Editorial Note
No official memorandum on the discussion at this dinner meeting by one of the participants listed above has been found, but Leahy noted in his diary: “The subjects discussed at dinner were generally international politics, economics and shipping; and the peace terms that should be imposed upon Germany when that country surrenders to the Allies.” (Leahy Diary)
Moran’s diary account is considerably fuller:
“… How to prevent another war with Germany was the only subject of conversation. The Americans were all for drastic action, [Page 325] maintaining that Germany should not be allowed ships or the yards in which to build them; what they needed could be carried in our ships. Morgenthau wanted to close down the Ruhr to help British exports, especially steel. The P.M. was against this. He did not seem happy about all this toughness.
“‘I’m all for disarming Germany,’ he said, ‘but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.’
“I thought he had done when he growled:
“‘I agree with Burke. You cannot indict a whole nation.’
“If the P.M. was vague about what ought to be done with Germany, he was at least quite clear what should not be done. He kept saying:
“‘At any rate, what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals, but don’t carry on the business for years.’
“Morgenthau asked the P.M. how he could prevent Britain starving when her exports had fallen so low that she would be unable to pay for imports. The P.M. had no satisfactory answer. His thoughts seemed to go back to the House of Commons and what he knew of the English people. In five years’ time, when passions would have died down, people, he said, would not stand for repressive measures. He harped on the necessity for disarmament. At that point one of the Americans intervened: he thought that Germany should be made to return to a pastoral state, she ought to have a lower standard of living. During all this wild talk only the P.M. seemed to have his feet on the ground. The President mostly listened; once he remarked that a factory which made steel furniture could be turned overnight to war production.2
“After three hours’ discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the Prime Minister. The Prof.,3 however, sided with the Americans. At last Roosevelt said: ‘Let the Prof, go into our plans with Morgenthau.’” (Moran, pp. 190–191)
On September 20, 1944, Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson that at this dinner meeting Churchill was violently opposed to the policy on Germany which was presented to him. He quoted Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought to Quebec to discuss such a scheme and as stating that it would mean that England would be chained to a dead body, i.e., Germany. See a memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), September 20, 1944, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 134.
Morgenthau, writing of the September 13 dinner meeting three years later, recalled that Churchill had been irascible and vitriolic when, at Roosevelt’s request, Morgenthau had explained the Treasury proposal. Churchill, he said, turned loose “the full flood of his rhetoric, sarcasm and violence”, stating that he looked on the Treasury plan “as he [Page 326] would on chaining himself to a dead German”. Roosevelt, Morgenthau recalled, sat by, saying very little. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., “Our Policy Toward Germany: Morgenthau’s Inside Story”, New York Post, November 28, 1947, p. 18.
The most detailed description of the dinner conversation which has been found was written by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. No source on the meeting (including White’s memorandum itself) states that White was present, and it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, in the period between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
“Though shipping was supposed to have been the subject for discussion the subject of shipping was not mentioned the entire evening except briefly when the question was raised as to the advisability of taking away all of Germany’s shipping.
“The discussion quickly turned to Germany. Churchill (apparently without reference to anything said previously) said something along the line of ‘What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without first discussing them with me? I intend to get into the matter myself.’
“The President said he had asked Secretary Morgenthau to come up for the purpose of discussing Germany and that he (Morgenthau) was to talk to Cherwell the following day.
“Churchill asked: ‘Why don’t we discuss Germany now?’ The President then asked the Secretary to explain the program he had in mind for Germany. The Secretary described that part of the Treasury proposal dealing with the Ruhr,4 Churchill indicated that he was strongly opposed to such a program. Pie said that all that was necessary was to eliminate the production of armament. To do what the Treasury suggested was ‘unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary.’ Churchill didn’t believe that it would be very much of an aid to the United Kingdom even if the United Kingdom did get the steel business that formerly went to Germany.
“Admiral Land, on the other hand, wholly supported Secretary Morgenthau’s proposal, thumping vigorously on the table to emphasize his remark. Admiral Land told the Secretary after the dinner that the President had been talking with him more or less along those lines for a long time but this was the first time that he (Admiral Land) had a chance to say what he felt. He had long been waiting for the opportunity and, encouraged by the Secretary’s statement, he had vigorously expressed himself.
“When the question arose about taking away German ships, Churchill was opposed. Admiral Land said, ‘Why not? It is no more cruel to take away ships than their steel plants.’
“Churchill said at one point: ‘If you [the United States]5 do not do something for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy [Page 327] gold and do business largely within the Empire.’ Lord Cherwell pooh poohed this idea of the Prime Minister’s.
“Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill. Admiral Leahy thought the only way to assure peace in the future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly Russia ‘if she behaves herself to ‘crack down’ on any country which stepped over the boundary line of any other country.
“The President said very little in reply to Churchill’s views. Secretary Morgenthau several times interjected into Churchill’s comments that his program did not recommend that Germany be permitted to starve as seemed to be the implication in Churchill’s remark.
“At another point when discussing the need for an international police air force Churchill said that the United States, United Kingdom and Russia would have to rotate the job ‘as our air people get dirty when they associate with the Russians.’
“At one point in the discussion Churchill said to the President: ‘Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?’
“The conversation then got on to India and stayed on India for about an hour. Churchill talked rather angrily at length about the difficulties the British were confronted with in administering India and on the lack of understanding in the United States about the Indian problem. He spoke of the high birth rate, the high death rate, the ignorance and the carelessness of the Indian people to poverty, disease, etc. Churchill said, ‘I will give the United States half of India to administer and we will take the other half and we will see who does better with each other’s half.’
“However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Teheran had said: ‘Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.’6
“Lord Cherwell seemed to be in sympathy with the Secretary’s point of view. Later when talking it over with him he said that he didn’t think that Churchill at all got the major point the Secretary was trying to make. The Secretary asked him if he didn’t think the real difficulty with Churchill was that he wanted a strong Germany to stand between ‘the white cliffs of Dover’ and Communist Russia. Cherwell agreed that that was it. Lord Leathers of the Shipping Board apparently disagreed with the Secretary’s point of view.
“On leaving, Lord Cherwell said that he expected to talk with the Secretary about lend-lease assistance for the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Secretary told him that he had been asked by the President to come to talk about Germany but after [that?] he would be glad to discuss lend-lease aid the following morning after they had had their conversation about Germany.
“The Secretary had an opportunity to tell the President that he believed the Russians were holding back on their cooperation with the United States because they were suspicious of the American and British attitude toward Germany. Russia feared we and the British were going to try to make a soft peace with Germany and build her [Page 328] up as a possible future counter-weight against Russia. The President replied, ‘You are right, and I want you to read a telegram I just received from Harriman.’ Admiral Leahy later gave the Secretary the telegram which Harriman sent to Harry Hopkins urging the President to call him (Harriman) home to report on the trend in Russia on non-cooperation with the United States.7 (Treasury Files)