761.91/11–344
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)83
Dr. Daftary called on me this afternoon, after his talk with the Acting Secretary of State, under instructions from his Government, regarding the present critical situation of Soviet-Iranian relations.
Dr. Daftary, who was in a state of great excitement recounted the various acts of brutality and oppression which he said the Russians visited upon the Iranians as punishment for the refusal by the Iranian Government to grant an oil concession to the Soviets on territories in the northern part of Iran. He pointed out that his Government felt that they had no one else to turn to except the United States for help in this time of need, and his Government trusted that we would lend every possible assistance to bring about a cessation of the present activities of the Russians in Iran.
I told Dr. Daftary that we, of course, intended to live up to the provisions, as far as we are concerned, of the Declaration on Iran signed last December in Tehran by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Premier Stalin. He would, of course, have to realize that we are in the midst of a war and that we cannot take any action which would interfere with the conduct of the war and with our vitally important relations with Soviet Russia. He could, however, rest assured that we were studying the situation carefully and that we would be prepared to do anything that might be practicable to bring about a better state of relations between Soviet Russia and Iran.
[Page 468]Turning then to some possible steps that might be taken by the Iranians themselves, I observed that according to information which we had received the Shah had had in mind the possible desirability of sending a special emissary to Moscow to discuss the situation fully with Stalin. I asked whether there was any likelihood of such a procedure being followed since, as he was well aware, it was often possible to settle problems of this kind by direct negotiation rather than by note-writing or protests. I mentioned in this connection that we had noted with special interest the fact that when Mr. Stalin was in Tehran during the conference last December, he had called upon the Shah personally and spent two hours with him. This seemed to be a good augury for the re-establishment of personal relations with Mr. Stalin that might give some promise of reaching an amicable settlement of the present difficulties. Dr. Daftary replied that no one in Iran, with the possible exception of the Prime Minister himself, was sufficiently acquainted with the Soviet mentality and the Russian language to undertake such a mission. In reply to my suggestion that Mr. Ala, Minister of Court, was a highly accomplished negotiator, Dr. Daftary observed that Mr. Ala could, of course, negotiate with people like ourselves or the British, but that he would be totally inadequate to deal with people like the Russians.
In assuring Dr. Daftary that we would, of course, examine this situation sympathetically with a view to rendering such assistance as might be possible, in view of the exigencies of the war, my own advice to him and to his people was not to take the situation too tragically; to bear in mind that Iran, with its ancient history, has gone through many crises far more serious than the present one; and that with patience and good will which they should endeavor to inspire in the Russians they might be able to pass successfully through the present crisis, however dark the situation might look at the present time.
During my discussion of this situation I expressed my surprise that there should be any newspapers in Iran today who would lend themselves to exploitation by any foreign powers for the purpose of rendering the position of the Iranian Government more precarious than it would otherwise have been. I also observed that in similar crises in the past the Iranians have found it possible, through a strong stand taken by the Medjliss, to resist demands from foreign powers which they believed to be unjust. A case in point was, of course, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 191984 which the British sought to impose upon the Iranians without success because of opposition in the Medjliss. I also recalled that the Iranian Constitution requires that all foreign concessions in the country must be approved by the Medjliss in order [Page 469] to obtain validity. In other words, and returning again to my original advice, I said I hoped the Iranians would not take this situation too tragically but would exert every effort on their part to win over the Russians to a more friendly attitude in the spirit of the tripartite Declaration on Iran signed by the Russians, the British and ourselves.
Dr. Daftary thanked me for the remarks I made to him but it was obvious that he has little hope of any outcome of the present crisis that will be favorable to his country.
- Copy transmitted on November 4 to the Under Secretary of State by Mr. Murray under a covering memorandum which stated in part “… the situation has fortunately greatly improved due, I feel sure, to the firm but friendly representations which we made on November 1, through our Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Government”. (761.91/11–344)↩
- Signed at Tehran August 9, 1919, Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. ii, p. 703.↩