740.0011 E. W./6–1445

No. 152
The Acting Secretary of State to the President


Memorandum for the President

Subject: Comments on Prime Minister Churchill’s Suggested Topics for Discussion at the Next Meeting of the Heads of Government

With my memorandum of May 301 submitting Prime Minister Churchill’s suggested list of subjects for discussion for the next meeting of the heads of government I offered to send you the Department’s comments thereon. A memorandum commenting upon the topics is now attached.

While in general the subject matter covered by Mr. Churchill is satisfactory and deals with a number of problems requiring urgent clarification, the form of presentation, I feel, is unfortunate: Mr. Churchill’s list is so drawn as to give the appearance largely of a bill of complaints against the Soviet Government, which seems hardly the proper approach to the forthcoming meeting. Presumably he would wish to reword his list of subjects prior to any communication of it to Marshal Stalin. Furthermore, several of the problems mentioned by Mr. Churchill seem to be on the way to settlement and may well be solved before your meeting.

I am having prepared in the Department:

A suggested list of questions which you may wish to bring up for discussion, together with pertinent memoranda. These will include the two points raised in your memoranda of July [June] 92 concerning procedure to facilitate interchange of views on the terms of the European Peace Settlements and the Twenty-five Year Treaty for the demilitarization of Germany.
A full set of detailed memoranda on policy with regard to the subjects suggested by the British Prime Minister;
A complete set of memoranda covering various policy questions which conceivably may be raised by Marshal Stalin or may arise in the course of discussion, and
A full collection of pertinent maps.

Joseph C. Grew
[Page 165]


[Page 166][Page 167]
British Agenda Comments
1. Poland
Main question.
Russian action in handing over German territory to Poland before peace settlement and without consulting either United States or British Governments.
No comment required pending outcome of talks in Moscow and further study of Mr. Hopkins’ report.
2. Germany. Inter-Allied policy and machinery as regards Germany including
(a) Conditions and timing for bringing into force of occupational zones. As you are aware this subject is now under discussion between the Governments. The State and War Departments are not prepared to defer indefinitely the withdrawal into the zones. According to Article 6 of the protocol on the zones of occupation,3 this protocol is to go into effect simultaneously with the signing of the surrender instrument.4 The Prime Minister has now agreed that this should be done, and that the settlement of the Austrian zones should be part of this arrangement. It is likely that sufficient progress will be achieved in the present discussions, so that the question will not have to be further considered at the forthcoming meeting.
(b) Establishment of a German Government or local administrations.
It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.
It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.
It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.
It is recommended that this Government oppose the creation of separate integrated German administrative and political entities coinciding with the four zones of occupation and favor, on the contrary, the use of central German administrative machinery, in so far as possible, for the despatch of business above the provincial or state level. It is in consequence further recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany, either de facto or de jure, along the lines of the zones of occupation.
It is recommended that this Government oppose the establishment for the time being of a central German Government in contradistinction to the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the interests of the Control Council.
(c) Feeding of Germany as a whole.
(d) Disposal of displaced persons in Germany especially Russians.
(e) Problem of German reparation with particular reference to Russian habit of stripping bare territories which they control. No comment on the inclusion of these items. Pertinent memoranda are being prepared.
(f) Disposal of German fleet and merchant ships.
3. Austria.
(a) Establishment of zones, particularly in Vienna, and of Control Commission.

The European Advisory Commission has been deadlocked for some time in completing arrangements on zones and occupational machinery for Austria. This situation results from the Soviet Government’s insistence that in zoning Vienna for occupation by the four Powers, the city limits be delineated as they were before 1938 (which would leave no airfield in our Vienna zone), while we prefer use of the present wider limits of the city, including the suburbs, with an airfield in our zone. The War Department has insisted upon having adequate facilities in Vienna, particularly airfields, and has not been willing to accept the airport offered by the Soviet Government. To solve this difficulty, military missions of the United States, United Kingdom and France have gone to Vienna to survey the situation and make recommendations to the European Advisory Commission, which it is hoped, will lead to a settlement.

While the agreement on control machinery for Austria and a protocol on zones (exclusive of Vienna) have not yet been formally recommended by the European Advisory Commission, these questions should not present great difficulty [Page 168] once the Vienna zone is agreed upon. If the present survey leads to a rapid agreement on Vienna, the European Advisory Commission can presumably make its recommendations at once in a form in which the four governments will approve.

Therefore this question may or may not require discussion in the meeting, depending upon developments in the next few weeks.

(b) Recognition of an Austrian Government satisfactory to all Allied Governments. It is recommended that this Government agree to give prompt consideration to the question of the recognition of the Renner Government after the zones of occupation, including the subdivision of Vienna, are satisfactorily delineated and our troops have taken up their positions accordingly and after an agreement on inter-Allied control machinery has been concluded and put into effect. We should also stipulate that the Renner Government should prepare to hold elections as soon as possible, under the supervision of the Occupying Powers, for a constituent assembly.
(c) Feeding of Austria.
4. Yugoslavia
Maintenance of status quo with regard to Yugoslav-Italian and Yugoslav-Austrian frontiers pending peace settlement. As regards the Trieste and Carinthia questions an adequate settlement has now been reached which will make it possible to cover this topic very briefly. The status quo should be maintained in respect of the Klagenfurt region. No zone of occupation should be given to Yugoslavia and in the final peace settlement this area will be retained by Austria. More important, however, would be the application of the Yalta principles5 to the totalitarian regime which has been set up in Yugoslavia. Our recommendation as seen at the [Page 169] moment would not be for formal tripartite consultation under the Yalta formula if Yugoslavs could themselves be induced to move in this direction, since the unrepresentative character of the Government and political intolerance of the Partisans is cause for some real concern.
5. Balkans

(a) Russian behaviour generally in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

As regards treatment of British and American representatives on Control Commission.
As regards the setting up of puppet governments in those countries.
As regards removal by Soviet authorities of industrial equipment especially in Rumania under the guise of booty.

Although this section with its three sub-headings covers the main points there should be some differentiation of treatment between them as regards their importance. Sub-heading (3) (removal of industrial equipment) hardly seems appropriate for discussion between the Heads of States since probably the worst part of it has already taken place. It would seem appropriate, therefore, that discussions in respect of this point take place on the diplomatic level. Since Anglo-American interests and responsibilities under the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe6 in Rumania require that we have a greater share in the Allied Control Commissions and other Allied activities the Soviet Government should be induced to agree that future Allied activities in these countries be on a genuinely tripartite basis. Joint decisions should be taken regarding:

The manner of the execution of the armistice agreements in the second period.
A program for the withdrawal of Soviet troops on the basis of the four Nations’ agreement at Moscow on October 30, 1943.7
The implementation of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, including [Page 170] its application in the matter of elections.
The conclusion of peace treaties and reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
The recognition and application of the principle of non-exclusion and equal access in economic relations between former satellites and other countries.

(b) Question of concluding peace treaties with these minor enemy states with a view to withdrawal of Russian armies of occupation.

This section requires rewording in the light of Marshal Stalin’s proposal to establish regular diplomatic relations.8 Essentially the whole problem in the satellite states is to determine:

Are they really independent.
Is the Soviet Army to remain.
If we accept less than really tripartite authority can we obtain firm assurances of non-exclusion for our rightful activities.

5B Albania

A short topic on Albania might be added worded as follows:

Agreement on parallel action regarding recognition of an Albanian Government. It would be desirable for the three Governments to reach agreement to the effect that no action will be taken with respect to the recognition of an Albanian Government without prior consultation.

6. Persia
Question of mutual withdrawal of troops. No comment upon the wording of this section.

7. Italy, Greece and Turkey

Re-definition of our policy and interests in these countries.
Conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy.

These topics are substantially what we proposed but a separate agenda in regard to Italy might be suggested as follows:

Review of tripartite policy, the U. S. objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.
Italy’s admission to the ranks of the United Nations.
Immediate revision of the surrender terms, keeping only controls essential:
to cover Allied military requirements as long as Allied forces remain in or operate from Italy;
to implement the pledge that the people will have an untrammeled choice of their form of government;
to safeguard disputed territories within the 1939 frontiers against settlements forced either by the Italians or rival claimants pending the final peace negotiations.
Negotiation in the near future of a definitive peace treaty, permitting the Italians to take part in discussions at an early stage rather than being forced to sign a treaty already negotiated in all details by the victorious powers.

8. Russian access to the sea.

Agreements of Montreux Convention9 (if raised by the Russians).
Special interests regarding entrances to the Baltic (if raised by the Russians).
It would be preferable that these subjects not be placed upon the agenda unless specifically requested by the Soviets. If the Montreux Convention and entrances to the Baltic are discussed it might also be desirable to include a discussion on Russian access to the Persian Gulf through Iran.
9. General
(a) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow Yalta declaration on liberated Europe to be applied to [Page 172] countries in which they are interested.

Difficulties on this subject have arisen in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In Austria, the Soviet Government has permitted establishment of a Provisional Austrian Government without consultation with us. The joint occupation plans for Austria are discussed above under 3 (a) [.]

With respect to Czechoslovakia, the situation is now somewhat improved. For some weeks, the Soviet Government refused to grant permission for our mission to proceed to the seat of the Czechoslovak Government at Košice and cancelled abruptly plans which had been under way for some time to send the diplomatic corps from London to Košice. However, the Beneš Government has now moved to Prague and our mission proceeded from London to Prague about June 1. We do not as yet have much information about the conditions there and consequently are not yet ready to decide whether or not the status of Czechoslovakia should be discussed at the meeting.

(b) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow representatives of the Press to function freely in countries under Soviet military administration.
(c) Transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

No comment as to the inclusion of these subjects on the agenda.

While we do not feel that it would be desirable to raise the Palestine question at this time and it is noted that it is apparently not the intention of the British Government to do so, a memorandum on the subject will be prepared for use in case the Soviets should bring the matter up for discussion. A memorandum on the current situation in the Levant States for use in case the Soviet Government introduces the subject is also being prepared. It is felt, however, that since it has been publicly stated [Page 173] that it is not the intention of the United States Government to endeavor to reach a solution of this question in the absence of representatives of France and the Levant States it would be desirable to avoid discussions of it in the meeting of the Big Three.

  1. Document No. 145.
  2. Document No. 150.
  3. Signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118.
  4. i. e., May 8, 1945. See Executive Agreement Series No. 502; 59 Stat. (2) 1857.
  5. See vol. ii, document No. 1417, section vii .
  6. See vol. ii, document No. 1417, section v .
  7. Text in Department of State Bulletin, vol. ix, p. 308.
  8. See document No. 285, footnote 5.
  9. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, p. 213.