Editorial Note
According to Morgenthau’s diary entry for September 15, 1944 (see post, p. 369), Leahy told Morgenthau at about 5 p.m. on that date that Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement during the afternoon on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany as between United States and British forces—a matter which had been left undecided in the protocol defining the boundaries of the three zones of occupation in Germany which had been signed at London on September 12 by the representatives on the European Advisory Commission of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (see post, pp. 389–390). Leahy embodied the Roosevelt–Churchill agreement of September 15 in a memorandum which he presented to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff the following morning (see post, p. 373). The Roosevelt–Churchill agreement, as reflected in the Leahy memorandum, (1) assigned the south western zone of occupation in Germany to United States forces and the northwestern zone to British forces; (2) changed the boundary between the two zones by transferring the province of Hessen–Nassau and Oberhessen from the northwestern to the southwestern zone and by transferring an area west of the Rhine comprising Saarland, the Palatinate, and Rheinhessen from the southwestern to the northwestern zone; and (3) provided that United States forces would have access “through the western and northwestern seaports” [Page 366] and rights of passage through the British zone of occupation.1 Although the allocation of sectors in Berlin as between United States and British forces had also been left undecided in the protocol of September 12, no evidence has been found that this question was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the Leahy memorandum on the morning of September 16 to provide specifically for American control of the port of Bremen (see post, p. 373) and presented a revised paper, designated C.C.S. 320/26, to the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff later on that day (see post, p. 375). For the text of the decision on zones of occupation as agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by Roosevelt and Churchill on September 16, see post, p. 476. For a map prepared in Washington after the Second Quebec Conference to accompany the text approved on September 16, see post, facing p. 476.
The Quebec decision, as amended in further American-British negotiations during the autumn of 1944, was introduced in the European Advisory Commission, where a tripartite agreement with the Soviet Union was signed on November 14, 1944, amending the protocol of September 12 in line with the understandings reached by the United [Page 367] States and the United Kingdom. For the text of the agreement of November 14, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 5, part 2, p. 2087.
The following passage from the minutes of a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee on September 15, 1944, indicates that Churchill must have had at least two separate conversations with Roosevelt on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany:
↩“The Prime Minister said that he had discussed with the President the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany between ourselves and the Americans. The President’s main anxiety was to arrange the zones so that the American area was not anywhere in direct contact with French territory and so that the American lines of communication with their zone need not pass through France. The President had roughly outlined his suggestion on a map which the Prime Minister showed to the Chiefs of Staff.
“The British were to have the zone comprising North-Western Germany and a strip stretching right up the right bank of the Rhine. The Americans were to have South-Western Germany extending Northwards roughly to a line due East of Coblenz.
“It was agreed that the President’s proposal was, in principle, acceptable to us. In effect it gave us the North-West zone, as at present proposed, together with the Westmark area and the Province of the Lorraine until this was taken over by the French; and gave the Americans the South-West zone (as at present proposed) together with the Province of Hessen–Nassau. It should be possible to arrange for the lines of communication to the American zone to enter through Amsterdam and Rotterdam and pass down the Rhine. It was, however, quite likely that the Americans would ask for the use, in addition, of one of the German ports. The President’s proposal would require a detailed examination from the administrative point of view, and it might later on be necessary to make some small adjustments in the boundaries.
“The Prime Minister added that the President shared his view that the appointment of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, should terminate with the defeat of Germany.
“It was agreed—
“That the Prime Minister should inform the President that his proposal for the allocation of zones of occupation was accepted by us in principle subject to minor adjustments later to suit administrative requirements.” (PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8–20–71)