Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Hopkins Papers

The Secretary of State to the President¹

top secret

Washington, September 17, 1944.

Subject: Considerations With Respect to Possible Recognition by Principal Allied Governments of a Provisional Government of France.

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government’s recognition of the de facto French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word “provisional” would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

(1) There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

(2) There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle’s desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

(3) The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower’s staff (Eeber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

(4) It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

(5) Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

(6) Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

(7) General Eisenhower’s headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

(8) Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

(9) A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

(1) The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the de facto French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

(2) The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C[ordell] H[ull]

1. The date of this memorandum suggests that it was prepared with a view to its use in the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations at Hyde Park. It is clear from the covering memorandum quoted below that it was written in ignorance of the existence of the Roosevelt-Churchill minute of September 15, 1944, on the subject of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation (see ante, p. 469). Hull’s memorandum was not transmitted directly to Roosevelt at Hyde Park, but was sent to Hopkins under cover of the following memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews):

   “Dear Harry: I took this up personally with the Secretary and he is in full agreement with the policy recommended in the memorandum. The Secretary has approved its immediate transmission to the President. I leave to your judgment whether to present it to the President now in view of the speed with which events are developing, or whether you think it better for the Secretary to take it up personally with the President upon his return. Without knowing whether the question came up at Quebec, I am inclined to feel the sooner we get moving on this the better. …Very sincerely, Doc.” (Hopkins Papers) This covering memorandum was dated September 18, 1944, and as Hopkins arrived at Hyde Park at noon on that day (see Leahy, p. 263), Hull’s memorandum could not have reached Hopkins before the latter left Washington for Hyde Park. The presence of the ribbon copy of Hull’s memorandum in the Hopkins Papers and a note of September 23, 1944, by Hopkins establish that the Hull memorandum of September 17 did not reach Roosevelt before Churchill’s departure from Hyde Park. Hopkins’ memorandum of September 23 stated: “I talked to Matthews about this. He tells me that the Secretary sent a further note to the President on this same subject and that this memo [Hull’s memorandum of September 17], therefore, need not be delivered.” (Hopkins Papers) For the text of the “further note” referred to, which was dated September 21, and with which Hull enclosed a copy of the memorandum of September 17, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 737–738.