Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes, Second Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 17, 1945, 4 p.m.¹⁴

Moscow, December 17, 1945, 4 p.m.

Present:15	Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to London
	Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo
	Mr. Tsarapkin, Chief, American Section, NKID
	Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter
	Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State
	Mr. Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow
	Mr. Cohen, Counselor of Department of State
	Dr. Conant, President of Harvard University
	Mr. Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs
	Mr. Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs
	Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary
	Mr. Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Sir A. Cadogan, Under Secretary of State
	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow
	Sir R. Campbell, Ambassador
	Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Counselor, Far Eastern Department
	Mr. McAfee, Interpreter

Subjects:	Chairmanship of Conference
	Procedure of Meetings
	Foreign Ministers Council
	Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission Korea
	Japanese in North China

Mr. Molotov opened the session. He then proposed that henceforth the conference should follow the rotating chairmanship procedure employed at London as he felt unable to preside exclusively and was anxious that the work of presiding be shared equally among the three Ministers.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not believe that things would proceed any better on that basis, that Mr. Molotov had presided with great skill and grace in the preceding session, and that he therefore proposed that Mr. Molotov continue to preside at all the sessions.

Mr. Molotov repeated his statement that he felt unable to assume the chairmanship alone and that this work would be accomplished more satisfactorily on the basis of rotation. Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin to consent to this proposal.

Mr. Byrnes stated that in as much as the chairmanship did not involve a great amount of work, he hoped that Mr. Molotov would agree to preside.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was only proposing to rotate the chairmanship, not to be permanently relieved of this duty.

Mr. Bevin stated that it would be desirable for Mr. Molotov to continue presiding.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that he was unable to accept this procedure.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he would prefer Mr. Molotov to continue presiding but that if Mr. Molotov did not wish to do so, there was no alternative but to accept his proposal.

Mr. Molotov thereupon proposed that Mr. Bevin take the chair.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had a further question in mind. The present conference had been contemplated as one which would consider questions informally and in an exploratory way. In this connection he wished to inquire whether the conference intended to adopt any decisions. He proposed that the Ministers arrive at an agreement on this question.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he hoped that the conference would reach decisions whenever possible to do so. He realized that it might not always be possible to reach decision in all matters. In any event matters could be explored, issues drawn, and whenever possible decisions reached.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether it would not be desirable to replace the word “decision” by the word “understanding”. He pointed out that other governments were involved in some of the matters to be discussed. On the other hand, there were certain matters, of concern to the three governments exclusively, upon which decision could be reached. It was not possible to foresee the outcome of the discussion at the outset.

Mr. Molotov observed that as he understood it, Mr. Byrnes thought it might be possible to arrive at decisions whereas Mr. Bevin doubted whether this would be possible. He reiterated his desire to learn whether the conference intended to adopt any decisions, pointing out that he was not insisting upon the adoption of any specific proposal. He merely wished to define the character of the conference.

Mr. Bevin stated that there might be decisions reached on certain matters and that with regard to other matters there might be obtained an understanding as to what would be the next step. He stated that he did not wish to be too legalistic in approaching this question.

Mr. Byrnes agreed with Mr. Bevin that there would be some cases in which it would be desirable to reach a decision but that in others, owing to the involvement of other powers, or for other reasons, no decision would be reached but an understanding could be reached among the three governments. Each case should be decided on its own merits.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to have defined the way in which the present conference differed from previous conferences. In the past there had been no such reservation as expressed in the terms “exploratory and informal”.

Mr. Byrnes stated that in London the conference agenda had been assigned to the Foreign Ministers by the heads of the three governments. The present conference, however, bore an informal character in that the Ministers could discuss any question they desired. He recalled that the idea of periodical meetings of the Foreign Ministers had arisen at Yalta. Mr. Byrnes quoted the section of the Yalta decisions bearing on this point.¹⁶ He added that through the periodic meetings of the Foreign Ministers the three peoples and Governments of the three countries would know that their Foreign Ministers were in close contact with each other. Furthermore, their exchanges of views would make it much easier to reach agreement than through exchanges of correspondence.

Mr. Molotov agreed with Mr. Byrnes that the Foreign Ministers conferences were useful, reiterating, however, that there had been no reservations in previous conferences as to the informal and exploratory character of the conference. The decisions of the Yalta and Berlin Conferences had made no mention of such a reservation and Mr. Molotov was anxious to clarify whether any special meaning was attached to it.

Mr. Byrnes recalled that the Yalta Conference had been a conference between the three heads of governments. The Foreign Ministers had held meetings in the mornings. Because of the successful results of these morning meetings it had been suggested by the three heads of governments that it would be desirable to continue these meetings. At the Potsdam Conference the Foreign Ministers had been brought together again. At the London Conference there had been an agenda fixed by the heads of government. By the term “informal” Mr. Byrnes merely wished to indicate that, as distinct from the procedure at London, the Foreign Ministers were free at the present Conference to discuss any question whatsoever and were not confined to a predetermined agenda. His thought was only that at the present Conference the Foreign Ministers were not bound to any agenda previously agreed upon but were free to discuss any question.

Mr. Molotov stated that as he understood it, then, decisions might be taken on some questions whereas there would be merely an exchange of views on others. He added that this meant that the Conference would proceed on the basis of the decisions of the Yalta Conference and not the Potsdam Conference with regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had not been aware that there were two procedures, one for, the Foreign Ministers Council and one for the present Conference.

Mr. Byrnes quoted the section of the Yalta decisions bearing on the proposed future conferences of the three Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin, who had assumed the chairmanship of the session in accordance with Mr. Molotov’s proposal, opened a discussion on the first item on the agenda.

1. Foreign Ministers Council¹⁷

Mr. Bevin stated that the United States Government had submitted a paper on this subject.¹⁸

Mr. Byrnes stated that there was nothing he wished to add to the memorandum which he had circulated yesterday evening on this question. He again called attention to the fact that one change had been made in the final paragraph. He reiterated that paragraph one had been submitted by Mr. Molotov, paragraph two by himself, and that Mr. Molotov had stated that he did not object in principle to this proposal, but had to consult his Government concerning it.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had a written proposal on this subject, which he circulated (enclosure no. 1).

Mr. Bevin requested a recess of a half hour in order for the American and British delegates to study Mr. Molotov’s memorandum.

At the end of this recess, Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to ask one or two questions. With regard to the peace conference, he desired to ascertain whether any country which had not been signatory to an armistice could express its opinion with regard to a peace treaty.¹⁹

Mr. Molotov replied that this interpretation was correct.

Mr. Byrnes stated that in this case, the peace treaty with Finland could be discussed at the peace conference only by the two powers which had prepared the treaty.

Mr. Molotov replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Byrnes inquired whether the United States would have to withdraw from the peace conference when this peace treaty was discussed.

Mr. Molotov stated that as far as he knew, the United States had never claimed to be a signatory to the armistice with Finland.

Mr. Byrnes replied that he had not referred to that point. He wished to know whether the United States would be entitled to express its views or whether it would have to withdraw from the peace conference when the treaty with Finland was discussed.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed that the United States would be able to express its views.

Mr. Byrnes replied that this was all that he had been concerned about, namely, that each country would be entitled to express its views, although the treaties would be signed by the countries signatory to the armistice.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet draft proposal set forth the views of the Soviet Government on this point.

Mr. Byrnes stated that there was nothing further for him to say. He stated that the delegates were farther apart on this issue than he had expected them to be and that he would like to pass on to the next item on the agenda and return to the present item later.

Mr. Bevin stated that the Soviet proposal recreated the issue which had arisen in London. He said that the delegates were farther apart than they had been in London, and this had placed him in a very uncomfortable situation. He wished to secure settlement on this point. He pointed out that in accordance with the Soviet proposal France would not be permitted to express its opinion on any peace treaty except the treaty with Italy, despite the fact that France is a European power. He pointed out that he was not talking about the deputies drawing up the peace treaties but about the expression of views on these treaties. He said that the Soviet proposal would exclude the Dominions from a voice in the peace treaties with Bulgaria and Rumania, although the Dominions had participated in the war since 1939. India would be totally excluded although Indian troops had participated in every theater of war and India had signed the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Mr. Bevin expressed the hope that the peace conference would be placed on a much broader basis. He pointed out that the Dominions, although non-signatories to the Bulgarian armistice, had received certified copies thereof as soon as they had been signed. He again reiterated his wish that the conference be placed on a broader basis. He stated that he also would like to know who would convoke the peace conference, whether it would be the Foreign Ministers Council or some other body.

Mr. Molotov replied that in his view this question was perfectly clear. Those who signed the armistice terms would call the peace conference.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was in agreement with Mr. Byrnes that this question should be discussed no further at this time.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to add a few words in explanation of the Soviet proposal. He stated that the French role in preparing the peace treaties had been determined at the Berlin Conference. The Soviet proposal was in accord with this Berlin Conference decision. With regard to the Dominions, their position was sufficiently definite. They had fought against Italy but not against Bulgaria and Rumania. Nothing was being said here regarding a peace treaty with Germany. It was obvious that in preparing a peace treaty for Germany the number of participants would be much larger. The questions at issue was whether only those countries which took part in the fighting should participate in the preparation of peace treaties. The Soviet Government took the affirmative in this issue, as a matter of principle, and was so guided in its proposal. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government was disposed to place a restricted interpretation upon its proposal with reference to the component republics of the USSR, such as the Ukraine, Belorussia, and certain others. Although these Soviet Republics would have a claim to participate in the preparation of peace treaties, such a claim was not being advanced. The Soviet Government believed that only those states which provided substantial military contingents should participate in the preparation of peace treaties. Those which had not provided such substantial military contingents or which had not actually fought the countries concerned had no basis for participation in the preparation of peace treaties.

Mr. Bevin stated that the Conference would proceed to the next item on the agenda.

2. Terms of Reference for the Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had distributed three papers on this topic²⁰ at the previous session and would like to receive the views of his colleagues concerning them.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether it was proposed to take a final decision on this question, in as much as it also concerned China.

Mr. Byrnes replied that China was, of course, interested and that he would wish to communicate with China with regard to it. However, he hoped that the three Ministers could reach an understanding and in that event it would be very hopeful that China would associate herself with the agreement reached.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether this applied also to the other powers on the Advisory Commission.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission had originally been proposed by four powers and that the other powers had been invited to join it on the terms agreed upon by the four.

Mr. Bevin explained that he had merely wished to be clear on this point.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was studying Mr. Byrnes’ proposal.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether, in view of that, Mr. Molotov would prefer not to discuss the question on the present occasion.

Mr. Molotov replied that it would be better to postpone consideration of this question until the following session.

Mr. Bevin proceeded to the third item on the agenda.

3. The Establishment of a United Administration for Korea

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had prepared a proposal on this subject which he wished to circulate, (enclosure No. 2).

Mr. Bevin stated that there seemed to be two principles involved in Mr. Byrnes’ proposal: the acceptance of the principle of a trusteeship, and the immediate establishment of a unified administration. Although it was obviously necessary to study the details, there would be no violent conflict with regard to these principles. Mr. Bevin stated further that this was the sort of question which the Three Powers might assign to specialists for concrete implementation.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had no desire to request immediate action upon his proposal. The United States Government had merely attempted to put its views in writing. As he had stated at yesterday’s session, at Yalta Generalissimo Stalin and President Roosevelt had had only an understanding on this question. The understanding was that a trusteeship would be the wise procedure in the case of Korea. As Mr. Bevin had remarked, there appeared to be agreement upon this in principle and the details could be worked out.

Mr. Bevin had no objection to appointing a committee to draft these details.

Mr. Molotov stated that it would be premature to refer the problem to a committee of specialists. It would require some time to study Mr. Byrnes’ proposal.

Mr. Bevin proceeded to the fourth item on the agenda.

4. The Disarming of Japanese in, and Their Evacuation From, Northern China

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had circulated at the previous session a statement concerning the United States Marine Forces in North China.²¹ Furthermore, a statement had been issued by the President last Sunday morning further clarifying this problem. Mr. Byrnes circulated the latter statement (enclosure No. 3²²).

Mr. Molotov said that it would be necessary to study Mr. Byrnes’ document.

Mr. Byrnes replied that he had no objection whatsoever. The paper which he had just circulated contained no proposal but was merely a statement of the situation. It set forth what the United States forces were doing in North China and what the President had announced was United States policy there. When Mr. Byrnes had stated that he wished to discuss this subject, it had been his intention to furnish a statement along these lines. Mr. Byrnes was following what he regarded as the purpose of the Conference—that of exchanging views on questions of common interest. He wished to advise his colleagues as to the situation and as to the United States policy in China.

Mr. Molotov stated that the documents which Mr. Byrnes had submitted dealt with a question which he believed it would be useful to discuss at the present Conference. He wished to have an opportunity to study these documents.

Mr. Bevin opened the discussion on item five of the agenda.²³

Mr. Byrnes stated that he would prefer not to discuss the fifth item at the present session.

Mr. Bevin adjourned the Conference for the day.

[Enclosure 1]

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 17, 1945.

On the Preparation of Peace Treaties With Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have agreed:

1. For the preparation of the terms of peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland the Council of Foreign Ministers is to be convoked, provided that:

A) the terms of a peace treaty with Italy will be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France;

B) the terms of a peace treaty with Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom;

C) the terms of peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

2. To discuss the terms of peace treaties prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers under paragraph 1 a Conference will be convoked as soon as practicable to which, besides the representatives of the states signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, (France being regarded as such for the purposes of peace treaty with Italy), shall be invited as well as representatives of the states, which contributed substantial military contingents and actually waged war against the aforementioned countries although not signatory to the terms of armistice, namely: representatives of Yugoslavia at this Conference will take part in the discussion of the terms of peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria; representatives of Greece—the terms of the peace treaties with Italy and Bulgaria; representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and of the Union of South Africa, Brazil, and Ethiopia—the terms of peace treaty with Italy; representatives of Czechoslovakia—the terms of peace treaty with Hungary.

3. After the conclusion of the Conference provided for in paragraph 2, the states, signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland or regarded as such (France—for the purposes of peace treaty with Italy) will accordingly draw up final texts of peace treaties.

4. Final texts of peace treaties will be signed by representatives of the Allied States in conformity with paragraph 2.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 17, 1945.

Unified Administration for Korea

We are committed by the Cairo Declaration and by the Potsdam Protocol to the creation of an independent Korea.²⁴ I believe we are all agreed that Korea should achieve its independence at the earliest feasible time and that every effort should be made to assist the Koreans in achieving independence.

In conversations between representatives of our governments the idea of a trusteeship for Korea has been sympathetically considered. It has been generally understood that the trusteeship authority would be composed of representatives of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K., and the U.S.; and that the period of trusteeship would endure for no longer period than necessary to allow the Koreans to form an independent, representative, and effective government.

At present Korea is divided into two zones of military administration. North of latitude 38 is the Soviet area; south of latitude 38 is the American area. This division, made before the termination of hostilities to facilitate military operations and the effectuation of the terms of surrender is manifestly an impediment to the achievement of a unified administration for Korea. No effective liaison or coordination exists between the two military administrations.

The American Government has informed the Soviet Government of some of the more urgent problems that arise out of the division of Korea and has proposed (1) the resumption of exchange of commodities between the two zones including the movement of coal and the release of electric power from the northern zone for use in the southern zone; (2) the resumption of railroad and other traffic between the two zones; (3) the resumption of coastal shipping; (4) the establishment throughout Korea of uniform fiscal policies; and (5) the solution by orderly means of the displaced persons problem, including the return to Japan of Japanese subjects. The U.S. Government has inquired of the Soviet Government whether it is prepared to authorize the Soviet commander in Korea to enter into negotiations with the American commander looking toward a solution of these problems or whether it wishes that these problems be discussed between the two Governments.

The United States Government believes that the immediate objective in Korea should be the creation of a unified adminstration under the two military commanders acting jointly in all matters of Korean national interest; that is, in matters pertaining to currency, trade and transportation, telecommunications, distribution of electric power, coastal shipping, displaced persons, et cetera. It is envisaged that Koreans would be utilized in so far as practicable in a unified administration both as administrators and as consultants and advisers to the military commanders.

We propose the unified administration described above as a transitory but essential step toward a broadly based non-military administration of Korea looking toward the establishment of an independent Korean Government. We believe that a four-power trusteeship would provide the most feasible machinery for bringing into being an independent Korea. We propose, therefore, that discussions be undertaken as soon as practicable among the four interested powers to set up a unified administration for Korea under a trusteeship agreement.

Our ideas on the provisions of a trusteeship agreement have not taken definite form but tentatively we propose that the agreement should provide, among other things, for an administering authority (the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K., and the U.S.) acting in behalf of the United Nations and the people of Korea; that the administering authority should exercise such executive, legislative, and judicial authority as may be necessary for the efficient administration of Korea until a free and independent Korean Government is established; that the administering authority should act in accordance with the basic objectives set forth in Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations; that the administering authority should exercise its powers and functions through a High Commissioner and an Executive Council composed of one representative for each of the States comprising the administering authority; and that the High Commissioner and Executive Council should promote as rapidly as possible the progressive political, economic, and social advancement of the Korean people, and should establish a popularly elected Korean legislature and an adequate Korean judicial system, all for the purpose of bringing into being an independent Korean Government within a period of five years, which might be extended if necessary by agreement among the four states represented on the administering authority for a further period not to exceed five years.

14. A brief report on this meeting was transmitted to Washington by the Secretary of State in telegram 4218, Delsec 13, December 18, 1945, from Moscow, not printed.
15. The British delegation minutes of this meeting (not printed) list the following additional persons present: for the United States—Edward Page; for the United Kingdom—Pierson J. Dixon.
16. See section VIII of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 974.
17. In the British delegation minutes of this meeting, this agenda item is called “Preparation of Peace Treaties”.
18. Memorandum by the United States delegation and Resolution by the United States delegation, both entitled “Preparation of Peace Treaties” and included as enclosure 2 and sub-enclosure to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session, December 16, pp. 621 and 622, respectively.
19. In this connection, the British delegation minutes of this meeting at this point read as follows: “When the meeting resumed Mr. Byrnes said that as he understood the Soviet proposal, only the Big Three could for instance speak when peace terms for Roumania were being discussed. M. Molotov said that was correct, as the other Powers were not at war with Roumania.” (740.00119 Council/12–2645).
20. Included as enclosures 3a, 3b, and 3c to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session, December 16, pp. 623, 624, and 626, respectively.
21. Included as enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session, December 16, p. 628.
22. For text of enclosure 3, containing President Truman’s statement regarding the United States policy toward China, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945, or Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945, p. 543.
23. i.e., Recognition of the Governments of Bulgaria and Rumania.
24. The “Cairo Declaration” here cited is the Communiqué of the First Cairo Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, released to the press on December 1, 1943; for text, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448, or Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393.