Cherwell Papers
Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General (Cherwell)1
Mr Morgenthau said he had been discussing with Lord Cherwell his proposals on the economic disarmament of Germany2 and would like him to give his impressions of these.
Lord Cherwell said he had, of course, not had time to read the papers or study the proposals in detail but he was definitely attracted by the possibilities set forth. So far as he understood it the intention was to hamstring Germany’s capacity for making war by taking whatever machinery was usable from the Ruhr and other areas in which industry capable of making war-like weapons was concentrated, and handing it over to the numerous countries she had devastated. The Ruhr and perhaps the other areas in question would be then placed under an international authority which should decide whether and when and to what degree industries of this type should be allowed to be re-built there. If the Germans were deprived of the possibility of making steel on a large scale as well as certain types of chemicals and electrical machinery, she would not be in a position to produce the armaments required for modern war. She would, of course, not starve. Her exports would be reduced and she might therefore go short of certain materials. But her standard of life would still undoubtedly be higher than it had been under the Nazis—when so much national effort was put into [Page 344] preparations for war—even if she was unable to establish the same high standard she enjoyed for some time before that. The consequence that her export markets would become available for the U.K. and U.S.A. did not seem a disadvantage.
The Prime Minister said that he thought there was a good deal to be said for this approach to the problem. We were entitled to make sure Germany could not commit wanton acts of aggression and the Russians would probably in any case insist on obtaining any machinery available with which to restore the factories which Germany had ruined in her advance into Russia.
Mr Morgenthau said that he could see no other way in which we could be sure of preventing the rearming of Germany. Great productive capacity was necessary for modern war and it could not be built up secretly. The removal of all the machinery and facilities should be undertaken as soon as possible, say, within the first six months of our troops entering the Ruhr. Thereafter this region should be put under international control which would see that it was not exploited again in the way Germany had used it to prepare the wanton acts of aggression she had committed.
The President said that he did not think it would be an undue hardship to require Germany to revert towards an agricultural status such as she had enjoyed up to the latter part of the last century. She had shown she could not be trusted with all these facilities for making weapons.
The Prime Minister said he was converted to the idea that we should explore this line of approach and see whether concrete suggestions could be worked out to ensure security and which it might be hoped would secure the approval of the United Nations.
- When Cherwell discussed this memorandum with Morgenthau on the morning of September 15, 1944 (see post, p. 359), the latter felt that it “went too far in the wrong direction”. According to Morgenthau’s diary entry for September 15, Morgenthau felt that Cherwell’s minutes “presented much too weak a case” and that Churchill could be prevailed upon “to go much further”. Morgenthau and Cherwell, by agreement, therefore, reported that they did not have minutes on the German discussion of September 14 when Churchill asked for them on September 15. See post, p. 361, and Blum, p. 370.↩
- See ante, p. 128.↩