Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes, First Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 16, 1945, 5:00–7:10 p.m.⁸⁴

Moscow, December 16, 1945, 5:00–7:10 p.m.

1st Formal Session

Present:85	Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Vyshinski, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs
	Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to London
	Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo
	Mr. Tsarapkin, Chief, American Section, NKID86
	Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter
	Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State
	Mr. Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow
	Mr. Cohen, Counselor of Department of State
	Dr. Conant, President of Harvard University
	Mr. Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs
	Mr. Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs
	Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary
	Mr. Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Sir A. Cadogan, Under Secretary of State
	Sir A. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow
	Sir B. Campbell, Ambassador
	Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Counselor, Far Eastern Department
	Mr. McAfee, Interpreter

Subject: Agenda

1. The Agenda, etc.

Mr. Molotov opened the meeting on his own behalf and that of the Soviet Government, welcoming the Delegations and his Colleagues: Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin. He expressed the hope that the conference would be a success.

Mr. Byrnes expressed confidence that great good would come of the conference and made the suggestion that Mr. Molotov should preside at its sessions.

Mr. Bevin expressed the hope that the conference would prove a great success not only for the countries immediately concerned, but also for the whole world and stated his support of Mr. Byrne’s proposal that Mr. Molotov should preside.

Mr. Molotov thanked the other two delegates for their proposal that he preside and raised the preliminary question of the procedure of convening sessions.

It was agreed that there should be daily meetings at 4:00 p.m. with provision for exceptions to this rule if desirable.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Malik would be the secretary of the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Bevin stated that Mr. Dickson [Dixon?] would be the secretary of the British Delegation.

Mr. Byrnes stated that Mr. Bohlen would be the secretary of the American Delegation.

Mr. Molotov then raised the question of the Conference agenda, pointing out that Mr. Byrnes, as the sponsor of the conference, had proposed an agenda of eight items.⁸⁷ Mr. Molotov stated that in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation the first item on the agenda proposed by Mr. Byrnes should be placed at the end of the agenda and that two additional items should be inserted after item five.⁸⁸

Mr. Molotov stated that the British Government had contributed its observations with regard to the proposed agenda and that Mr. Bevin had objected to discussing the question of withdrawing British troops from Greece. He added that Mr. Bevin had also made observations concerning economic collaboration in Europe without however proposing the inclusion of this topic in the agenda. Mr. Molotov stated further that Mr. Byrnes had objected to the proposal of the Soviet Government to discuss the withdrawal of American troops from China.

Mr. Byrnes stated that there must be a misunderstanding in this matter as he had no objection to discussing the question of American troops in China, but on the contrary, would be very glad to discuss it.

Mr. Molotov maintained that Mr. Harriman’s letter⁸⁹ in this connection had replaced the question of withdrawing American troops from China by the question of withdrawing Allied troops from all independent states except Germany and Japan.

Mr. Byrnes at this point read aloud relevant excerpts of Mr. Harriman’s letter (see enclosure no. 1⁹⁰). Mr. Byrnes stated further that although he did not wish to arrive at a final understanding with regard to United States forces in China in the absence of a representative of the Chinese Government, he would be glad to discuss this question informally and also to discuss the withdrawal of Allied troops from all independent countries. With regard to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion that the first item on the agenda submitted by Mr. Byrnes should be placed at the end of the agenda, Mr. Byrnes stated that he had no objection to this.

Mr. Molotov stated that there appeared to be certain differences of opinion with regard to the agenda. He inquired whether there was any objection to the Soviet proposal that the first item proposed by Mr. Byrnes should be discussed last.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether this item should necessarily be discussed last and suggested that it might be discussed further on in the course of the conference.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Byrnes had agreed to the Soviet proposal; however, if it were found necessary in the course of the discussions to change this decision, it would be agreeable to him.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had not known that Mr. Byrnes was in agreement with the Soviet proposal and that in view of Mr. Byrnes’ agreement, he would present no objections.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that in his opinion there should be no hard and fast agenda, but that the delegates should feel free to bring up any questions which they desired to discuss and that the agenda should be kept open at all times.

Mr. Molotov indicated his agreement, but suggested that the first item be considered as being placed at the end of the agenda.

There was no objection to this proposal.

Mr. Molotov then stated that the Soviet Government proposed to add to the agenda the following two questions:

1. The withdrawal of American troops from China, and

2. The withdrawal of British troops from Greece.

He stated further that the Soviet Delegation believed it necessary to receive information concerning developments in Indonesia and informally to exchange views on this topic. He stated that the Soviet Delegation, therefore, proposed to add the Indonesian situation to the agenda.⁹¹

With regard to item six of Mr. Byrnes’ proposed agenda, concerning the transfer of control over Manchuria to the Chinese National Government, Mr. Molotov stated that this question might be removed from the agenda since the Soviet Government had a special agreement with the Chinese Government concerning Manchuria⁹² and since there were no differences of opinion between the Soviet and Chinese Governments on this score. He, therefore, saw no reason why the Manchurian question should require special consideration.

Mr. Bevin stated that he could not agree to the inclusion of the British withdrawal from Greece on the agenda. He stated that he would be prepared to talk this matter over at a later date when it was determined how the conference was progressing in its discussions on the peace treaties. He took the point of view that Greek discussions should be handled in a preliminary way, rather than as a formal item on the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes stated that although the presence of United States troops in North China was covered by the surrender agreement, he had no objections to discussing this subject and would be glad to provide his colleagues with full information concerning it. He stated that his colleagues were entitled to be thoroughly informed concerning American actions in China and that he desired them to have this information. This, he said, applied to his desire to discuss the withdrawal of Allied troops from all states.

Mr. Bevin stated that with regard to Indonesia he did not quite know what his position was inasmuch as the British in Indonesia were acting under the orders of those who signed the surrender terms; the British troops were stationed in Indonesia in order to carry out the duties allocated to them there. He inquired as to whom he was to report to—the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the present body. He continued that he did not wish to be judged by those who were not in a position to judge him. He stated that the Soviet Government desired to ascertain what the British were doing in Indonesia and explained that they were merely the agents of the Supreme Commander. He explained that he did not want to be “put on the carpet” in the present situation.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he hoped Mr. Bevin would bear in mind the distinction between formal and informal discussions and pointed out that this question might be discussed informally without being placed on the agenda. He added that he was in favor of discussing any and all matters informally and that it would lead to better understanding among all three governments for any question in the minds of any one of the three to be discussed. He, for his part, would be glad to advise his colleagues on any subject they wished to raise.

Mr. Bevin stated that if the Indonesian question were discussed without agreement being obtained, then this would cause misunderstanding. He stated that he would be glad to talk with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes on the subject of Indonesia but repeated that the British were not free agents and were obligated to fulfil the instructions of the East Asia Command. He added that there were certain questions in his mind also which he would like to discuss informally for purposes of clarification without placing them on the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes stated that if Mr. Molotov’s suggestion with regard to Indonesia was based upon the inclusion by Mr. Byrnes of Manchuria on the agenda, he wished to point out that he had included Manchuria not in order to provoke a discussion of the conduct of the Soviet Command but purely to obtain information concerning the situation in Manchuria. He added that if Mr. Molotov so desired, he would be willing to withdraw the question of Manchuria from the agenda. He stated that this was particularly the case in view of Mr. Molotov’s statement that the USSR was working harmoniously with the Chinese Government in regard to Manchuria. He stated that he desired to advise his colleagues of the situation in North China and had also desired to inquire about the situation in Manchuria, in which all sides were interested, but that the question of Manchuria could be withdrawn if Mr. Molotov so wished.

Mr. Molotov stated that with regard to Indonesia he was not referring to the execution of the armistice terms with Japan, which had been signed by the representatives of all three powers, but that the Indonesian question merited examination in essence. He stated that at the end of November the New York radio had reported that the Indonesians had lost 30,000 to 40,000 men and that actual warfare was taking place there. This had attracted the attention of the whole world. The Soviet Government would like to obtain informally information about these events and an explanation of them. He stated that the three Ministers could discuss informally ways and means of ending the bloodshed and stopping the intervention of foreign troops, particularly British, and could discuss the settlement of this question in a peaceful and democratic way. He inquired why this question could not be discussed informally in view of the proposals to discuss the questions of China and Iran. He then repeated that such discussion might facilitate a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Indonesian question.

With regard to the question of the transfer of the control of Manchuria to the Chinese National Government, Mr. Molotov repeated that the Soviet Government had an agreement with the Chinese National Government concerning Manchuria. He stated further that the Soviet Command had worked out a plan of evacuation under the terms of this agreement in accordance with which the Soviet evacuation of Manchuria would have been completed by December 3. The Soviet Command had proceeded with the evacuation and had already evacuated southern Manchuria when the Chinese Government in the middle of November had requested that the evacuation be suspended for a period of one month, to which the Soviet Government had agreed. The Chinese Government had recently approached the Soviet Government again with the request that the evacuation be suspended until February 1st and this further proposal was now under consideration.⁹³ Mr. Molotov concluded that the Soviet Government had neither misunderstandings nor differences of opinion with the Chinese Government on this question and accordingly he saw no reason for its inclusion in the agenda. With regard to the withdrawal of United States troops from North China, Mr. Molotov inquired whether he was correct in assuming that Mr. Byrnes did not object to the inclusion of this topic on the agenda and to an informal exchange of views upon it.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he was in agreement with this.

Mr. Molotov stated that with regard to Greece, he believed that the Ministers were fully entitled to have an exchange of views. He stated that if the withdrawal of our troops from Iran were to be discussed, he saw no reason why the withdrawal from Greece and China should not also be discussed.

With regard to Iran, Mr. Molotov stated that the presence of Soviet troops is covered by the Anglo-Soviet Treaty⁹⁵ and that this question had been discussed at Berlin and had come up for examination again at London. An exchange of views had taken place in London. There had also been an exchange of letters between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin on this question. Mr. Molotov stated further that if Mr. Bevin opposed the discussion of the evacuation of troops from Indonesia, then he would object to including the question of evacuating troops from Iran on the agenda. He would propose therefore that these two questions be considered apart from the agenda.

Mr. Bevin stated that the question of evacuating troops from Iran had not been proposed by him since he had exchanged letters with Mr. Molotov on this question and they had agreed that all troops would be evacuated from Iran by a certain time. He added that before reaching a final conclusion on this issue, he would like to have an unofficial exchange of views with his colleagues. He did not wish to bargain the withdrawal of troops from one area against the withdrawal from another, but to discuss each question on its own merits.

Mr. Molotov expressed his agreement with this.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that the questions of evacuating troops from Greece, Iran and Indonesia be eliminated from the agenda but be discussed informally.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the agenda would be somewhat shorter in view of this and inquired whether agreement had been reached that the question of Manchuria should also be deleted from the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin agreed that Manchuria should also be deleted.

Mr. Byrnes referred to topic No. 4 on his proposed agenda, concerning an independent government for Korea. He wished to point out that he now proposed a new title for this subject reading; “The creation of a unified administration for Korea looking toward the eventual establishment of an independent Korean Government”.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin stated that they had no objections to this revised wording.

Mr. Molotov summed up the items which had been agreed upon as constituting the agenda:

(1) The reconvening of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the resumption of the work of their deputies.

(2) The terms of reference of the Allied Council and FEC.⁹⁶

(3) The creation of a unified administration for Korea looking toward the establishment of an independent Korean Government.

(4) The disarming of Japanese armed forces in North China and their evacuation to Japan.

(5) Conditions permitting the recognition of the present governments of Roumania and Bulgaria.

(6) Proposals concerning a United Nations Commission for consideration of the control of atomic energy.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would proceed to the first item.

2. Preliminary Discussions

Mr. Byrnes stated that he was circulating a memorandum entitled “Preparations for Peace Treaties” (enclosure No. 2). Mr. Byrnes called attention to the fact that this document was similar to the document which the United States Government had presented at London except for one point.⁹⁷ The first paragraph was that which had been presented by Mr. Molotov.⁹⁸ The second paragraph was that which had been presented by Mr. Byrnes. The only change was in the second sentence of the last paragraph.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation wished to have time to review this question and proposed that Mr. Byrnes’ recommendations be considered at the following meeting. He therefore suggested that the conference proceed to point No. 2 on the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had no objection to this and called attention again to the fact that only one change had been made in the original document on this subject. He added that, as he remembered, Mr. Molotov had stated that he had no objection in principle to this proposal. He expressed the hope that Mr. Molotov would have no objection at this time.

Mr. Byrnes stated that with regard to item No. 2 on the agenda he was circulating papers (enclosure No. 3⁹⁹). He stated that the other delegates would wish to have the opportunity to study these papers, and Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin assented.

Mr. Byrnes then proceeded to item No. 3, the question of Korea, referring to Mr. Harriman’s letter of November 8 to Mr. Molotov (enclosure No. 4).

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Harriman’s letter of November 8 did not embrace the question which had been placed upon the agenda, viz. the Korean situation as a whole.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether there had been an answer to Mr. Harriman’s letter of November 8.

Mr. Molotov replied that there had not been an answer but that the questions raised in Mr. Harriman’s letter were being studied. He later corrected himself and stated that a reply had been made.¹

Mr. Byrnes stated that Mr. Harriman’s letter had represented the first step toward accomplishment of the objectives formulated in item No. 3 of the agenda.

Mr. Molotov replied that the letter contained no reference to or mention of a Korean government.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had referred to Mr. Harriman’s letter in connection with the discussion of Korea in as much as this letter contained the ideas of the United States Government as to what would be the first step toward establishing an independent Korean government. It had been his understanding that all three parties had agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea. This could not be accomplished immediately, but the proposals made in Mr. Harriman’s letter would be a most desirable step toward that end and Mr. Byrnes therefore suggested that these proposals be considered in order to relieve the situation in Korea, following which a formula of trusteeship could be discussed. Mr. Byrnes wished that there should be a full exchange of views on this subject but this should be prefaced by discussion of immediate steps to be taken. Then the formula of trusteeship could be discussed. Mr. Byrnes inquired as to the views of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Molotov concerning the specific proposals set forth in this letter with regard to the resumption of commodity exchange, et cetera.

Mr. Molotov repeated his previous statement that Mr. Harriman’s letter had not touched upon the question of a Korean government or the establishment of a trusteeship. He stated that the question placed by Mr. Byrnes on the agenda, however, was the general one of a Korean government and an over-all administration for Korea. Mr. Harriman’s letter raised questions of the exchange of commodities, the resumption of railway operations, shipping, financial policy, displaced persons, et cetera. Mr. Molotov had only just been apprised of the fact that Mr. Byrnes linked these questions with the general question of a Korean government but he did not understand how these questions were related and would like to have this explained.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States Government proposed that a unified administration for Korea be established. Mr. Harriman’s letter had set forth certain proposals which should be adopted in order to achieve this end. If a unified administration were to be established, it would be necessary to have the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea confer and reach agreement concerning the points raised in Mr. Harriman’s letter and other measures looking to the replacement of the present two administrations by a unified administration. The establishment of a unified administration would facilitate the next stage which would be the establishment of a trusteeship as agreed. The agreement had provided for a four-power trusteeship, but there was no reason not to achieve a unified administration at the present time.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Harriman’s letter raised a number of specific questions and that the Soviet Delegation had not been apprised in advance that the Korean question would be raised from this point of view. The specific questions touched upon in Mr. Harriman’s letter were being studied. The Soviet Delegation must obtain material from the appropriate authorities and also from the military authorities in Korea, but Mr. Molotov could state at the present time that due attention had been devoted to these questions in recent weeks.

Mr. Molotov went on to say that since Mr. Harriman’s letter had not referred to a unified administration in Korea or mentioned a Korean government, Mr. Byrnes might wish to explain what the United States Government had in mind on this question.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the United States Government had seen no way to unify the administration of Korea other than by authorizing the American and Soviet Commanders in Korea to confer on steps to be taken toward this end. Mr. Byrnes suggested that there might be a misunderstanding over the phrase “unified administration” which in the American view merely summed up the various specific proposals regarding the nationalization [rationalization] of communications, et cetera. If necessary, the words “unified administration” might be deleted and replaced by the concrete words employed in Mr. Harriman’s letter. Mr. Byrnes moved, therefore, to strike out of the agenda the term “unification.”

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Byrnes was raising an entirely different question from that of the government, trusteeship, or unified administration of Korea. The concrete proposals presented by Mr. Byrnes would require the presence of specialists and advisers on railways, finance, commercial matters, et cetera, but time would not permit this.

Mr. Byrnes agreed that there would not be time for this, but stated that he had desired to discuss whether the Commanders in Korea could be authorized to take up these matters with the appropriate specialists. He agreed that specialists could not be invited to the conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed an examination of the question of a unified administration, trusteeship and an independent government of Korea, as discussed at Yalta by President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin,² would facilitate the settlement of these practical questions raised in Mr. Harriman’s letter. He said that it might be necessary to obtain the opinion of the civilian and military authorities on the questions raised by Mr. Harriman which were of course important. At the moment Mr. Molotov did not have any information regarding the latter questions, although it was quite possible that they were under consideration at the present time. But it would not be desirable to confine discussion of the Korean question to a consideration of these practical questions. Mr. Byrnes at the outset had raised the question of establishing an independent government in Korea. Today he had added to this the question of creating a unified administration and trusteeship. There was a connection between these general and specific questions and a discussion of the former would facilitate examination of the latter.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the original agreement on a trusteeship for Korea.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make it clear that no agreement existed. There had been an exchange of views between the United States and Soviet representatives at the time of the Yalta conference on the necessity of establishing a trusteeship for Korea.

Mr. Byrnes stated that this was in accordance with his understanding. In citing Mr. Harriman’s letter he had not desired to confine discussion to the consideration of the questions raised in this letter. He wished to discuss the general subject. He hoped that a time would come when agreement could be reached upon the establishment of an independent government. The understanding reached at Yalta looked toward the establishment of a trusteeship, which in turn provided for the formation of an independent government. Mr. Byrnes added that the American Delegation would prepare a paper on this general subject for distribution at the following meeting.

Mr. Bevin agreed that this would be the most desirable procedure. He stated that he well understood the desire of Mr. Byrnes to coordinate economic functions in Korea as that was very necessary to bring about unification of that country.

Mr. Molotov stated that the conference would defer discussion of Korea pending presentation of Mr. Byrnes’ document.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had a statement which had been made by the President during the last day or so regarding the presence of American troops in North China (enclosure No. 5³). He proposed that the other delegates take this statement for consideration and that it be discussed at tomorrow’s session.

Mr. Molotov expressed gratification to Mr. Byrnes for the document and terminated the session at 7:10 p.m.

It was agreed among the delegates that no statement would be made to the press following the present meeting, but that at each succeeding meeting a decision would be made as to whether statements should be issued to the press.

[Enclosure 1]

[Enclosure 1, the letter of December 9 from Ambassador Harriman to Foreign Commissar Molotov, is printed on page 606.]

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

Preparation of Peace Treaties

It will be recalled that on September 30, 1945 the Soviet Delegation presented a resolution to the Council of Foreign Ministers to which the United States Delegation proposed an addition on the same date.⁴ The resolution set forth procedure to be adopted for the preparation of peace treaties. It was the feeling of the American Delegation that all members of the Council of Foreign Ministers and all European members of the United Nations, and all non-European members of the United Nations which contributed substantial military contingents in the war against the European members of the Axis, should be permitted to attend a conference and participate in the discussions and in the drafting of peace treaties.

The Soviet Delegate indicated that he was prepared to consult his Government with regard to the addition to the Soviet proposal suggested by the American Delegation.

The United States Delegation attaches for the convenience of the Soviet and British Delegates a copy of the resolution in question and submits it for approval by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

[Subenclosure]

Resolution Proposed by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

Preparation of Peace Treaties

Notwithstanding the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the participation of the members of the Council, adopted on 11th September, in the drawing up by the Council of treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, only members of the Council who are, or under the Berlin Agreement are deemed to be, signatory of the surrender terms, will participate, unless and until the Council takes further action under the Berlin Agreement to invite other members on questions directly concerning them.

The Council will convoke a Conference under the provisions of II, 4(ii) of the Berlin Agreement for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Conference will consist of the five members of the Council, which also constituted the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, together with all European members of the United Nations and all non-European members of the United Nations which supplied substantial military contingents against European members of the Axis. The Conference will be held in London and will begin its proceedings not later than . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945. It will take as the bases for its discussion reports of the Deputies with any modifications agreed upon by the governments of the Deputies in question.

After full hearing and discussion by the invited States, and upon consideration of their recommendations, the final approval of the terms of the treaties of peace will be made by those of the invited States which were at war with the enemy state in question.

[Enclosure 3a]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council

The United States Government has from the outset clearly demonstrated its desire to cooperate with its Allies in bringing about effective implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and the Terms of Surrender for Japan.

In August we proposed the establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. In order to meet the views of our Allies, we have subsequently been giving careful consideration to related proposals put forward by them for the modification and extension of our original proposals.

Over the past two months, discussions have been proceeding with the Soviet Government on this subject. The British and Chinese Governments have been kept informed of the course of these discussions. As a result, the original proposal for the Far Eastern Advisory Commission has undergone considerable modification. The name has been altered to eliminate the word “Advisory”, and the Commission, originally conceived as a recommendatory body, has been clothed with real authority in the formulation of policies, principles and standards for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender. Additionally, we have proposed the establishment of an Allied Council in Tokyo to consult with and advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We have now reached a point where I can lay before my Soviet and British colleagues for their consideration revised proposals for a Far Eastern Commission in Washington and an Allied Council in Tokyo. I am therefore giving you our revisions of the Terms of Reference for the Far Eastern Commission and for the Allied Council. I want to discuss these revised Terms of Reference with you and to reach agreement on them. I believe that a Commission and a Council operating under these Terms of Reference as now proposed by us would bring into being the cooperation among the interested Allied powers for the control and administration of Japan which we have sought from the outset.

[Enclosure 3b]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

Far Eastern Commission

Proposed Revision of the Terms of Reference

I. Establishment.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, United Kingdom, United States, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth hereby establish a Far Eastern Commission composed of representatives of the participating powers.

II. Functions.

A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

1. To formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the instrument of surrender may be accomplished.

2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdictions of the Commission.

3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement between the participating Governments.

B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

C. The Commission shall respect existing control machinery in Japan including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander’s command of occupation forces; and the Supreme Commander shall continue to act under directives which the United States has already sent to him, unless and until the issuing authority shall have modified such directives in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations.

III. Functions of the United States Government.

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.

2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II, A, 2, should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.

3. Any directives dealing with fundamental changes in Japanese constitutional structure, or in the regime of occupation, will only be issued following prior consultation and agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

4. The United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission.

5. All directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.

IV. Other Methods of Consultation.

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

V. Composition.

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the states party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement between the participating powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

VI. Location and Organization.

The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so.

It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Each representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.

The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VII. Termination.

The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization to which the participating governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred.

[Enclosure 3c]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

Allied Council

Proposed Revision of the Terms of Reference

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his Deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, occupation and control of Japan and of directive supplementary thereto.

2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy), who shall be Chairman and United States member; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member; Chinese member; and a British Commonwealth of Nations member. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff, the size of which shall be fixed in agreement with the Chairman of the Council.

3. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

4. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto. He will consult and advise with the Council upon orders involving questions of principle in advance of their issuance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decision upon all matters shall be controlling. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers within the area of his command.

5. Action to modify the agreed regime of allied control for Japan or to approve revisions or modifications of the Japanese Constitution will be taken only in accordance with decisions of the Far Eastern Commission.

[Enclosure 4]

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)⁶

Moscow, November 8, 1945.

Dear Mr. Molotov: In connection with the division of Korea into Soviet and American occupied zones, I have been instructed by my Government to explore the possibility of an interim working agreement being negotiated with the Soviet Government regarding the rationalization of communications, commerce, finance and other outstanding issues in Korea.

General Hodge, the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea, has been vested with the necessary authority to negotiate on a local military basis with the Soviet Commander in Korea regarding the foregoing problems. It appears, however, that the Soviet Commander is not authorized to enter into negotiations with General Hodge on these matters. Urgent economic and social problems affecting the whole of Korea therefore continue to remain unsolved.

Some of these problems, specifically, are: (1) the resumption of exchange of commodities between the two zones including the movement of coal and the release of electric power from the northern zone for use in the southern zone; (2) the resumption of railroad and other traffic between the two zones; (3) the resumption of coastal shipping; (4) the establishment throughout Korea of uniform fiscal policies; and (5) the solution by orderly means of the displaced persons problem, including the return to Japan of Japanese subjects.

My Government wishes to ascertain whether the Soviet Government is prepared to authorize the Soviet Commander in Korea to enter into negotiations with General Hodge in these matters or whether it wishes that these problems be discussed between the two Governments.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. Harriman

[Enclosure 5]

Moscow, December 16, 1945.

American Marines in China

President Truman has announced⁸ and I have stated to the press on a number of occasions that American Marines are in North China for the purpose of assisting the Chinese Government in the demobilization and deportation of Japanese troops in North China in accordance with the Terms of Surrender. We have assumed a responsibility in this respect which we feel obliged to discharge in the interest of international peace as well as of internal stability in China. One of the causes that brought us into war against Japan was our refusal to accept the position of Japan in China—our refusal to compromise the principle of the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Our Marines will be withdrawn when they are no longer required for the purpose stated. We hope that will be soon. There are something over 50,000 of them in North China now. This represents a small reduction from the original number. There are in North China some 325,000 Japanese troops. Over half of these have been disarmed but their deportation from China has been slow due to a shortage of shipping. We are making plans for a considerable increase in shipping facilities which will make possible a much more rapid deportation of Japanese—civilians as well as troops—from China.

The President has recently sent General Marshall to China as his special representative. We recognize that internal conditions in North China, arising out of differences between the Chinese Government and dissident political factions in China, constitute a serious impediment to carrying out the Terms of Surrender and in particular to the demobilization and deportation of Japanese. In view of this situation we are very anxious that the differences which exist between the National Government and the dissident political factions be settled by methods of peaceful negotiation having as its objective the broadening of the base of the present National Government of China to provide fair and effective representation to the principal political elements in China. The primary objective of President Truman in sending General Marshall to China is that he exert his influence to bring about discussion and agreement among the various political elements and, concurrently, to arrange for a truce between the opposing Chinese military forces in North China. The arrangement of such a truce would facilitate and speed the demobilization and deportation of Japanese troops from China and hasten the day—which we sincerely hope will be soon—when the American Marines will be returned to the United States from China.

84. The Secretary reported to Washington on this meeting in telegram 4190, Delsec 9, December 17, from Moscow, not printed.
85. The British delegation minutes of this meeting (not printed) list the following additional participants: For the United States—Edward Page, Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union; for the United Kingdom—Pierson J. Dixon of the British Foreign Office.
86. Narodnyi Kommissariat Inostrannykh Del (People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs).
87. The original agenda proposed by the Secretary of State was set forth in Harriman’s letter of December 7 to Molotov, p. 599.
88. Molotov’s proposed modifications of the Secretary’s suggested agenda were set forth in his letter of December 7 to Harriman, p. 600.
89. Reference is to Harriman’s letter of December 9 to Molotov, p. 606, setting forth the Secretary’s reactions to Molotov’s letter of December 7.
90. See previous footnote.
91. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the political developments in the Netherlands East Indies following the defeat of Japan, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.
92. Apparently reference is to the agreement of August 14, 1945, between the Soviet Union and China regarding relations between the Soviet Commander in Chief and the Chinese administration following the entry of Soviet forces into the territory of the “Three Eastern Provinces” of China in connection with military operations against Japan; for text, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 331; Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1946, p. 206; or Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 30: United States Relations with China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 592.
93. In his telegram 4190, Delsec. 9, December 17, from Moscow, reporting on the First Formal Session of the Conference, the Secretary added the following remark regarding Soviet-Chinese exchanges on the matter of evacuation of Manchuria: “Chinese Ambassador here says there was no new commitment by China to secure delay of withdrawal of Soviet troops.” (740.00119–Council/12–1745)
95. Presumably reference here is to the Treaty of Alliance between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the one hand and Iran on the other, signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942; for text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 1017, or Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1942, p. 249. For documentation on the treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.
96. Far Eastern Commission.
97. See Proposal by the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, C.F.M. (45) 84, September 30, p. 475.
98. See Resolution Proposed by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, C.F.M. (45) 83, September 30, p. 474.
99. Enclosure No. 3 consists of three memoranda by the United States delegation, labeled enclosures 3a, 3b, and 3c.
1. Telegram 3940, November 23, from Moscow, printed in vol. vi , reported receipt of a letter on November 21 from Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky stating that the American proposals had been transmitted to the competent Soviet authorities.
2. Regarding the discussion at Yalta between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin on the subject of trusteeships, see the Bohlen Minutes of the Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 8, 1945, 3:30 p.m., Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 770.
3. For the statement by President Truman regarding United States policy toward China, released to the press by the White House on December 16, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945, or Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945, p. 543. The memorandum circulated to the Conference by the Secretary of State, included as enclosure 5, p. 628, was based upon the President’s statement.
4. Reference here is to the Proposal by the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, C.F.M. (45) 84, September 30, p. 475, and Resolution Proposed by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, C.F.M. (45) 83, September 30, p. 474.
6. For the instructions upon which this letter was based, see telegram 2278, November 3, 6 p.m., to Moscow, printed in vol. vi .
8. Reference is to the statement by President Truman regarding United States policy toward China, released to the press by the White House on December 16, 1945; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945, or Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945, p. 543.