740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–2844

The Secretary of State to the President 1

Memorandum for the President

I am attaching a summary of recommendations prepared after careful study in the Department with regard to the treatment of Germany.2 I am also attaching for your consideration a longer paper giving the reasoning behind the recommendations and a memorandum on the present status of negotiations and discussions with regard to Germany.

This problem is, of course, of great importance and considerable urgency, for until an American policy has been decided upon with regard to the future treatment of Germany, we are not in a position to discuss the matter with the British or Russians. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to study the attached documents and let me have your comments thereon at an early date. The two former documents were [Page 49] transmitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago with a request for their views.3

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs 4

top secret
PWC–149c

The Treatment of Germany: Policy Recommendations

i. long-term interests and objectives of the united states

A. Frontiers

1.
The Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged. (Recommended)
2.
The water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel. The land-boundary should remain unchanged. (Recommended with request for further study of possible territorial compensation for the Netherlands for areas ruined by flooding.)
3.
The Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920–1940 line. (Recommended)
4.
Alsace–Lorraine should be returned to France. (Recommended)
5.
The transfer of the Sonthofen district from Austria to Germany should be recognized unless there is convincing evidence that the in habitants wish to return to Austrian rule. (Recommended)
6.
The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia should in principle be restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovakian Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. (Recommended)
7.
This Government should not oppose the annexation by Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, and in German Upper Silesia the industrial district and a rural hinterland to be determined primarily by ethnic considerations. The United States, however, would not be disposed to encourage the acquisition by Poland of additional German-populated territory in the trans-Oder region. (Recommended)
8.
This Government should oppose the mass transfer to the Reich of Germanic people from neighboring countries immediately after the cessation of hostilities but should approve the removal of individuals and groups who constitute an especially difficult problem; the transfer should be made, so far as may be feasible, under humane conditions and without undue strain on Germany’s absorptive capacity. (Tentatively recommended; Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to study further the question of (a) criteria for selecting populations for transfer, (b) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia, and (c) establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of population.)

B. Political and Economic Conditions

9.
This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war matériel. (Tentatively recommended subject to further study.)
10.
The United States should encourage democratic self-government both at the local and national level as soon as security precautions make it feasible. (Recommended)
11.
The German people should be assured that a democratic Germany can, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, earn an honorable place in the society of peace-loving nations. (Recommended)
12.
A “war-guilt” clause should not be written into the surrender instrument or into the peace terms. (Recommended)
13.
Partition should not be imposed upon Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)
14.
The victors should make every feasible effort to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. The imposition of a degree of political decentralization more extensive than that which moderate Germans would be willing to support might defeat its purpose by creating internal confusion and by arousing a lasting antagonism even among liberal and democratic German groups.
15.
It should be an ultimate objective of this Government to assimilate Germany into world economy without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls. (Recommended)
16.
The large German landed estates should be broken up. (Recommended, with a request to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to continue its study of means of implementation.)
17.
The great concentration of power exercised by German industrial and financial concerns should be destroyed. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany for further study.)
18.
Free labor organizations possessing the power of collective bargaining should be revived. (Recommended)
19.
The German people should be permitted, subject to security requirements, and to such international obligations as Germany may be required to assume, eventually to determine the nature of their economic system without foreign pressure or intervention. (Recommended)

C. German Foreign Relations

20.
Germany should be admitted, as soon as its good faith is demonstrated, to participation without discrimination, other than for security objectives, in general political and economic arrangements. (Recommended)
21.
Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression. (Recommended)

ii. transitional procedures and arrangements

A. Surrender Terms

22.
The victor powers should secure through a single surrender instrument an unequivocal delivery of unrestricted rights and powers over Germany rather than rely on the rights of occupation and conquest or on undefined unconditional surrender. (Recommended)
23.
The surrender instrument should be authorized and ratified by whatever German Government is in existence at the time. It should be signed by properly authorized military plenipotentiaries and, if a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government is in power, by authorized civilian agents. (Recommended)
24.
The rights and powers surrendered by Germany should be acquired by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on behalf of the United Nations and should be exercised jointly by their three Governments acting in the interests of the United Nations. (Recommended)

B. Occupation

25.
The three principal United Nations should set up a military government which, while making extensive use of German administrative machinery and personnel, should supplant any existing central political authority. (Recommended)
26.
While the military occupation of Germany should be effected on a zonal basis, the principal instrumentality of military government should be a tripartite agency in Berlin possessing the power, under instructions from the three Governments, to direct a uniform administration over the whole of Germany and to maintain the unity of those essential administrative functions and economic processes now operated on a nation-wide basis. (Recommended)
27.
As soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency under whose authority military occupation would be continued. (Recommended)
28.
This Government should favor the participation of the other United Nations in so far as would be compatible with the responsibility of the three major powers in planning and executing the measures for the treatment of Germany. (Recommended)
29.
The German armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded as rapidly as considerations of internal order and the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow. (Recommended)
30.
This Government is in principle opposed to the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units, but should not oppose the employment of Waffen SS and other Nazi Party military formations in reconstruction work outside Germany. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany with request for a separate study of this problem.)
31.
German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be scrapped except as they are wanted for use in the war against Japan or are adaptable to peaceful uses. (Further study requested of the disposition of German armaments.)
32.
All German military and para-military organizations, the General Staff, military training centers, supply services and all directly related groups should be promptly dissolved and permanently prohibited. (Recommended)
33.
The manufacture and import of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be forbidden, necessary security controls established over German economy, and those industrial plants dismantled which are not convertible to peace-time production or which otherwise present insuperable security problems. (Recommended)
34.
The National Socialist Party and dependent organizations should be abolished and their records and assets seized. (Recommended)
35.
The chief categories of Party “leaders”, both local and national, and other active Nazis, should be removed from governmental service and posts in cultural and economic enterprises. (Recommended)
36.
All parties and groups reflecting National Socialist views should be rigorously suppressed, but non-Nazi parties based on democratic principles should be encouraged to organize and appeal for support in so far as their activities do not jeopardize public order. (Recommended)
37.
In order to prevent an economic collapse the existing German administrative machinery of economic control should be utilized, with necessary adaptations. (Recommended)
38.
The mark should not be deliberately undervalued on the foreign exchanges. (Recommended)
39.
Reparation exacted from Germany should be directed mainly to furthering reconstruction. Even though it will not be large enough to meet the total cost, the payments should be confined to early years after the close of hostilities. The transfer of capital equipment should not be large enough seriously to cripple German economy. (Deferred for the consideration of the report of the Committee on Reparation.)

C. Establishment of Permanent Government

40.
The direct inter-allied administration of Germany should terminate as soon as the prospects of order and the emergence of an acceptable German Government make it desirable. (Recommended)
41.
The process of political reconstruction should begin with the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities and should be extended to larger units as the success of each step becomes apparent. (Recommended)

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs 5

top secret
PWC–141b

The Treatment of Germany

i. introductory

The following discussion of the treatment of Germany makes a distinction between (1) long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period.

The latter category embraces those immediate concerns of the victor powers from the moment of Germany’s surrender or collapse until [Page 54] a time when it will be safe to establish a permanent system of controls and to permit the organization of a constitutional German Government. The major tasks of this period will be (1) to secure through the surrender instrument and to exercise an unqualified authority over Germany, (2) to establish the machinery of an effective military government, (3) to destroy the National Socialist Party and uproot its influence from German life, (4) to disarm and demobilize the German military machine and establish controls over Germany’s war potential, (5) to institute a program of restitution and reparation, (6) to prevent an economic breakdown and to begin an economic reorganization which will destroy autarky and eliminate, in so far as possible, the economic and social bases of ultra-nationalism and militarism, and (7) to make a start towards the creation of an acceptable and durable political structure in Germany.

If this program is to provide more than temporary security and is to prepare the way for continuing European stability and peace, it must be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and to Germany’s place in the projected world order.

ii. long-term interests and objectives of the united states

Axiomatically the basic long-term interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned, consequently, the basic objective is to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future—not only during but beyond the occupation period—through a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and through vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people, however, would at best be an expensive undertaking that would afford the world little sense of real security and, more important still, there exists no convincing reason to anticipate that the victor powers would be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guarantee of security, and the least expensive, would be the German people’s repudiation of militaristic ambitions and their assimilation, as an equal partner, into a cooperative world society.

These considerations dictate the search for a policy which will pre vent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

The long-range objectives which might best protect the interests of the United States include (1) the settlement of disturbing frontier [Page 55] problems, (2) the achievement of political and economic reform within Germany, and (3) a constructive role for Germany, both political and economic, in international relations.

A. Frontiers

In order to strengthen the forces of peace throughout the world, it is a continuing interest of the United States that the significance of frontiers be reduced through the development of international organization and of freer international economic relations. In the establishment of post-war boundaries, the objectives of the United States can be best served by territorial settlements which, by doing least in justice to the peoples of all the states concerned, offer the most reason able prospect of general acceptance and stability. In the case of Germany the principles of minimum change and minimum grievance apply fairly well to her northern, western and southern boundaries.

1. With Denmark.—The existing Danish-German boundary has not been challenged by the Danes, and there is no apparent reason to propose a change.

2. With the Netherlands.—No adjustment of the Netherlands land boundary seems desirable since it has heretofore been no source of disturbance. The Netherlands Government, however, has a justified claim for the relocation of the boundary in the Ems Estuary in the main channel rather than along the western shore as has been maintained by Germany in contravention of an established principle of international law. Unofficial Netherlands spokesmen have recently threatened to claim compensation in adjacent German territory if the German army should destroy the dikes and flood the reclaimed lands of their country.

Further study is being given to the question of possible territorial compensation in such an event.

3. With Belgium.—There appears to be no convincing reason why the 1920 line should not be restored. The justice of the Belgian frontier as established in 1920 was attacked by the Germans, and the pre-1914 line was restored in 1940. Despite Belgian abuse of the open plebiscite, the inhabitants of the disputed region had generally become reconciled to Belgian authority.

4. With France.—The United States Government is committed to the restoration of Alsace–Lorraine to France. Since there are no strong forces, either political or economic, working toward the creation of a separate state, or federation, composed of French, German, Luxembourg, Belgian and other territories within the watershed of the Rhine River, it would be undesirable for this Government to support such a proposal.

5. With Austria.—It is recommended that the present administrative boundary be maintained as the international frontier. After the [Page 56] absorption of Austria, the German Government made a slight rectification of the old frontier—now an administrative boundary—for reasons of convenience rather than for political motives. There is no cause to restore the pre-1938 boundary unless that should be desired by the 2000 inhabitants of the small Sonthofen area, which is shut off by mountains from close contact with Austria.

6. With Czechoslovakia.—It is recommended that the pre-Munich frontier be restored without prejudice to any rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Since a viable Czechoslovakia, to whose restoration this Government is committed, must include a substantial German population, it is believed that the pre-Munich frontier with Germany should in principle be restored on grounds of historic, legal and strategic considerations. Such a conclusion is without prejudice to any cessions in the six northern salients (area, 772 square miles; population, 320,000, about 96 percent German) which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to negotiate with Germany or to slight rectifications in favor of Czechoslovakia. If such rectifications should be arranged by the two Governments concerned, this settlement could be approved by this Government, which is not committed to support any specific boundaries.

7. With Poland.—The principle of minimum grievance will be fairly well attained by the dispositions indicated above. In the case of the Polish-German frontier that principle may have to be overridden. To strengthen Poland strategically and economically and to compensate it for prospective losses of territories in the East, the Polish Government urges, with Soviet and British support, that East Prussia, Danzig, and a portion of German Upper Silesia should be ceded to Poland, and will probably insist that the approximately 3.4 million German inhabitants of the ceded areas should be transferred to Germany. The Soviet Government with apparently some British support, has suggested the cession of additional German territory up to the Oder River.

A basic question which has arisen in acute form is whether this Government should enter into active negotiations with the British and Soviet Governments with a view to determining a new Polish-German boundary or whether it should disclaim interest in this question and refrain from expressing approval or disapproval of a settlement agreed upon by its two major allies and Poland. If it is determined that this Government should play an active role, two questions arise. The first is whether a settlement of the future Polish boundaries should be negotiated now or be treated as part of the final peace settlement.

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The second is whether this Government should admit the principle of the acquisition by Poland of territories containing large blocs of ethnically German population as compensation for the loss of only partially Polish-inhabited territories to the Soviet Union or for strategic and economic reasons.

Regardless of whether the United States takes an active or passive role with respect to the disposition of East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia, it is recommended that the United States not encourage the cession of German territory in the lower trans-Oder region. The strategic considerations advanced in support of such an annexation are difficult to justify since no frontier arrangement between the two states could of itself suffice to maintain Poland’s security against German aggression.

8. Transfer of Germanic Populations.—A problem closely related to that of establishment of equitable frontiers is presented by the presence of considerable German minorities in the various states of Eastern Europe. In particular, the Czechoslovak Government has indicated a desire to transfer a substantial number of the 3,200,000 Germans from that state; Poland will wish likewise to remove the Germans from Poznań, as well as from newly acquired territories; Yugoslavia may desire to take similar action.

These German minorities became the advance guard of National Socialist penetration, and the states which they helped to deliver to Hitler have a well-founded grievance against them. Their transfer to Germany would probably contribute to the tranquility of the countries concerned. Hitler himself has set an example by numerous forced migrations of the peoples of this region of Europe.

The problem, however, is one of enormous proportions. Serious economic injury would be done if these people should be summarily uprooted from their homes and thrown into Germany without compensation for their possessions and without provision for livelihood. By land reform in Germany it would be possible to absorb perhaps one million of the immigrants into agriculture. The great majority would have to enter urban life and would cause considerable strains unless there were an expanding German economy accompanied by an increase in foreign trade.

It is recommended, because of the above consideration, that this Government oppose the mass transfer of these peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. It will perhaps be desirable, however, to sanction the relocation of individuals and groups who have constituted a special problem.

Further study is to be undertaken on the questions of (a) criteria for selecting populations to be transferred, (b) the establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of populations, and (c) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia.

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B. Political and Economic Conditions

1. Disarmament.—This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war material.

The details of this problem will be the subject of further study.

2. Democracy.—Since a peace maintained only by the continuous coercion of Germany would be a precarious and expensive one at best, it must be an objective of the United States to promote in Germany the largest degree possible of internal stability based on free institutions, on the psychological disarmament of the German people, and on tolerable economic conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of a democratic government, despite serious difficulties facing such an attempt. It is therefore recommended that the aim of American policy should be to prepare the German people for self-government as early as that may be compatible with the operation of security controls over Germany and with the functioning of a general system of international security.

The survival of a new democratic regime will depend in considerable measure on the psychological disarmament of the German people as well as on a tolerable standard of living. Although a democracy will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors, it must be able to offer some claim on German pride and patriotism purged of its aggressive content. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in German political life, the United States should favor holding out the prospect that a democratic Germany, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit and destroy all attempts to promote liberalism and international cooperation, this Government should oppose writing into the surrender terms or the peace settlement a verdict of moral guilt against the German people as a whole.

3. Partition.—It is recommended that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

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An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. Such a drastic interference in German life would evoke a vastly increased resentment over and above the inevitable discontent with defeat and its consequences. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany.

4. Political Decentralization.—It is recommended that every feasible effort should be made to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states.

In reaction to National Socialist over-centralization, the Germans will probably return, of their own accord, to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia, which in 1938 included 62 percent of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany, into several states of moderate size.

Two risks may, however, be incurred by going beyond encouragement of decentralization. The first is that an imposed weakening of the governmental structure more sweeping than that favored by the moderate and liberal parties in Germany would, like an imposed dismemberment, provide a ready-made program for the nationalistic groups. The second risk is that a weak central authority would be unable to cope with the social and economic problems of post-war adjustment. In addition, a return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of penetrating the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists captured control of several of the smaller states. Finally, even the cumbersome federalism of the Bismarckian empire was no protection against the growth of German power and militarism. Too much importance should not be attached to movements for decentralization, in any case, for the democratic forces have generally favored greater unification of the Reich.

5. Economic Arrangements.—It is to the long-range interest of the United States that Germany be prosperous but that, at the same time, [Page 60] German economy should not again be directed to war-like purposes. A prime concern of this Government, therefore, is that Germany for the indefinite future be forbidden the manufacture and import of arms, ammunition and implements of war and be denied the right to develop an economically unsound productive capacity convertible to war purposes. This interest points to the termination of an autarkic policy and to the assimilation of Germany, without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls, into world economy, the maximum reduction of the economic significance of frontiers and the development of responsible international agencies for transportation, power, and other functions. It is equally to the interest of this Government that Germany eventually should participate fully in such international economic organizations and agencies, but should not be permitted to use foreign trade or commercial relations as an instrument of nationalistic policy.

In the interest of eliminating the social and economic bases of re current militarism, it is recommended that this Government approve a program for destroying the privileged positions of the Junker estate owners and of the great financial and industrial monopolies. The problem of the Junkers can be solved by breaking up the large landed estates; the problem of financial and industrial monopoly could be met in part through disestablishing the top financial structures of the great industrial combines and redistributing the ownership of constituent operating companies, and in part through some effective form of public control exercised through a democratic regime. It is also possible that nationalization of certain industries would contribute to the elimination of militarism and of political and economic abuses arising from the excessive concentration of economic power in private hands. Moreover, this Government should oppose the development of new forms of industrial combinations, whether on a German or international basis, which could contribute to renewed German economic and political aggression in Europe.

Further study is to be undertaken of ways and means of implementing these recommendations with respect to landed estates and industrial concentration.

It is recommended that this Government propose allowing the German people, subject to such requirements as those outlined above, to determine the nature of their economic system. It is to the interest of the United States to see in Germany the revival of free labor organizations enjoying ultimately the rights of association and of collective bargaining. (See also PWC–71a, “General Objectives of United States Economic Policy With Respect to Germany”.6)

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C. German Foreign Relations

The position of post-war Germany in world affairs will be conditioned largely by the success or failure of international cooperation for security and prosperity and by the degree to which Germany demonstrates its abandonment of aggressive and totalitarian ambitions. Although deprived for an undefined future of all military power, Germany will remain the most populous and productive country in Europe to the west of Russia. Germany would present a danger to peace only if the victors should fall out among themselves and if either Russia or Great Britain should try to bring Germany into its orbit. The best guarantee against such a development would therefore lie in the continued cooperation of the three principal victors in their treatment of Germany and in the solution of other problems, and in the early establishment of a general international organization within which the security of Germany, like that of other nations, would be assured.

In the post-war period Germany will presumably be debarred by its own weakness and by the continuing resentment of its smaller neighbors from pursuing independently any regional policy in Europe. If, however, European economic interests can be served by promoting, on a non-discriminatory basis, commercial exchanges between Germany and its neighbors to their mutual benefit and without undue advantage to Germany, this Government should be prepared to view such a development with equanimity. It is probable, however, that Germany’s overseas trade will play a much larger part than before in an economy reoriented away from war and the pursuit of autarky. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression.

It is recommended that the United States encourage the earliest possible integation of Germany into the community of peace-loving nations and into world commerce through holding out to a reconstructed Germany the prospect of early admission to the general international organization and of participation without discrimination in world trade.

iii. transitional procedures and arrangements

A. Surrender Terms

This Government, by public commitment, demands the unconditional surrender of Germany.

1. The Psychological Result.—The exaction of an admission of total defeat might prevent the invention of new legends about the alleged invincibility of German arms. Against this future advantage is to be weighed the immediate disadvantage of the fact that German propaganda, by misinterpreting the intentions of the United Nations [Page 62] to mean subjugation and destruction, is encouraging the resistance of the German people and is to that extent prolonging the war.

2. The Legal Basis for the Authority and the Acts of the Victor Powers.—The basic problem of the surrender is the establishment of a firm legal basis for the authority and acts of the victor powers. The traditional rights of military occupation do not give all the authority that is necessary for dealing with unforeseen contingencies and for effecting the reforms prescribed by long-term objectives. It is open to question whether an assertion of rights of conquest would provide a more satisfactory legal basis. In any case, unconditional surrender of a state is an innovation which requires exact definition before unusual rights can be derived incontestably from it.

It would seem essential, therefore, that the terms written into the surrender instrument, rather than conventional rights of occupation or the rights of conquest, be the source of the authority of the victors, provided there is a German Government capable of signing, and that the instrument contain a clear and comprehensive statement of that authority.

3. The Extent of the Rights To Be Surrendered.—A further problem is the definition of unconditional surrender in terms of the extent of the rights to be surrendered by Germany.7 The alternatives are (a) that Germany should deliver all rights and powers to the victors, and (b) that the stipulations of the instrument be limited essentially to military terms.

Previous statements of American policy and the draft terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have adopted the former interpretation. The British draft likewise embodies this definition. The Soviet view, on the other hand, is that the surrender instrument should contain primarily the military terms designed to render Germany incapable of renewing hostilities with the understanding that other provisions relating to political and economic matters should subsequently be imposed on Germany. In Soviet opinion, German military leaders would more readily accept military terms and would, if confronted with the sweeping demands of the American draft, use them to spur the German people to renewed resistance. It may be said in criticism of the Soviet approach that it would not assure to the victors an adequate legal basis for such measures as the punishment of war criminals, the abolition of the Nazi dictatorship, the reordering of German economy, etc., which are among the aims of this country. Furthermore, the political after-effects of increasing the stringency of the surrender terms step by step would perhaps play into the hands of nationalistic agitators against the peace settlement, as that procedure did after the last war.

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4. A Long Versus a Short Surrender Document.—In the discussions of the European Advisory Commission, question has arisen over whether the surrender document should contain detailed provisions or be limited to a general acknowledgment of the comprehensive rights of the victors and the unqualified obligations of the vanquished. Proponents of the longer instrument argue that German acceptance would be more readily given to it than to a “blank-check” instrument and that it would expressly obligate Germany to a complete range of military, political, and economic stipulations without limiting the freedom of the victors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of their short document8 argue, in turn, that a comprehensive surrender of powers makes specific provisions unnecessary and that an enumeration of detailed stipulations in the surrender document would carry with it the implication of a limitation of powers to the provisions specified. They attribute certain difficulties in Italy to the restrictive character of the long document used there and contend that the application of the broad authority can best be effected by ordinances of the occupation commanders. The American position is in favor of a short document, and it is probable that the British Government will accept one if there is agreement on proclamations and ordinances designed to give effect to the surrender terms.

5. Who Should Sign for Germany.—The transfer of the full powers implicit in unconditional surrender can be effected only by the German Government, and the signatory or signatories should be duly authorized, therefore, by the Government. For psychological reasons it is desirable that the instrument likewise be signed on behalf of the German High Command and by as important an officer as can be found. In case of the existence at the time of a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government, the signature of a highly placed civilian representative would be equally desirable. If a moderate regime is in power at the time of surrender, it might well be advisable to compel the military alone to bear the onus of signing. A military signature, however, would have to be authorized by whatever government was in power at that time.

6. Ratification of the Signed Instrument.—A further problem already posed is whether the signed instrument should be ratified by the German Government. Since no official can sign away more authority than he legally possesses, the unqualified legality of the sweeping delivery of powers through surrender will depend in German eyes on whether it is properly authorized by the Government in power at the time. It is recommended that the surrender instrument be ratified by whatever German Government is in power at the time of surrender.

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7. Who Should Acquire the Enemy’s Surrendered Rights.—Whatever arguments might be advanced for vesting the rights over Germany in all of the states at war with it, the practical necessities for prompt action, and the responsibilities of the three major powers, make such an arrangement impossible. The real issue, therefore, is whether the rights surrendered by Germany should be transferred to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments jointly, or to each of them separately. A provision in the surrender instrument explicitly naming the three powers as joint recipients would have the advantage of binding the three Governments to act jointly in the post-surrender treatment of Germany, and would help to avoid the confusions and suspicions which would arise if each had the right to deal separately with the defeated enemy. The disadvantage of vesting these powers in all three Governments jointly is that no one of them would, in theory at least, be allowed to act unless all three Governments were in agreement. On balance, however, the likelihood of bringing about a policy of uniform action towards Germany would be improved by vesting power over Germany in the three Governments jointly, and this alternative is consequently recommended.

The rights and powers accruing from the surrender of Germany are to be acquired and exercised jointly by the aforesaid powers in the interests of the United Nations.

B. Occupation

1. Administrative Machinery.—Since the main responsibility for the occupation of Germany must rest with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, a basic problem arises as to how the interests and policies of the three powers are to be coordinated. The choice of a form of administrative machinery appears to lie between (a) a unified tripartite system, (b) a completely separate and independent administration in each of three zones, and (c) an inter mediate arrangement.

Uniformity of procedure throughout Germany would be most easily obtained, and undue exercise of influence by any one of the occupation authorities would be most effectively forestalled, if there were a smoothly working unified tripartite control. Linguistic and other difficulties, however, appear to argue for separate zones to be administered by each of the three armies of occupation. Such an arrangement, while avoiding local friction, would pose the problems of uniform security measures and general coordination of policy in the treatment of Germany as a whole. A strict application of the second alternative, by suddenly breaking the normal unity of the land, might easily lead to economic and social catastrophe. If prolonged prostration is to be avoided, the essential administrative functions and [Page 65] economic processes now operated on a national basis will need to be left intact and a high degree of uniformity maintained in the administration of any separate zones that may be established.

This Government has recommended the creation of a tripartite civil affairs agency for Germany to coordinate the military government of the proposed three zones of occupation. This plan emphasizes the consultative and advisory role of the tripartite board and the reservation of full administrative powers to the commander of each zone acting under direction of his own military superior. A British plan, questioning the adequacy of a purely advisory agency for coping with the highly unified administration of so many aspects of German life, proposes the establishment of a tripartite administrative board possessing the authority, within the limits of the agreement of the three Governments, to direct the application of approved policies to Germany as a whole. This proposal would limit the duty of the zonal commanders primarily to that of enforcing the administrative regulations of the central tripartite organ.

The American plan, approved by the Department of State and presented to the European Advisory Commission, is general in character. Further clarification as to whether the tripartite agency should be primarily consultative or should constitute a genuine joint administrative authority will be needed.

It is recommended that this Government favor the establishment of a tripartite organization with authority to direct the uniform administration of the whole of Germany.

2. The Delimitation and Allocation of Zones.—It is recommended that, in case three zones of occupation are established, this Government accept the boundaries proposed by the British and Soviet Governments.

This recommendation is made on the grounds that (a) a tripartite governing machinery for the whole of Germany, in which the three powers would be equal partners, would tend to minimize the significance of the exact location of zonal boundary lines, (b) an arrangement which would make each zone contiguous to Berlin is hot feasible because of the location of the capital.

A further problem is presented by the allocation of the zones. The plans hitherto advanced agree in assigning the eastern zone to Soviet command. The British and Soviet proposals assign the northwestern zone to British command and the southern to American control. The President has stated, however, that, because of convenience of access, American troops should control the northwestern zone.

3. Military Government and Subsequent Method of Control.—At the time of post-surrender occupation the victors may either (a) set up a direct military government which would supplant the [Page 66] German political authorities while using more or less fully the administrative machinery, or (b) govern Germany by means of directives to a central political regime.

Although a final decision should be made only after future developments are assessed, it is tentatively recommended that this Government favor the first alternative. Direct military government will probably be necessary because of prospective internal confusion and would, in any case, be an effective means of impressing the totality of defeat on the German mentality. If a quasi-Nazi or military group should be in power at the time of surrender, it would be desirable to have that regime bear the onus of admitting defeat and of executing the orders of the occupation forces, but the procedure would entail the political limitation of dealing with a regime repugnant to the peoples of the victor states. If a group of moderates should gain control of Germany, there might be advantages administratively in working through it. Such a method, however, would have a very heavy disadvantage of exposing the moderates to the charge of being the tools of the allied powers. The moderates would have a better chance of survival in the court of popular German opinion if they came into power as the successors and supplanters of direct military government than as its instrument.

On the assumption of the probability of direct military government, it is further recommended that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency.

The importance of strictly military dispositions will tend to recede when the German forces have been disarmed and order is established under allied military occupation. Progressively from the time of surrender, consequently, the major concern of the victors will be the inauguration of political and economic reforms within Germany looking to the uprooting of National Socialism and the eventual integration of Germany into the organized community of nations. It is believed that these functions are more logically the work of the civilian authorities of the Governments concerned and can more effectively be performed by them. This recommendation does not envisage the termination of military occupation at the time of the transfer of authority to the civilian agency, but merely the subordination of the military to the civilian.

The point at which civilian control should supplant the military cannot be determined now, but it is recommended that in principle the change be made as soon as the maintenance of orderly conditions in Germany is assured.

4. Participation of the Smaller United Nations in the Control of Germany.—The primary military responsibility of the three principal United Nations requires that they make the basic decisions regarding [Page 67] the treatment of Germany in the transitional period and bear the principal burden of enforcing them. At the same time the smaller United Nations in Europe have a vital interest in what is done to Germany as well as in future international organization. Questions therefore have arisen as to their participation in (a) the formulation of surrender terms, (b) the military occupation of Germany, (c) the joint military governmental body, and (d) the proposed civilian control agency.

The first question has been resolved by the offer of the European Advisory Commission to receive their proposals. The others remain unanswered. While it is impossible here to present a comprehensive program for the future, it is recommended that this Government favor the principle of the fullest participation of the smaller United Nations compatible with the major military responsibility of the three Great Powers. Some positive role for the smaller nations, although making decision a more cumbersome process, would help to forestall the formation of a bloc of the lesser states and the appearance of disruptive political maneuvers. It would likewise establish a pattern of cooperation looking forward to international organization.

5. Relation of Machinery for Control of Germany With Machinery for European Reconstruction.—The security political and economic dispositions relating to Germany affect in so many vital respects the general problem of the reconstruction of Europe that the British Government has raised a question as to the advisability of creating some kind of inter-allied body for coordinating policies and actions with respect to Europe as a whole.

Under such a plan an Allied Commission, or a similar body, for control of Germany would report to and receive directives from a European Council or similar body which would coordinate policies relating to Germany with those which affect Europe as a whole. In the absence of such an agency, the various governments and their inter governmental agencies, such as those relating to economic disarmament, collection and allocation of reparation, regulation of property rights, and revival of international trade, may find themselves working at cross purposes. On the other hand, in view of the risk that the operations of such a regional organization might tend to jeopardize the willingness of the various countries to cooperate in the early establishment of a general international organization, this Government has hitherto tended to discourage establishment of such a European body.

6. Security Functions During Occupation.—The following problems, among others, will require immediate action by the occupation authorities:

a. Demobilization of German armed forces.—Immediately upon the acceptance of Germany’s surrender, the allies will be confronted with the problem of dealing with several million German soldiers. The [Page 68] alternative solutions will be (1) demobilization and disbandment carried out as expeditiously as considerations of internal order and in so far as feasible, the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow, (2) a retention of the troops in their formations under some form of direct control, either to be held in restraint for security reasons or used for labor service until such time as their release will be expedient.

It is recommended that this Government favor in principle the first alternative because of the problems of control and maintenance involved in keeping so many troops in confinement. This recommendation would not exclude the use of Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations in performing labor service for the needs of European reconstruction but would oppose the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units.

Further study is to be made of the problem of the employment of forced German labor in reconstruction work outside of Germany.

b. Disarmament and the disposition of surrendered German arms and military equipment.—It is recommended that German arms, am munition and instruments of war be scrapped in so far as they are not wanted for use in the war against Japan or adaptable to peaceful uses.

Total and lasting disarmament of Germany is a formal commitment of the United States Government. Among the proposals for the disposition of German arms, ammunition and implements of war are (1) that they be given to the states overrun by Germany and (2) that they be scrapped in so far as they are not capable of conversion to peaceful purposes. While the first alternative might give Germany’s neighbors a temporary sense of added security, the measure is fraught with dangers. The rearming of European nations with surrendered German war materiel would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries concerned look to Germany for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to international peace and security.

Further study is to be made of the post-surrender disposition of German armaments.

c. Dissolution of military and para-military agencies.—It is recommended that, except for a civil police force adequate to maintain order, the occupation authorities proceed to the immediate dissolution of the army, the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, the administrative agencies performing military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition. All such organizations should be permanently prohibited.

[Page 69]

d. Immediate measures for the control of German war potential.—The essential first steps in the control of German war potential involve (1) the immediate cessation of the manufacture of war materiel and prohibition of resumption except in so far as it may be desired to make a limited use of German industrial capacity in the prosecution of the war against Japan, (2) the establishment of controls over industrial production, importation, and other economic activities, and (3) the dismantling of industrial machinery and plants not convertible to peace-time production or presenting an insuperable security problem. Likewise, the occupation authorities should proceed to the early inauguration of reforms designed to eliminate a policy of German autarky and to integrate Germany into the world economy by increasing its dependence on foreign trade.

C. Political Dispositions

1. Use of German Agencies and Personnel During Military Government.—To the end that civilian life continue as smoothly as possible, it is recommended that the occupation authorities make maximum use of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi control and abuses, and use of non-Nazi civil servants in so far as they are efficient and politically acceptable to the occupation authorities.

2. Treatment of National Socialist Party and Party Members.—The first act in the fulfillment of the commitment to eliminate National Socialism should be the abolition of the Party and the impounding of its assets and records. The numerous affiliated and supervised organizations should be dissolved promptly, although certain social services now performed by them should be transferred to state organs or to newly established voluntary associations.

It is recommended that the occupation authorities impose political and other restrictions on the categories of the more important leaders, both national and local, rather than on the whole membership of the Party. Theoretically the Party has probably more than 5 million members, about 2 million of whom are considered as “leaders”. To impose comprehensive disabilities upon all Party members would involve undertaking an enormous administrative task and giving the same treatment to the active and incorrigible nucleus of leadership as to a great mass of passive, and by then presumably disillusioned, followers. The punishment of war criminals will in itself serve to exclude a certain number of important Nazis. It consequently seems desirable to favor the exclusion from government office and from enjoyment of political rights of certain broad categories of Nazis rather than of all nominal members of the Party. Careful attention [Page 70] will have to be given to the elimination of convinced Nazis and other politically objectionable elements from education, journalism, and from control of industrial and financial enterprises.

3. Political Activity and Association.—Upon the establishment of military government, the uncertainties of the first days will probably require a complete ban on political agitation and on the activities of political associations. Commitments require the lasting suppression of parties assuming the trappings of quasi-military organizations or espousing National Socialist ideals.

It is recommended, however, that as soon as military conditions permit, parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalist ideology be permitted to organize and appeal for support. This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, organization and public debate before they are prepared to decide their future form of government and that there is advantage in beginning these activities while National Socialism is under the immediate impact of defeat.

D. Economic Dispositions

1.
The Prevention of Collapse.—A major concern of the victors at the time of occupation will of necessity be the prevention of an economic collapse or the revival of economic activity if a collapse has already occurred. A memorandum, which has been presented to the Committee on Post-War Programs (PWC–72a),9 has outlined a series of measures which appear essential to that end; they include the maintenance and strengthening of the existing machinery for price and credit control, for distribution of food and other civilian supplies, for the control of labor, for the allocation of raw materials and capital in the interest of maintaining production, and for reviving essential foreign trade.
2.
Exchange Rate.—The rate of the mark for international trans actions will need to be fixed with a view to both economic and political conditions, first consideration being given to stimulating confidence in the value of the currency. A rate which, avoids undervaluation will be desirable in facilitating the best possible support for internal and external commerce.
3.
Reparation.—The problem of reparation has been the subject of a separate report by the Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights (PWC–223, 224, 225, 226).10
4.
Economic Reorganization.—While the immediate economic objective upon occupation is the prevention of collapse, the victor powers can hardly avoid dealing with many of the basic problems of the German economy. Among those problems are: creation of organizations designed to promote the unification of European transport and power and communication facilities; the prohibition or regulation of enduring international agreements between private firms; the breakup of the large landed estates; the reduction of over-concentration of financial and industrial control; the revival of international commerce by the reduction of trade barriers; the eventual development of multilateral trade and elimination of uneconomical enterprises developed under the banner of autarky; finally, the definitive determination of the most effective means for the control of Germany’s economic war potential.

E. Establishment of Permanent Government

The establishment of military government over Germany will give the victors an opportunity to observe the new political conditions which may emerge before making a final decision with respect to a permanent German Government. Certain issues, however, merit consideration at this time.

1. Termination of Allied Government.—It is recommended that this Government favor the policy of terminating direct administration of the German governmental structure, whether by military or civilian agencies, as soon as prospects of order and the possibility of establishing an acceptable and competent German Government make its termination feasible. This recommendation would not affect the continued military occupation of Germany or the exercise of controls, by direct intervention if necessary, on the part of inter-allied agencies.

The duration of direct control, either military or civilian, will depend, among other things, on the continued need for order, on an assessment of the psychological effect of occupation government, and on an estimate of how ready the Germans are to organize a government. It may be anticipated that the major result of military government on German mentality will be achieved within a few months at the most. As they recover from the shock, the people may become progressively resentful over the delay in reviving their political activity, and friction would work to the advantage of the nationalistic elements. It is equally important, however, that the people should not give their decisive votes before an adequate period of public discussion has clarified the issues.

2. Procedures for Restoration of Permanent Government.—There are three general alternatives of procedure: (1) restoration of the pre-Hitler [Page 72] Weimar constitution; (2) the convocation of a new constituent assembly; and (3) progressive extension of self-government from local units through the states to the federal Reich as the success of each step seemed assured. The principle of continuity would be observed by returning to the original Weimar text. Yet that document, while a good rational product, was not an organic part of German life, and it is doubtful if the mass of Germans would wish to go back to it. A new constitution drawn up after a decade of political sterility, however, might not prove a much more effective instrument. Fear has been expressed that an election for a constituent assembly as the first political experience of the German people would revive the old bankrupt political parties and focus all political attention on the central government to the detriment of healthy local and provincial political life. The third alternative, by reviving free local self-government, would provide a transition period in which the German people could develop new leaders and gain experience in democratic practice, central governmental functions being carried on meanwhile by civil servants under allied control.

If there is a period of direct military government, it is recommended that democratic self-government be established in local communities as soon as military necessities permit. Decision as to when the next step should be taken could profitably be made in consultation with responsible local leaders.

3. The Exercise of External Influence.—In fidelity to their commitment to uproot National Socialism, the victor powers will need to intervene in the process of reconstructing government to the extent of denying political rights to those categories of Nazis adjudged dangerous. An attempt positively to influence political decisions of the German people might be successful if the intervention were the joint work of the major powers, but in the course of time [the] habit of intervention, if developed, would probably outlive joint action, and, if so, Germany would become the hunting ground of competing influences and would be able to play off one rival against another, with disastrous consequences for any system of controls and for the peace.

These considerations point to the desirability of limiting positive influence to the encouragement of popular self-government and not attempting to determine precisely the forms of government to be established. At the same time, however, it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared, to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.

[Page 73]
[Attachment 3]

Memorandum by the Division of Central European Affairs 11

secret

Status of Negotiations and Discussions on Germany

negotiations in the e.a.c.

The European Advisory Commission, after six months of discussions, has formally recommended the surrender terms for Germany to the Governments of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The American Government has notified Ambassador Winant of its formal approval of these terms.12 Approval by the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. is expected momentarily.

Attached to the recommendation of the Commission is a letter to the European United Nations inviting their views in writing on the question of the surrender of Germany. To date, we are not informed of what views have been submitted to the Commission.

Before the Commission at present are three other important matters: (a) the protocol on the occupation of Germany, (b) the protocol on the occupation of Austria, and (c) proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany.

With respect to the occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the three zones of occupation have been provisionally agreed upon, but the question of whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern or southern zone is still undecided.13 The President has indicated he desires the American forces to occupy the northwestern zone and my information is to the effect that he is still awaiting Churchill’s agreement on this point. Acting on the authority of the President, Ambassador Winant has agreed to a tripartite occupation of Austria but the protocol on this has not as yet been formally recommended by the EAC.

[Page 74]

With respect to control machinery for Germany, British and American proposals have been before the EAC for some months.14 The American proposal envisages a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanders-in-Chief and advised by a Control Council which would be established on a functional basis (political, economic, military, transport, etc. sections).

Under this proposal the separate American, British and Soviet zonal administrations would retain their identity and operate separately in their respective zones. The policies pursued in the zones would be coordinated by the Control Council in Berlin, which would make recommendations on all policies to be executed throughout Germany.

The British have submitted a somewhat similar proposal, which has likewise been before the EAC for some months. The Russians have not submitted any proposal on control machinery and have recently indicated that they are unwilling to discuss any further questions in the EAC until the dispute between the British and Americans over their respective zones of occupation has been settled.

discussions in washington on treatment of germany

The Department has prepared, and the Committee on Post-War Programs has approved, a basic policy statement entitled “Treatment of Germany”15 to which is attached a summary of policy recommendations.16 This report was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago through the Working Security Committee. The JCS, however, have not as yet made known their approval to this document or the comments thereon.17 It is envisaged that as soon as the JCS have acted on it that it will be submitted to the President and, if he approves, will be transmitted to London for the guidance of Ambassador Winant in his negotiations on the EAC. A similar paper on Austria18 has been approved by the President and transmitted to Ambassador Winant.

In addition to the foregoing, a basic report on economic policy towards Germany and on reparations19 has been prepared in the Department and has been cleared by the Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy. These will be submitted to the Secretary in the near future with a suggestion as to how they should be taken up with the military authorities.

[Page 75]

A vast amount of material has been prepared in the Department on a variety of problems which will arise from the occupation of Germany but it has not yet been approved. These papers cover a variety of subjects, of which a few are set forth below for the purpose of illustration:

  • Abrogation of Nazi Laws
  • Disposition of Nazi Organizations
  • Displaced Persons
  • Control of Political Activities
  • Supervision of Education
  • Use of German Officials in Administration
  • Control of Communications
  • Control of Industry Potential for War
  • Disposition of Merchant Shipping, etc.

The Working Security Committee has now drafted a paper entitled “Statement of General Policies To Be Followed in the Administration of Germany”.20 This report will lay down the general policies to be agreed upon by the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. on most important matters requiring agreement by the three powers for the administration of Germany after occupation. It is based upon the assumption that agreement will be reached on zones of occupation and control machinery.

It is anticipated that this paper will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. If this approval is given, it will be possible for the Department to send to London a vast amount of detailed information respecting the policies to be applied in Germany after occupation.

discussions with the british in London

The British authorities have prepared and submitted to the EAC a number of directives covering policies to be followed in Germany upon occupation. In general, they cover much the same subjects as those which have been prepared in Washington and which are briefly described in the preceding paragraph. On a number of them, our views are not very different from those submitted by the British, but a certain amount of negotiation will no doubt be necessary before complete agreement is reached on all directives submitted by them.

In addition, Ambassador Winant’s Planning Group has likewise drafted a number of directives for consideration by the American authorities. The Working Security Committee is prepared to correlate the various statements that have been prepared as soon as the military members have received authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate under the statement of general policies described above.

[Page 76]

conclusion

The slowness in arriving at agreed policies on the treatment of Germany has resulted primarily from the unwillingness of the Russians to discuss the control machinery proposal until the zones of occupation are definitely decided. Without agreement on control machinery, it is difficult for the Department to make any real progress on the detailed planning. We have attempted through the Ambassador at Moscow to get the Russians to continue discussions, but without success to date.

  1. Printed from an uncertified carbon copy which, however, bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Secretary of State’s Assistant: “Left with the President by the Secretary. J[ames] E B[rown] Jr.
  2. The first two attachments to this memorandum are not filed with the source text. They have been supplied from Lot 55 D 375 and the Notter File, Box 18, respectively.
  3. For the memorandum of transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 22, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 251. For the reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated September 29, 1944 (after the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference), see ibid., p. 343.
  4. The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC–181b) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany, and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.
  5. The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC–143b) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.
  6. For the text of this paper, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D–36/44, August 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 278.
  7. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 167172.
  8. Cf. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 210.
  9. Not printed.
  10. For the text of this report, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D–37/44, August 12, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 287.
  11. This attachment was an abridgement of a memorandum of August 22, 1944 (not printed), from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) and the Secretary of State (740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–2844). The passages of Riddleberger’s memorandum which were omitted from the memorandum forwarded to Roosevelt dealt with differences between the military authorities and officers of the Department of State, particularly with respect to matters before the Working Security Committee.
  12. For the text of the document entitled “Unconditional Surrender of Germany”, signed ad referendum at London, July 25, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 256. Concerning approval of this instrument by the United States, see ibid., p. 265.
  13. For a summary of Anglo-American differences of opinion on this question in the period before the Second Quebec Conference, see an undated memorandum by the Assistant to the President’s Naval Aide (Elsey) printed post, p. 145.
  14. For texts of the United States and British proposals referred to, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 185, 201.
  15. Ante, p. 53.
  16. Ante, p. 49.
  17. See ante, p. 49, fn. 3.
  18. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 438.
  19. See ante, p. 60, fn. 6, and p. 70, fn. 10.
  20. For the revision of this paper dated August 30, 1944, see post, p. 77.