Roosevelt Papers
The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1
Memorandum for the President
Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself,2 I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany.3 There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other [Page 483] memoranda.4 I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory,—this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.
The point of difference is not one of objective,—continued world peace—it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.
If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.
The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims—it would be a crime against civilization itself.
This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the [Page 484] Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.
The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people’s lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.
I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.
The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.
I plead for no “soft” treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its [Page 485] violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.
I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944,5 the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.
Secretary of War
- Concerning the preparation of this memorandum, see Stimson and Bundy, p. 578. Although the paper was prepared during the course of the Second Quebec Conference, it apparently did not reach Roosevelt until the latter had gone to Hyde Park for further conversations with Churchill. See ibid., p. 580.↩
- See ante, p. 144.↩
- Ante, p. 128.↩
- Ante, pp. 123, 127.↩
- Ante, p. 123.↩