Editorial Note
According to the Log, ante, p. 292, Roosevelt had tea at 5 p.m. with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. No American source has been found on the substance of the discussion. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:1
“Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect,2 and ‘we don’t know much about it.’3 Immediately following this he remarked ‘that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.’ This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.
[Page 368]“The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:
“Hungary. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.
“Russia. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally—although he said a little later that he was ‘untrustworthy’ and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine)—the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power—naturally short of war.
“Poland. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.
“Austria. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature [Page 369] at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)
“Vatican. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Yugoslavia. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very had shape.
“Miscellaneous. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium.—In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands.—Is very angry at Argentina.—Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all.—Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.” (Habsburg Papers)
- The author of the following memorandum, in a letter to the Director of the Historical Office, Department of State, dated April 30, 1971, stated that the question of occupation zones in Austria was also discussed during his meeting with Roosevelt at Quebec. “Here the problem which arose was particularly the question, whether Austria’s occupation should be made in several zones or only in two zones, namely a Russian and an Anglo-American. In this connection I had also talks with Mr. Churchill, who like myself favoured the establishment of a number of zones in Austria due to the fact that it would thus be possible to diminish the Soviet influence with the Central government. President Roosevelt, who at first was more in favour of a temporary occupation in two zones, which he considered as a very short and passing phase, agreed that probably in view of future Austrian independence the solution, of several zones would be better.” (POL 32–3 AUS/4–30–71)↩
- An armistice with Rumania had been signed at Moscow on September 13, 1944 (dated as of September 12). For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712; Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 3, p. 901. The wording of article 19 of the armistice agreement, which related to Transylvania, was a matter of disagreement between the Soviet and Rumanian delegations to the armistice negotiations until the eve of signature. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, p. 232.↩
- Words and phrases printed in italics (except paragraph headings) appeared in English, without emphasis, in the German source text.↩