Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

September 14, 1944, 10 a.m.

top secret

1. Approval of the Minutes of the 173d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions of the 173d Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was approved, subject to later minor amendments.²

2. Control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe

(C.C.S. 520/4³)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the directive in C.C.S. 520/4 as amended in C.C.S. 520/5.⁴ (Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 520/6.⁵)

3. British Participation in the Pacific

(C.C.S. 452/26⁶ and 452/27⁷)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were disturbed by the statement of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/27 with regard to British participation in the war against Japan. He realized that this paper had been written before the Plenary session on the previous day. He felt that it did not entirely coincide with the proposal put forward at that conference and accepted by the President. For political reasons it was essential that the British Fleet should take part in the main operations against Japan.

Admiral Leahy asked if Sir Alan Brooke’s point would be met by the elimination of the words, “They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific.” It might be that the British Fleet would be used initially in the Bay of Bengal and thereafter as required by the existing situation.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the main fleet would not be required in the Bay of Bengal since there were already more British forces there than required. He agreed to the deletion proposed by Admiral Leahy.

Admiral King also agreed to the deletion of these words which he felt were not relevant to the general case.

Continuing, Sir Andrew Cunningham asked the U.S. views as to the meaning of the term “balanced forces” in the final sentence of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 452/27. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind a force of some 4 battleships, 5 to 6 large carriers, 20 light fleet carriers and CVE’s and the appropriate number of cruisers and destroyers. This he would regard as a balanced force.

Admiral King stressed that it was essential for these forces to be self-supporting.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that if these forces had their fleet train, they could operate unassisted for several months provided they had the necessary rear bases—probably in Australia. The provision of bases would be a matter for agreement.

Admiral King said that the practicability of employing these forces would be a matter for discussion from time to time.

Admiral Leahy said that he did not feel that the question for discussion was the practicability of employment but rather the matter of where they should be employed from time to time.

Sir Andrew Cunningham referred to the Prime Minister’s statement that he wished the British Fleet to take part in the main operations in the Pacific. Decision with regard to this was necessary since many preliminary preparations had to be made.

Admiral King suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should put forward proposals with regard to the employment of the British Fleet.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British wish was that they should be employed in the Central Pacific.

Admiral King said that at the Plenary meeting no specific reference to the Central Pacific had been made.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the emphasis had been laid on the use of the British Fleet in the main effort against Japan.

Admiral Leahy said that as he saw it the main effort was at present from New Guinea to the Philippines and it would later move to the northward.

Admiral King said that he was in no position now to commit himself as to where the British Fleet could be employed.

Sir Charles Portal reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the original offer made by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/18, paragraph 9,⁸ which read:

“It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty’s Government’s policy, that this fleet should, play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest naval strength is required.”

When the British Chiefs of Staff spoke of the main operations against Japan they did not intend to confine this meaning to Japan itself geographically but meant rather that the fleet should take part in the main operations within the theater of war wherever they might be taking place.

Sir Andrew Cunningham stressed that the British Chiefs of Staff did not wish the British Fleet merely to take part in mopping up operations in areas falling into our hands.

Admiral Leahy said that he felt that the actual operations in which the British Fleet would take part would have to be decided in the future. It might well be that the fleet would be required for the conquest of Singapore, which he would regard as a major operation.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27 referring to the use of a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.

Sir Charles Portal said that the Prime Minister had offered the British Fleet for use in the main operations against Japan. By implication this paragraph accepted a naval task force for the Southwest Pacific, and was therefore contrary to the intention he had expressed.

Admiral King said that it was of course essential to have sufficient forces for the war against Japan. He was not, however, prepared to accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support. In principle he wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific but it would be entirely unacceptable for the British main fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific and thus necessitate withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet.

Sir Charles Portal reminded Admiral King that the Prime Minister had suggested that certain of the newer British capital ships should be substituted for certain of the older U.S. ships.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that as he understood it the Prime Minister and President were in agreement that it was essential for British forces to take a leading part in the main operations against Japan.

Admiral King said that it was not his recollection that the President had agreed to this. He could not accept that a view expressed by the Prime Minister should be regarded as a directive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Charles Portal said that the Prime Minister felt it essential that it should be placed on record that he wished the British Fleet to play a major role in the operations against Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, as he remembered it, the offer was no sooner made than accepted by the President.

Admiral King asked for specific British proposals.

Sir Charles Portal referred once more to the offer made in C.C.S. 452/18 which he had had previously quoted.

Admiral Leahy said that he could see no objection whatever to this proposal. He could not say exactly where the fleet could be employed at this moment but there would be ample opportunity for its use provided it was self-supporting.

Admiral King said that the question of the British proposal for the use [of] the main fleet would have to be referred to the President before it could be accepted.

Admiral Leahy said that if Admiral King saw any objections to this proposal he should take the matter up himself with the President.⁹ It might not be wise to use the term “main fleet.”

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British Fleet had been offered by the Prime Minister and the President had accepted it. He was prepared to agree to the deletion of the word “main” from paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 452/27.

Admiral King said that the Prime Minister had also referred to the use of British air power in the Pacific.

General Arnold said that a definite answer with regard to British air help in the war against Japan could not be given now. The amount which could be absorbed would depend on the development of suitable facilities.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was, of course, impossible to be definite at the moment since the forces available would depend on the length of the war with Germany. What he would ask for was air facilities available in the bases in the Pacific so that the British could play their part. He would put forward a proposal for consideration.

General Marshall said that the best method would be a statement of numbers of aircraft and dates at which they would be available.

General Arnold agreed that this would be preferable.

Referring to paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27, Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this paragraph dealt with the formation of a British Empire task force which was the second alternative put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff if for any reason the support of the British Fleet in the main operations could not be accepted. Since this support had been accepted there would be no British naval forces available for the task force and British land forces could only arrive at a later date. He suggested therefore that this paragraph should be deleted.

Admiral King asked if it was intended to use the British Fleet only in the main operations and to make no contribution to a task force in the Southwest Pacific.

General Marshall said there were certain objections to forming a British Empire task force under General MacArthur’s command at the present time. This had been proposed by General Blarney but if it were carried out between now and February of next year it would cause considerable difficulties from the point of view of land forces since the grouping of formations and the sequence of their movement had already been scheduled in accordance with future operations. The position would be different after March.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that since British land forces would not be available until after Operation Dracula it would be of no particular value to form a British task force now. The British Fleet could of course play a part in operations in the Southwest Pacific if they were required.

Sir Andrew Cunningham confirmed that there would be no objection to the British Fleet working from time to time under General MacArthur’s command.

General Marshall requested that, in order to safeguard his position with regard to the immediate formation of a task force, paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27 be deleted.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed. General MacArthur’s plans had already been made and since no British land contribution could at present be made there was no object in retaining this paragraph.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific.

b. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that this fleet would be balanced and self-supporting.

c. Agreed that the method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific would be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.

d. Took note that in the light of a above, the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw their alternative proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.

e. Invited the Chief of the Air Staff to put forward, for planning purposes, a paper containing an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force would be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

4. Future Operations in Southeast Asia

(C.C.S. 452/28¹⁰ and 452/29¹¹)

(Octagon–in–9¹²)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the situation report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (Octagon–in–9 of 8 September) should be noted.

Admiral Leahy agreed.

Sir Alan Brooke then suggested that before considering the draft directive to Admiral Mountbatten contained in C.C.S. 452/28, he should briefly outline the British views with regard to future operations in Burma. It was the British intention to endeavor to carry out operations aimed at liquidating the Burma commitment as soon as possible. This commitment was a heavy one, particularly with regard to casualties from sickness and the large numbers of men required in view of the long and tenuous lines of communication. For instance, an ordinary division amounted to some 40,000 men, whereas one particular division in Southeast Asia required approximately 90,000. The reconquest of Burma would also eliminate the commitments for the protection of the northeast frontier of India and the air route to China.

With these objects in view, operations against Rangoon had been examined. A seaborne amphibious operation was extremely difficult due to the fact that Rangoon lay some way up a river and the surrounding terrain was extremely marshy. An airborne assault had therefore been considered. By the use of airborne forces it was thought that the airfields to the north of Rangoon could be seized and that formations could then be flown in. These formations would seize the area to the north of Rangoon, then open up the river communications through Rangoon, block the Pegu route and then eliminate the Japanese in Burma by operations both from the south and from the north. If this could be achieved we should be in far better position. Forces could be released from the theater and the protection of India would be simplified.

To sum up, we should eliminate the Burma commitment, secure the air route to China, and possibly at a later date a land route, and obtain jumping-off places for further operations against Bangkok or to the Kra Peninsula and from there to Singapore.

Admiral Mountbatten had prepared a plan. This, however, had entailed removing forces from north Burma, which was felt to be unacceptable. The possibility therefore of obtaining forces from Europe had been examined. It was estimated that a decision to remove these forces would have to be taken by the first of October and that they would include the 6th Airborne Division, the 52nd Division, and the 3rd Division, from northwest Europe and three Indian divisions from Italy. There were certain difficulties with regard to this plan. The Indian troops who had been fighting for five years would have to be taken home and given three weeks’ leave. This would take some time since many of them lived in extremely inaccessible parts of India, entailing in some cases a journey of a month each way to their homes. Further, India’s capacity to absorb personnel was limited and had been estimated at 50,000 a month, though it was believed that this could, in certain instances, be raised to 80,000 a month. If forces were brought to India, it was estimated that two months must elapse between their arrival and the period when they would be ready to start. Every effort was being made to try and cut the time factor in this jig-saw puzzle, but there was no doubt that the moves ought to begin in October if the 15th of March was taken as the date for Operation Dracula. It might be possible to postpone this date until the 1st of April, the limiting factor being the weather conditions in April rendering the airdromes north of Rangoon unserviceable.

Another possibility might be to undertake the operation with fewer forces. However, if the operation was launched and Japanese resistance was extremely strong, we should find ourselves in a difficult position since the nearest reserves would be in northwest Europe or Italy. It was felt therefore that if the operation was to be undertaken it must be undertaken with an adequate margin of strength. Operations in Europe did not permit of reaching a decision at the present time with regard to the removal of the necessary forces, i.e., three divisions from Italy and three divisions from northwest Europe. Further, there was the question of the administrative troops which would be required, particularly signal and movement personnel. These were of the utmost importance to the 21st Army Group and to General Alexander if his army advanced towards the Po. The situation was such therefore that we could not at present gamble by removing these troops. Every effort was being made to reduce the estimated time from the removal of the troops from Europe till the launching of the operation in order that a decision could be postponed and yet the operation be undertaken in the spring. Such a decision with regard to withdrawal of troops from Europe might be possible in a month’s time. There were also the complications of the regulations now being instituted with regard to conditions of service for the war against Japan, the giving of leave before troops who had been fighting for many years were sent to a new theater, and the question of the release of men who had over five years of war service. Every conceivable effort was being made to find the necessary forces to carry out Dracula in the spring. If it were carried out, then Admiral Mountbatten’s advance in the north would be limited, whereas if the operation was postponed till November, he could fight his way much further south.

Sir Charles Portal said that the air transport side of the problem was all-important. At present Admiral Mountbatten had 448 transport aircraft, and required 1200 for the Rangoon operation. Only 190 of the additional 752 required could be found from British sources, and these only from operations in Europe. The remainder would have to be provided by the United States either from Europe or from elsewhere if they were available.

At present Admiral Mountbatten had two combat cargo groups and wished to obtain the third combat cargo group by the 15th of October in order to undertake Operation Capital. Further, he also required the ground echelon of the second group by that date. If Operation Dracula were undertaken, he would require the fourth combat cargo group by mid-January and the ground echelon of the third at the same time.

General Arnold said that even if the fourth combat cargo group were made available to Admiral Mountbatten, he would not have enough aircraft for Operation Dracula, and it would be necessary to divert further air forces to assist him.

Sir Charles Portal said that he noticed in C.C.S. 452/29 that the United States Chiefs of Staff were allocating the fourth combat cargo group to the Southwest Pacific. He asked that if Operation Dracula was approved, the effect of this proposal should be examined.

General Marshall pointed out that this fourth combat cargo group was required for the Philippine operations, but it might be possible to send it back for the peak period of the Dracula operation if the timings fitted. B–24 aircraft might also be used.

Sir Charles Portal said it was hoped by then to have a suitable staging point.

There was general agreement that the provision of the necessary aircraft would depend on the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.

General Arnold said that if hostilities in Europe had terminated, there would be 2200 U.S. transport aircraft which would become available.

Sir Charles Portal said he felt that the ground echelons for these aircraft would probably have to be taken out of Europe by December.

General Arnold felt that the date might be postponed since a large part of the ground echelons could be flown out in the aircraft. The ground echelon for the second combat cargo group was already on its way to Southeast Asia, and the ground echelon for the third combat cargo group could sail as soon as shipping was available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then examined the draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C.C.S. 452/28.

Admiral Leahy put forward certain amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. These included provision in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2a for the opening of land communications with China.

General Marshall said that this was an important factor, and was necessary in order to introduce wheeled transport into China. It might be possible to take the short northern route though this was tortuous and difficult.

General Arnold said that in the last month 23,000 tons of stores had been flown into China but in view of the lack of motor transport certain of these were lying on the airfields and could not be distributed.

Referring to C.C.S. 452/29, Sir Charles Portal asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that the whole feasibility of Operation Dracula was dependent upon the provision of the necessary aircraft and, further, of the possibility of the transfer of the fourth combat cargo group from operations against the Philippines for a short period at the peak load of Operation Dracula.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note of the progress report on operations in the Southeast Asia Command contained in Octagon–in–9.

b. Approved the directive in C.C.S. 452/28 as amended during discussion. (Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 452/30.¹³)

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff were making every effort to overcome the problems involved in moving the necessary resources from Europe for Dracula so that the operation can be carried out before the 1945 monsoon.

d. Recognized that the ability to carry out Operation Dracula would depend very largely on the provision of transport aircraft, and took note:

(1) That the ground echelon of the second combat cargo group was already on its way to the Southeast Asia Command.

(2) That the United States Chiefs of Staff had already assigned the third, combat cargo group to Southeast Asia and that it would go out as soon as shipping was available.

(3) That the possibility of assigning to Southeast Asia Command the fourth combat cargo group and the remaining transport aircraft required would depend on the progress of operations in Europe and in the Pacific, and that, on the whole, the prospects of making the necessary provision seemed good.

5. Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan

(C.C.S. 678¹⁴)

Admiral Leahy said that the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the proposed date for the end of the war against Japan was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff with certain amendments. It was felt that paragraph 1a should be eliminated, since it was hoped that the redeployment of forces against Japan would not take two years. The United States Chiefs of Staff also felt that 18 months was a more appropriate time factor than two years. A further sentence should be added to paragraph 2, to read: “This date will be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.”

General Marshall said that for demobilization purposes the United States Army were using a time factor of one year. This, of course, would not affect the decision with regard to the date of 18 months after the termination of hostilities with Germany for planning for production.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

6. Operations of the Twentieth Air Force

General Arnold made the following statement with regard to operations of the Twentieth Air Force:

“The Twentieth Air Force is designed around and includes all B–29 airplanes.

“The B–29 airplane, which is the basis of the Twentieth Air Force, is a very long range, fast, heavily armed precision day bomber. At maximum combat loading its gross weight is 140,000 pounds at which weight it operates up to 30,000-feet altitudes at a top speed of 370 miles per hour and cruises at 220 miles per hour. During a normal combat mission it burns 450 gallons per hour and at high speed consumes up to 700 gallons per hour. The airplane is operated by a crew of 11 men. A notable feature is the airplane pressurization which results in providing inside pressure equivalent to altitudes of about 8,000 feet when the airplane is actually at 30,000 feet. The most notable feature, however, is probably the central fire control features whereby three centrally located gunners handle, with precision, twelve 50-caliber machine guns and one 20 mm. cannon, all remotely controlled. In spite of its weight, this airplane can be operated from 8500-foot runways at maximum gross loadings and from 7500-foot runways when loaded to 135,000 pounds.

“The Twentieth Air Force operates directly under the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is commanded by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who acts as the executive agent of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in implementing their directive for the employment of very long range bomber forces.

“Theater commanders in which elements of the Twentieth Air Force are based are responsible for logistic support and defense of Twentieth Air Force bases.

“At this time the major units of the Twentieth Air Force are the XX, XXI and XXII Bomber Commands. Each of these Bomber Commands, as a matter of fact, is a complete self-sustaining very long range air force.

“The XX Bomber Command is now based in the Southeast Asia Command in the area just west of Calcutta and operates principally from bases in the vicinity of Chengtu, China, against targets in Japan and Manchuria. It comprises four groups and had in the theater on September 11th, 155 B–29’s, of which 120 are unit equipment aircraft.

“The XXI Bomber Command consists of three wings of four groups each with a total unit equipment strength of 360 B–29 aircraft. Its headquarters, ground echelons and service units, are now moving to the Marianas. All 12 groups will complete their training and move to bases in the Marianas as bases become available.

“The XXII Bomber Command, consisting of two 4-group wings, was activated on August 15th and ground echelons will be available for movement to bases in Formosa or Luzon as quickly as they can be made available. The first air echelons of the XXII Bomber Command will be ready to move in March 1945.

“The logistic requirements of the XX Bomber Command operating out of China were extremely heavy, and provision of the necessary gasoline had presented a major problem. It had, in fact, been necessary to divert some 20 B–29’s to use in the role of tankers; these were now being relieved by B–24 tankers which were now en route.”

General Arnold then outlined with the aid of a map the targets that were being brought within range of B–29’s operating from the various bases either now available or which it was hoped would shortly be available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note with interest of General Arnold’s statement with respect to the Twentieth Air Force.

7. Communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

Admiral King suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should prepare for submission to the President and Prime Minister draft communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek dealing with the broad results of the Conference. This had been done on previous occasions.

It was generally agreed that, with regard to the communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, details of Operation Dracula should not be entered into and that some broad statement should be used to the effect that amphibious operations against Lower Burma would be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Directed the Secretaries to draft suitable messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of Octagon.¹⁵

8. Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to meet at 1030 Friday, 15 September.

2. The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 173d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed ante, p. 320.
3. Post, p. 431.
4. “Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe Following the Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent”, September 14, 1944. This memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff is not printed as such, but the amendments to the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/4 suggested therein can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 520/6, post, p. 432, and the footnotes thereto.
5. Post, p. 432.
6. Post, p. 441.
7. Post, p. 447. See also the discussion of this subject on September 13, 1944, ante, pp. 315, 317–318.
8. Ante, p. 246.
9. No indication has been found that King did in fact take this matter up with Roosevelt. Cf. Cunningham, p. 612.
10. Post, p. 447.
11. Post, p. 452.
12. Ante, p. 258.
13. “Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command”, September 14, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but the text of the revised directive can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 452/28, post, p. 447, and the footnotes thereto.
14. Post, p. 451.
15. For the texts of the messages sent to Stalin and Chiang on September 18, 1944, see post, pp. 478, 479.