J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff
top secret
C.C.S. 654/2
C.C.S. 654/2
[Washington,] 2 September 1944.
Agenda for the Next United States-British Staff Conference
References: | C.C.S. 654 Series1 |
C.C.S. 6432 | |
C.C.S. 6603 |
- 1.
- The broad headings of the agenda for the next United States-British Staff Conference have already been agreed. A copy is attached, for ease of reference, at Enclosure “A”.
- 2.
- The British Chiefs of Staff now propose that these broad headings
should be elaborated as follows, observing that these suggestions
are of course liable to modification or addition as a result of
developments between now and the start of the Conference:—
- (A)
- War Against Germany.
- (i)
- Progress Reports by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.
- (ii)
- Estimate of the Enemy Situation.
- (iii)
- Development of the Italian Campaign.
- (iv)
- Control of Strategic Bomber Force.
- (v)
- Allocation of Zones of Occupation and Provision of Forces. (In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff are anxious to know what forces the United States Chiefs of Staff are prepared to provide in Europe. They are also anxious to settle the question of the control of German naval bases [Page 31] and the part that air forces will play in the control of Europe.)
- (vi)
- Machinery for inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.
- (B)
- War Against Japan.
- (i)
- Progress Report by Supreme Allied Commander, South east Asia.
- (ii)
- Progress Report of Operations in the Pacific.
- (iii)
- Estimate of Enemy Situation.
- (iv)
- Strategy for the Defeat of Japan. (In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff would also wish to discuss Russian participation in the war against Japan and the possibility of making an approach to the Russians on this subject.)
- (v)
- British Participation in the War Against Japan. (In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff are anxious to carry the discussion to the point where definite operations are approved, in order that preparations can be made. They feel moreover, in the light of such decisions as may be reached, that questions of the system of command and the boundaries between commands may also arise.)
- (C)
- Redeployment of Forces Reoriented From Europe to the War Against Japan.
- 3.
- The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the detailed papers on the relation of resources to plans and the calculations for redeployment after Germany’s defeat should be completed after the Conference ends.
- 4.
- With reference to (A) (i) and (B) (i) above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Supreme Allied Commander, South east Asia of the forthcoming Conference and request brief telegraphic reports by the 9th September of the progress of their operations and of their intentions in the near future. We recommend the despatch of the telegram attached as Enclosure “B” to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
- 5.
- With reference to (A) (ii) and (B) (iii), the estimates of the enemy situation contained in C.C.S. 643 and C.C.S. 660 have been brought up to date by the Combined Intelligence Committee.4
- 6.
- With reference to (B) (iv), the British Chiefs of Staff assume that the United States Chiefs of Staff will open the discussion on strategy for the defeat of Japan and give a report on operations in the Pacific.
- For C.C.S. 654 and C.C.S. 654/1, see post, pp. 218, 219.↩
- “Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East”, August 5, 1944; not printed.↩
- “Prospects of a German Collapse or Surrender”, August 27, 1944; not printed.↩
- See the enclosures to C.C.S. 643/1 and C.C.S. 660/1, post, pp. 267 and 237, respectively.↩
- Exact wording of heading still under consideration. [Footnote in the source text]↩
- Following approval by the United States Chiefs of Staff on September 7, 1944 (see C.C.S. 654/3, post, p. 39), messages closely following this draft were dispatched to Eisenhower as telegram No. Facs 69, to Wilson as telegram No. Fan 406, and to Mountbatten. The message to Eisenhower instructed him specifically to include Operation Pointblank in his report. The texts of the messages as sent were circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 8, 1944, as enclosures A and B to C.C.S. 654/4, not printed.↩