Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Notter File, Box 168: Stettinius Diary

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)¹

restricted

Fifteenth Day, Wednesday, September 6, 1944.

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Conversation With Cadogan

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I asked Cadogan if he had received any further word on the possibility of his being called to Quebec. He said his instructions were to report to the Prime Minister on his arrival. I told him that we would be very disappointed if that occurred as we thought it would be misunderstood everywhere and that if it did turn out that it was necessary for him to go that we hoped Lord Halifax would take over his chair.² (Dunn takes a very serious view of Cadogan deserting the meeting to go to Quebec. He believes the press reaction worldwide would be very unfavorable. Pasvolsky does not think he will leave.)

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Meeting With the President and the Secretary

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I first presented to the President maps and analyses of the climatic conditions and harbor facilities of the [islands of] Flores in the Azores and Niihau in the Hawaiian group.³ The President said he still thought the Azores would be the place. I said, “Well, your island of Flores is fine but has no harbor”. He said, “Ed, you don’t know your poetry”.⁴ The President said he would take these memos and maps to Quebec and discuss them with the Prime Minister.⁵

I then informed the President that we felt that inasmuch as Vice Admiral Willson would be in Quebec and was completely informed on the proposals and the activity thus far at Dumbarton Oaks⁶ that it would be better for him to rely on the Admiral for information if he became involved in discussions on this subject rather than to burden him with memoranda and other documents. He agreed with the proviso that Admiral Willson be supplied with complete papers in case it was necessary for him to refer to them.⁷

I next took up with the President the question of an international air force.⁸ We had some little difficulty in explaining this so that the President completely understood it. But after we had stressed that he had already gone on record against an international police force and [we?] recommended to him that we stick to our guns on this question. He finally agreed. I confirmed our previous discussion about the possibility of a change in the Prime Minister’s position and he said that he would be ready to discuss this with him at Quebec if we found it was necessary for him to do so.⁹1 then asked the President whom we would work through in Quebec, and he said, “I don’t want you to work through anybody; you should call me direct.” I said this was not always practicable; and he said that in such an event to call Admiral Leahy if Hopkins was not going. (He did not go.) I then told him that if the international air force question remained open until after the Churchill arrival in Quebec that this might hold up our proceedings with the Russians …¹⁰

I then told the President of the possibility of Cadogan being called to Quebec. Mr. Hull thought this would be bad and the President felt so strongly about it that he said that if Churchill spoke of having a diplomat come that he would suggest Eden … During this conversation, Mr. Hull got the incorrect impression that the President was talking about Eden taking Cadogan’s place in Washington while Cadogan was in Quebec and objected violently to such a procedure. We of course straightened this out. I suggested that I be authorized to press for Halifax taking Cadogan’s chair if the latter should be called away. Both gave complete approval to this but wished me to make every effort to persuade Cadogan not to leave the meeting. …

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I then raised with the President the importance of his having political advisers with him at meetings such as the forthcoming one at Quebec, in the event that political questions would be discussed. The President agreed that this was sound and important but said the forthcoming meeting would be of a military nature. He did, however, promise to send for Mr. Hull if the discussions took a political turn. I later asked Mr. Hull if he thought I had spoken out of turn and he said no, that it was wonderful.

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1. In the form of a daily record pertaining to Stettinius’ activities during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See ante, p. 22, fn. 1.
2. At the Dumbarton Oaks conversations.
3. In a discussion with Roosevelt on August 28, 1944, with respect to the location of the headquarters of the various organs of the proposed international organization, Stettinius had promised to give Roosevelt maps and information on points in the Azores and the Hawaiian Islands. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 745–746.
4. Roosevelt’s reference was presumably to Tennyson’s poem, The “Revenge”.
5. No indication has been found that this material (not printed) was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.
6. Willson was a member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the United States delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, at which he chaired the meetings of the Special Informal Military Group.
7. As it turned out, Roosevelt did not consult at Quebec the papers which Willson took there with relation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3580), p. 323, fn. 25.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 716, 748–749, 769–770.
9. No indication has been found that this subject was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.
10. For the passage omitted here and for other portions not printed here of Stettinius’ record covering September 6, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 773 ff.