740.0011 E.W./9–1244
The Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of
State
top secret
[Quebec,] 12 September 1944.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to
your letter of 9 September regarding Norway,1 it will be noted from
the enclosed copies of messages to General Deane that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have instructed him as indicated in the third
paragraph of your letter.
Sincerely yours,
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A J McFarland
Brigadier General, U.S.A. Secretary
[Enclosure 1—Telegram]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chiefs
of the United States and British Military Missions to the
Soviet Union (Deane and
Burrows), Temporarily at London2
top
secret
[Washington,] 30 August
1944.
Occupation of Norway under Rankin conditions is
subject. (TopSec to Generals
Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return,
repeated to ETOUSA for
British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.)
- 1.
- Combined Chiefs of Staff consider it advisable to open
early military conversations with Soviet General Staff
through you.
- 2.
- You should bear in mind that our object is to re-establish
the legal Norwegian Government in full control as early as
possible after the German withdrawal.
- 3.
- Plans for occupying Norway under Rankin
“B” and “C”
conditions are as follows:
- (1)
- Rankin “B” (Organized German
withdrawal from Norway). To occupy in initial stages
any two of following:
- (a)
- Finnmark (Hammerfest and Kirkenes).
- (b)
- Tromsö or Narvik.
- (c)
- Trondheim.
- Subsequently Stiavanger and Bergen, Christiansand
(S) and Oslo would
be occupied as forces became available.
- (2)
- Rankin “C” (German unconditional
surrender and cessation of organized resistance in
northwest Europe).
- To occupy first southern Norway and then send, if
required, a force with a Norwegian detachment to
eastern Finnmark. Norwegians however, are anxious
for Finnmark to be reoccupied as soon as possible.
It might therefore be desirable to send to Finnmark
area Norwegian warship with some Norwegian troops
immediately after Rankin “C”
conditions arise. SCAEF is being instructed to consider the
possibility of this.
- 4.
- It should be made clear to Soviets that since above plans
for Rankin “B” depend on the method of
German withdrawal they are provisional. Soviets should be
informed that we appreciate that they may already have plans
for following up a German withdrawal through Finnmark. You
should therefore invite Soviets to concert their plans with
ours using the following points as basis:
- (a)
- Necessity for harassing enemy during his
withdrawal;
- (b)
- Advantages of stimulating Norwegian resistance by
sending in Norwegian forces as early as
possible;
- (c)
- Desirability of establishing a naval base in
northern Norway for escorts protecting convoys to
Russia.
- 5.
- You should ask the Soviets if they have any objection to
participation by Norwegian Military Attaché in your
conversations.
[Enclosure 2—Telegram]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chiefs
of the United States and British Military Missions to the
Soviet Union (Deane and
Burrows), Temporarily at London3
top
secret
[Washington,] 30 August
1944.
In connection with our immediately preceding signal, following is
background for your personal information only. (TopSec to Generals Deane and
Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to
ETOUSA for British Chiefs
of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.)
- 1.
- No agreement exists with the Russians acknowledging that
Norway is a British/American sphere of operations. Although
it is to our advantage for the Russians to harass a German
withdrawal as we have insufficient forces to do this
ourselves our long term requirement is to ensure that they
should not permanently occupy Norwegian territory in view of
potential threat to North Atlantic trade routes, Iceland and
the northern approaches to the North Sea. Our purpose must
be therefore to avoid any clash with the Russians in Norway
and yet to safeguard our long term interests.
- 2.
- Combined Chiefs of Staff have no evidence that the
Russians intend to establish themselves in Finnmark but it
is felt that it would be
[Page 401]
desirable to arrange as far as
possible for a joint occupation by Russian, Norwegian and
British forces rather than by a purely Russian force.
Nevertheless, if the Russians enter Norway during the course
of operations against the Germans it is considered
undesirable for us to intervene since a Russian/Norwegian
civil affairs agreement has been concluded which covers this
contingency.4
[Enclosure 3—Telegram]
The Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Chief of the Military Mission in
the Soviet Union (Deane)5
top
secret
[Quebec,] 12 September
1944.
British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is undesirable to postpone
any longer the discussion of the occupation of Norway under
Rankin conditions and the Foreign Office has
sent Ambassador6 a political background to explain to Brinckman.
You should now open conversations outlined in War 89077 of 30
August.7
It is important that you communicate to the Soviets the fact that
the plans for occupying Norway under Rankin were prepared
some time ago, that you may dispel any possible Soviet suspicion
that they have been recently improvised to counter possible
entry of Soviet forces into northern Norway.
