations could only be made possible on this basis. From the standpoint of countries which indulged in overseas trade, it was important that this matter be clarified.

Mr. Bevin desired that those countries which had been at war should be permitted to sign the peace treaties.

Mr. Molotov reminded Mr. Bevin that the British Ambassador had signed the armistice agreement with Finland on behalf of the whole British Commonwealth including the Dominions. The same principle should be applied in the case of peace treaties. With the British signature of the Finnish armistice, Canada’s signature had been dispensed with. Czechoslovakia was the only country among those which had declared war on Finland which had not been represented in the armistice signatures.

Mr. Bevin replied that the Dominions might be “infuriated” if he were to agree without consulting them to sign the peace treaties on their behalf. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had at times signed documents on Great Britain’s behalf.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union had been authorized to do so.

Mr. Bevin stated that authorization was something which it was necessary to obtain. He pointed out that at Versailles each Dominion had insisted upon signing on its own behalf. He could not assume that he would be given authority to sign on their behalf. The Dominions might decide that this was necessary for them to do themselves. However, if willing, they could authorize him to sign on their behalf. India had always insisted upon signing herself.

Mr. Byrnes interrupted to say that in his view the important issue was that of paragraph 3, namely, which states would finally approve the treaties. No one could object to any nation’s signing the treaties. The Foreign Ministers would have done their part when they had submitted peace treaty drafts which they considered wise and just. Other states could decide whether to sign the treaties or to continue in a formal state of war. Mr. Byrnes had always regarded this as a matter of course. The important matter was the determination of the final terms of peace treaties.

With regard to the question of giving countries an opportunity to express their views, Mr. Byrnes wished to urge upon Mr. Molotov once more that this was, after all, one war. In point of fact, the United States had been able to conduct only limited operations in the Balkans. That was because strategy had determined that the United States should invade through Normandy and not through the Balkans. Had it been decided by the military to invade the Balkans first, the United States would have played a much more active role in the war there. As partners in a common venture each of the Allies had served where it could serve best. China had performed a great service by holding the Japanese and giving the United States an opportunity to furnish more aid to those engaged in Europe. Norwegian shipping had helped to supply the United States Air Force in its bombing operations. These other states would merely be given an opportunity to come to the conference and present their views. This would do no harm but on the contrary would give the world confidence in the fairness of the Big Three.

Mr. Bevin remarked that Norway had lost one-third of its seamen in the war.

Mr. Molotov stated that China had not lost a single soldier in Europe.

Mr. Byrnes stated that if governments were given an opportunity to be present at the peace conference, there would be no difficulty in finding a formula. With regard to China and France, they were members of the Foreign Ministers Council. There was no question of their being charged with the duty of drafting the treaties. The United States had agreed with the Soviet position in that respect, but there was a provision that they could be present, if not as members of the Security Council, then, in accordance with the Berlin decisions, as members of the Foreign Ministers Council. The heads of government had made them members of the Foreign Ministers Council and they might be invited as associates of the Big Three on that body. They would be given the same privilege as that furnished Brazil, namely, the privilege of expressing their views for those drafting the treaties to consider.

Mr. Molotov said that it was necessary to agree upon a principle determining the invitation to the peace conference.

Mr. Byrnes stated that with further regard to China, the heads of government had evidently presupposed that China would participate in the peace conference as otherwise they would not have made China a member of the Foreign Ministers Council. If France and China were invited in their capacity as members of the Foreign Ministers Council this would not involve voting privileges. Under this procedure the peace conference would be convoked by the Foreign Ministers Council to consider peace treaties drafted by the Deputies under the formula suggested by the Soviet Government. There would be at the conference the five members of the Foreign Ministers Council and the states which had actively waged war with substantial military forces against the European members of the Axis. When these states had listened and expressed their views, then the peace treaties would be drafted by the countries which in the decision of the present conference would be entitled to draft the final texts. It was necessary for the present meeting to decide which countries would draft the final texts. If agreement could be reached on this matter, there would be no difficulty over the question of inviting others to express their views.

Mr. Bevin inferred from Mr. Byrnes’ remarks that the conference itself would consist of the list of countries presented by Mr. Byrnes. He was clear as to which countries would draft the treaties and finally approve them, but not as to the countries which would constitute the peace conference itself.

Mr. Molotov proposed the principle that those countries which contributed substantial military contingents and actually waged war against specific countries would participate in the discussions of the respective peace treaties. If the principle could be determined governing participation in the peace conference, then it would be easy to draw up a list of the participants.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to see the actual list.

Mr. Molotov agreed that the Soviet Delegation would submit such a list.

Mr. Bevin stated that it was a question of what was meant by “substantial military aid”. England had been at war with Bulgaria—he could not recall exactly how long before others had declared war on Bulgaria. The Dominions had furnished bombers and supplied explosives, et cetera, in these operations. He was quite sure they would never agree to the theory that these were separate wars. England had never inquired as to where Germany procured its oil—from Rumania or elsewhere—but nonetheless London had been bombed. He considered it better to have a conference along the lines of the United States formula, to hear the views of all on all treaties, and in the last analysis to leave the decision as to who finally approved the treaties to the limited group. The present United States proposal had approved the head and tail of the Soviet proposal. The middle, that representing the United States position, would give satisfaction to a wide circle of states. He hoped that the Soviet Government would agree with the British and United States Governments on this.

Mr. Byrnes stated that there was a difference between paragraph 3 of the United States proposal and paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal. However, he was willing to make one more concession in an effort to come to an agreement. He would surrender paragraph 3 of the United States proposal in favor of paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal provided that Mr. Molotov agreed to allow the conference to proceed in accordance with the United States proposal.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was necessary to study the United States list, which appeared too extensive. The Soviet Delegation would submit a list of states which in its opinion should be eligible to express their views.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States had made a concession in regard to the procedure of drafting peace treaties. Again in the all-important matter of the final step, he had agreed to do as the Soviet Government desired. The three Governments could not be brought into agreement if all concessions were on one side. All that the United States asked in return for conceding what Mr. Molotov asked for was that the small governments enumerated on its list should be given an opportunity to be heard before action was taken.

Mr. Molotov replied that the question was not one of concessions on the part of the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Delegation did not request any concessions. He remarked that the meeting had now returned to what the Big Three had decided at Berlin last August. The Soviet Delegation did not ask for concessions; it only desired to carry out their formal decisions. Therefore it was necessary to agree as to the principle of the peace conference in such a way as to give satisfaction to all those present, as well as to be fair to other states. The principle was that those states which actually waged war against given enemy states should participate in the conference. Mr. Molotov anticipated that the list of participants would be considerably larger in the case of the German peace treaty. He promised to submit a list of states which in the Soviet view should participate in the drafting of the several peace treaties.

Mr. Byrnes replied that it had been President Truman’s understanding at Berlin that all the members of the Foreign Ministers Council would be allowed to be present at and participate in the discussion of the peace treaties. Mr. Attlee had also had this understanding. Thus this opinion was supported by two out of the three heads of government. Nevertheless the United States had now conceded that the Soviet view should prevail and that the matter was settled.

The Berlin decisions said nothing concerning the peace conference and that question accordingly was up to the Foreign Ministers to settle. The United States had desired the conference to be as broad as possible, but in the hope of reaching agreement with the Soviet Government had made the restriction specified in the United States proposal as it now read. The United States had desired others to participate in approving the final texts, but in order to reach agreement had accepted the Soviet point of view. Mr. Byrnes did not mind making concessions because, when several parties were interested, each would have to make some concession in order for all to reach agreement.

Mr. Bevin apologized for having previously confused paragraphs 3 and 4, signatures and final approval.

Mr. Byrnes stated that if Mr. Molotov would agree to a broad conference he would agree to the restricted language which Mr. Molotov proposed in paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was troubled about the Dominions. He would like to see the proposal in final form.

Mr. Byrnes reiterated that, in the hope of reaching agreement, he had consented to accept Mr. Molotov’s final paragraph. He agreed to Mr. Molotov’s idea concerning who should be the judges provided that Mr. Molotov agreed to his idea concerning who should be the witnesses. By the “judges” he meant the countries drafting the treaties; by the “witnesses” the countries expressing their views.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would present a list expressing the view of the Soviet Delegation as to which countries were eligible to participate in the conference discussion. Furthermore he would study Mr. Byrnes’ list.

After a brief recess Mr. Byrnes proceeded to the second point on the agenda.

2. Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States Delegation had presented its views on this subject and that there was nothing he wished to add. He inquired concerning the views of his colleagues.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had expressed its opinion on this question more than once during the recent Moscow negotiations between the United States and Soviet Governments.

Mr. Bevin stated that he knew about the negotiations but was uninformed concerning precise views which had been formulated therein.

Mr. Molotov observed that according to the United States paper³⁴ the British and Chinese Governments had been informed of the negotiations.

Mr. Byrnes understood that it had been communicated to Great Britain, and that the United States was in communication with the Soviet Government in an attempt to reach an agreement on this matter.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had been informed of the talks but had not heretofore been informed of their conclusions. He inquired whether the paper in hand was an agreed text between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Byrnes said that there had been no agreement reached.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had not referred to an agreed text.

Mr. Byrnes stated that although no agreement had been reached, the United States Government had attempted as a result of the conversations to go as far as possible toward meeting the views of the Soviet Government. About two weeks ago the representative of Great Britain in Washington had been given a memorandum containing the United States proposals.

Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that the British Government took a favorable view of these negotiations.

Mr. Bevin said that he merely wished to know what it was that he was being asked to agree to.

Mr. Byrnes said that the text was contained in the two papers which he had circulated at the opening session.

Mr. Bevin understood that the discussions had been inconclusive. Amendments had been proposed. However, Mr. Bevin did not know whether these amendments had been adopted. He wished to see a draft of What had been agreed to.

Mr. Molotov stated that in his view Mr. Byrnes had stated his proposals in sufficiently definite fashion. In the view of the Soviet Government the negotiations of the past two months had been both useful and fruitful. Mr. Molotov believed that the proposals presented by Mr. Byrnes could be the basis of further discussion. The Soviet Delegation, however, desired to make certain amendments. It had now become easier to propose these amendments since the United States and Soviet views had come closer than in the beginning. This was the Soviet view concerning the progress of the negotiations to date.

Mr. Byrnes inquired what amendments Mr. Molotov had in mind.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was interested in the attitude of the British Delegation with regard to the proposals.

Mr. Bevin stated that they were generally acceptable but that the British Delegation would have some suggestions to make which were not vital.

Mr. Molotov circulated copies in Russian of the proposed Soviet amendments to the United States proposals concerning the terms of reference of the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission.³⁵

Mr. Byrnes stated that it would be necessary to have this document translated.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation was also interested in amendments which the British Delegation might propose.

Mr. Byrnes proceeded to the open discussion on the question of an independent government for Korea, but Mr. Molotov requested that this be postponed until the following session as the Soviet Delegation had not concluded its study of the United States draft proposal.

Mr. Byrnes proceeded to item 4, the disarmament of Japanese forces in North China and their evacuation to Japan. He then proposed that a special meeting be arranged in which the Ministers could discuss the several matters referring to troop withdrawals. It had been understood that an informal meeting would take place on these matters and Mr. Byrnes proposed that such a meeting be held tomorrow.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had not yet completed its study of the documents on item 4. This would require some time and he would inform his colleagues as soon as the study had been completed.

Mr. Byrnes said that there were several questions on which it had been agreed to have informal discussions including the withdrawal of troops from Iran and Greece and the transfer of control over Manchuria. He suggested that the meeting to discuss these matters be held tomorrow around noon time.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this with the qualification that the Soviet Delegation had not concluded its study of the documents on North China.

It was agreed that the meeting proposed by Mr. Byrnes would be held in Mr. Molotov’s office at 12 noon tomorrow.

Mr. Byrnes then circulated a United States paper on the atomic bomb.³⁸

Mr. Molotov inquired whether this document had previously been published.

Mr. Byrnes replied that it had not.

Mr. Byrnes adjourned the meeting at 7:15.

[Enclosure 1]

[Enclosure 1 set forth the names of the States to be invited to the peace conference to discuss the peace treaties, as proposed by the United States delegation; for the list of these names, see footnote 33, page 649.]

[Enclosure 2a]

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 18, 1945.

The Allied Council for Japan

The Soviet Delegation proposes the following amendments to the draft of the American Delegation of December 16:³⁹

Point 1. Point 1 to be worded as follows:

“There shall be established an Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission) with its seat in Tokyo under chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his Deputy) for the purpose of control over the execution of the terms of surrender of Japan and for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender and occupation of Japan and also for fulfilling directives supplementary thereto.”

Point 2. In the last sentence of this point the words:

“the size of which shall be fixed in agreement with the Chairman of the Council”

to read:

“consisting of military and civilian representation.”

Point 4. In place of the words:

“He will consult and advise with the Council upon orders involving questions of principle, in advance of their issuance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon all matters shall be controlling.”

to say as follows:

“On questions concerning the implementation of decrees of the Far Eastern Commission the decisions of the Supreme Commander shall be final with the exception of questions of principle, such as questions concerning a change in the regime of control over Japan, changes in the constitutional structure, of a change in the Japanese Government as a whole. In the event that a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy) regarding the implementation of the aforementioned decrees involving questions of principle, the decisions of the Supreme Commander on these questions will not be put into effect prior to agreement (soglasovanie) on these questions in the Far Eastern Commission.

In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may take decisions concerning the change of individual ministers of the Japanese Government after appropriate preliminary consultation with representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission)”.

Point 5. To delete Point 5 in view of the fact that this point is covered by Point 4.

[Enclosure 2b]

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 18, 1945.

The Far Eastern Commission

The Soviet Delegation proposes the following amendments to the draft of the American Delegation of December 16:⁴⁰

• Article I to be worded as follows: “The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines hereby establish a Far Eastern Commission composed of representatives of the participating powers.”
• Article II C to be worded as follows: “The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission for Japan) and will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander’s command of occupation forces.”
• Article III(3) to be worded as follows: “Any directives dealing with fundamental changes in Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of occupation or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will only be issued following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.”
• Article III(4) to be deleted.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 18, 1945.

United States Proposals on Atomic Energy

It is the earnest desire of the United States to collaborate with other nations for the purpose of developing with the greatest practicable speed international measures to prevent the use for destructive purposes of atomic energy and other means of mass destruction, and to promote the use of atomic energy and other scientific advances for the benefit of mankind.

The President of the United States announced on October 3, 1945, that, in furtherance of this purpose, it was the intention of this Government to hold conversations with the other Governments associated with it in the development and use of atomic energy, and subsequently with other governments.⁴¹ The first step having been taken, it is now desired, as the next step, to hold exploratory conversations with the Soviet Government in regard to this matter which is of such vital importance to the peace and well-being of the peoples of the world.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the Governments of Great Britain, Canada and the United States believe that a commission should be established under the United Nations Organization to study the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters and to make recommendations for submission to the Organization. It is suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council, together with Canada, should join in the sponsorship of a proposal to this effect at the first meeting of the United Nations in January 1946. It is the hope of this Government that the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and of the United Kingdom will fall in with this suggestion and will join in recommending it to the Governments of China, France and Canada. A draft embodying the present views of the Government of the United States as to the method of establishing the Commission is submitted herewith. It is the desire of this Government to have a full exchange of views on this draft.

In connection with these proposals we call attention to the following statements taken from the Declaration on Atomic Energy issued by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee and W. L. Mackenzie King of Canada on November 15, 1945:⁴²

• “(4) Representing as we do, the three countries which possess the knowledge essential to the use of atomic energy, we declare at the outset our willingness, as a first contribution, to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific information and the interchange of scientists and scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate.
• “(5) We believe that the fruits of scientific research should be made available to all nations, and that freedom of investigation and free interchange of ideas are essential to the progress of knowledge. In pursuance of this policy, the basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has already been made available to the world. It is our intention that all further information of this character that may become available from time to time shall be similarly treated. We trust that other nations will adopt the same policy, thereby creating an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence in which political agreement and cooperation will flourish.
• “(6) We have considered the question of the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy. The military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses.
• “We are not convinced that the spreading of the specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb.
• “On the contrary we think it might have the opposite effect. We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of the United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.”
• [“(8) The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. Specifically it is considered that the commission might well devote its attention first to the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information, and as a second stage to the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials.”]⁴³

[Annex]

Proposed Recommendations for the Establishment by the United Nations of a Commission To Deal With the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy and Other Related Matters

i. establishment of the commission

The Commission should be established by the General Assembly which is the only body, under the terms of the Charter, possessing the authority to examine the entire problem of atomic energy.

ii. reports of the commission

The reports of the Commission should be made to the General Assembly for transmission to the members of the United Nations, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. The General Assembly should also request action of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council on those aspects of the reports which require action, and which fall within the respective jurisdiction of those bodies.

iii. composition of the commission

The Commission should be composed of one representative each of those nations represented on the Security Council, and Canada when that nation is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission should have such assistants as he may desire.

iv. rules of procedure

The Commission should establish its own rules of procedure, and have whatever staff may be deemed necessary.

v. terms of reference of the commission

The Commission should proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular, the Commission should make specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends,

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes,

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The Commission should not infringe upon the responsibility of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

[A meeting between M. Molotov, accompanied by M. Vyshinsky and M. Pavlov, and Mr. Bevin, accompanied by Ambassador Kerr and Mr. McAfee, took place on the afternoon of December 18. M. Molotov and Mr. Bevin outlined the positions of their Governments on various issues, particularly Greece, the Balkans, Iran, Indonesia, and India. A record of this meeting (not printed) was given by Ambassador Clark Kerr to Ambassador Harriman on the same day.]

29. A brief report on this meeting was transmitted to Washington by the Secretary of State in telegram 4221, Delsec 15, December 19, 1945, from Moscow (740.00119 Council/12–1945).
30. According to the British delegation minutes of this meeting (not printed) the following additional persons were present: For the United States—Edward Page; for the United Kingdom—Maj. Gen. Ian C. Jacob, John G. Ward of the British Foreign Office, and Pierson J. Dixon.
31. The text of the Soviet proposal on the preparation of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland is included as enclosure 1 to the United States delegation minutes of the Second Formal Session of the Conference, December 17, pp. 632, 640.
32. The American proposals on the preparation of peace treaties were included as enclosure 2 and subenclosure to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session of the Conference, December 16, pp. 621 and 622, respectively.
33. Not printed; the States enumerated in the United States delegation list were as follows: United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, White Russia, and Ukraine.
34. United States delegation memoranda regarding the revision of the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council (for Japan) are included as enclosures 3a, 3b, and 3c to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session of the Conference, December 16, pp. 623, 624, and 626, respectively.
35. The Soviet proposals are included as enclosures 2a and 2b, pp. 661 and 662, respectively.
38. The United States delegation memorandum is included as enclosure 3 to these minutes, p. 663.
39. For the text of the United States delegation’s proposed revision of the terms of reference of the Allied Council, see enclosure 3c to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session of the Conference, December 16, p. 626.
40. For text of the United States delegation’s proposed revision of the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission, see enclosure 3b to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session of the-Conference, December 16, p. 624.
41. For relevant excerpts from President Truman’s message of October 3, 1945, to the Congress on the subject of the international control of atomic energy, see Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945, p. 514.
42. For text of the Declaration on Atomic Energy, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 3) 1479.
43. This final paragraph was not included in the United States memorandum as originally circulated at the Third Formal Session of the Conference but was circulated as an addition by the United States delegation in the course of the Fifth Formal Session of the Conference, December 20, p. 692.