Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–1745

Record of Conversation, Prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers⁹

Moscow, December 17, 1945.

Present:	Mr. Byrnes
	Mr. Bevin
	Sir A. Cadogan
	Mr. Dixon

Soviet Policy

Mr. Bevin said that Soviet policy was disturbing. It looked as if the Russians were attempting to undermine the British position in the Middle East. This could be seen in their attitude towards Greece, Turkey and Persia, all three points where the U.S.S.R. rubbed with the British Empire. The Soviet Government were maintaining large numbers of troops in Bulgaria and in Hungary, and there were also national armies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The world seemed to be drifting into the position of “three Monroes”. The United States already had their “Monroe” on the American continent and were extending it to the Pacific. (Mr. Byrnes interjected that in the Pacific the United States only wished to establish bases for security purposes in islands many of which were uninhabited.) Russia seemed to be aiming at the formation of a “Monroe” area from the Baltic to the Adriatic on the west to Port Arthur or beyond on the east.

Greece

As regards Greece, if we withdrew our troops the result would be increased pressure from the Soviet Government on Greece or some manufactured incident between Bulgaria and Greece. Even if agreement were reached to withdraw Soviet troops from Bulgaria, the threat of the Bulgar army to Greece would remain. Greece had been overrun by two enemies, her economy had completely run down and everything had to be reconstructed. We were doing our best.

Dodecanese

Mr. Bevin recalled that it had been impossible to reach agreement on the cession of the Dodecanese to Greece at the London Conference. We were anxious to withdraw our troops and had thought of handing the administration of the islands over to the Greeks de facto. We had, however, hesitated to do this because of the Russian threat.

Turkey

His Majesty’s Government could not be indifferent to a Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her. We could not agree to the Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan. Mr. Bevin asked if Mr. Byrnes intended to raise the question of the Straits at the present meeting.

Mr. Byrnes replied that he did not.

Persia

Mr. Bevin suggested that possibly a desire for oil was at the bottom of the Soviet attitude towards Persia. Mr. Byrnes doubted this since the Soviet Union had enough oil. Mr. Bevin agreed and thought that Soviet intentions were probably to turn the province of Azerbaijan into a subservient area.

Mr. Byrnes said that according to information received from the U.S. Representative at Tehran it was not necessary for the Soviet Government, in order to achieve their aims in Azerbaijan, to retain troops beyond the treaty date, since they would hope to control the province by underground methods after the troops had been withdrawn.¹¹ He was also informed that the inhabitants of the province had a real grievance and that they had not been given the measure of provincial autonomy for which they had asked.¹²

Mr. Bevin agreed that there was something in this and said that we had been urging the Persian Government to consider taking steps to meet the provincial demands.

Mr. Byrnes thought that it would help if the British and American Governments could recommend to the Persian Government that they should grant the necessary provincial freedom; this would cut the ground from under the Soviet Government, who were posing as the defender of democracy in Persia, which offended American sensibilities.

Mr. Bevin agreed that consideration might be given to the three Powers sending representatives to Azerbaijan to report on the position.

Summing up, Mr. Bevin said that he proposed to have a frank talk with M. Molotov and tell him how uneasy Soviet intentions made us. He would ask M. Molotov what the Soviet intentions were. Just as a British admiral, when he saw an island, instinctively wanted to grab it, so the Soviet Government if they saw a piece of land wanted to acquire it. If these were the Soviet intentions we should like to be told in order to know where we stood.

Mr. Byrnes approved the idea of a frank talk by Mr. Bevin with M. Molotov, and said that he also intended to see M. Molotov and to raise with him in particular the report of Mr. Ethridge which revealed that the Bulgarian elections had been a farce and that there was a deplorable economic state of affairs in Bulgaria and Roumania. He suggested that Mr. Bevin might see M. Molotov tomorrow morning, that he himself might see M. Molotov later in the day and that the three of them should meet for an informal discussion the following day. This was agreed.

Middle East Questions

the levant

Mr. Bevin said that he had read some criticisms from the State Department about our recent settlement with the French Government regarding the Levant States.

Mr. Byrnes had not heard of this and enquired what was the position.

Mr. Bevin explained that the State Department had criticized the retention of British and French troops in the Levant pending consideration of the status of the States by the United Nations.¹³ We were anxious to withdraw our own troops but could not do so until the French troops left. This they had hitherto been unwilling to do. The settlement which had now been reached, including the references to Anglo-French interests in the Levant, had been introduced mainly in order to save the face of the French. The difficulties had arisen largely owing to the predominant position which had been conceded to the French by the previous British administration.

egypt

Mr. Bevin explained that we should like to withdraw our troops from Egypt but the Egyptians could not defend Egypt by themselves and we had no other base in the Middle East. He admitted that we had hoped that the trusteeship for Cyrenaica might have been allotted to us (and mentioned in passing that when he had said as much to M. Molotov in London, adding that the arrangement that would suit us best was the allocation of Tripolitania to Italy, M. Molotov had replied “Let us agree”).

Atomic Energy

Mr. Bevin said that we had seen the latest American proposals and would be grateful if Mr. Byrnes would defer circulating a paper on the subject to the Conference until Wednesday morning, by which time we hoped to have received the comments of the Prime Minister and other Ministers. Meanwhile, he wished to make two observations on the American proposals. He suggested, in the first place, that paragraph 8 of the Washington communiqué, providing that the Commission should carry on its task by stages, ought to be included.^13a Secondly, it was his provisional view that the Commission ought to report, not to the Assembly but to the Security Council.

With regard to the latter point, Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this procedure would enable the Russians to use the veto which would be obviated if the Commission reported to the Assembly. He agreed, however, to consider Mr. Bevin’s suggestion.

9. Meeting held at the residence of the American Ambassador, Moscow, on December 17, 1945, 2:45 to 3:45 p.m. No American record of this meeting has been found.

   Telegram 4195, Delsec 7, December 17, 4 p.m., from Moscow, vol. v, p. 1299, reported that the question of the procedure to be followed in establishing diplomatic relations with the newly proclaimed “Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” had been taken up with Bevin. Such a discussion with Bevin had been requested in telegram 2521, Secdel 8, December 14, 8 p.m., to Moscow, ibid., p. 1297. No records of British-American discussions at Moscow on the Yugoslav question have been found, but the matter may have been taken up at this meeting.

11. No message of this nature from the Ambassador in Iran has been found in Department files.
12. Regarding the intention of the Iranian Government to institute some measure of provincial autonomy for Azerbaijan, see telegram 1118, December 13, from Tehran, printed in vol. viii . In this connection, see also telegram 183, December 20, from the Secretary of State (in Moscow) to the Ambassador in Iran, repeated to the Department as telegram 4229, ibid. , directing the Ambassador to inform the Iranian Prime Minister of the advisability for the Iranian Government to make early concessions to the demands formulated by the Azerbaijanians.
13. For the Department’s views regarding a draft agreement between the British and French Governments on the withdrawal of troops from Syria and Lebanon, see note of December 13 to the British Embassy, printed in vol. viii .
14. For text of the Agreed Declaration by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, signed at Washington, November 15, 1945, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1504; or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.